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 But let us not forget that in the United States we have been 
blessed with two centuries of secure borders and political stability. 
Not so our European counterparts, who have experienced Nazism 
and other destructive social movements on their own soil. Their 
efforts to control their legacy of extremism should be respected, 
even if their methods are not ours.1 
 In the Netherlands Mein Kampf is outlawed. When it was 
outlawed, the politically correct leftist and liberal parties 
applauded it. My point was that for the same reason and (legal) 
arguments that Mein Kampf was outlawed in the Netherlands, the 
                                                     
 B.A. Columbia University, J.D. New York University School of Law, PhD (political 
science) Johns Hopkins University, Associate Professor, University of St. Thomas School 
of Law. An early version of this paper was presented at the University of St. Thomas 
Faculty Colloquium in February 2012. The author would like to thank Jacqueline 
Baronian, Mitchell Gordon, Robert Delahunty, Robert Vischer, Tom Berg, Virgil Wiebe, 
Joel Nichols, Jerry Organ, David Patton, and Charles Reid for their helpful comments. 
1 Abraham Foxman, Introduction to ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF xiii, xiv (Mariner 
Press 1999) [hereinafter Foxman, Introduction]. 
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Koran could and should be outlawed since both books are full of 
incitement of violence.2 
I 
THE ANTI-FASCIST CONSENSUS 
European hate speech laws rest in part on the idea that Europe’s 
past—in particular its Nazi past—creates a special situation, one that 
justifies restrictions on speech that would otherwise be incompatible 
with a liberal democracy. While this trend is most evident in laws that 
relate directly to the Nazi past (such as those banning denial or 
trivialization of the Holocaust) the issue is broader.3 To take one 
example, there is considerable concern about what will happen in 
Germany (and Europe) when the Bavarian Finance Ministry loses its 
copyright over the German language rights to Mein Kampf.4 With the 
copyright set to expire in 2015, the Finance Ministry has blocked an 
effort by German academics to release an annotated version of the 
book that would, through its comprehensive footnotes, “break the 
peculiar myth which surrounds Mein Kampf.”5 The Finance Ministry 
justified its decision as “preventing the distribution of Nazi ideology” 
and to showing “responsibility and respect for the victims of the 
Holocaust, for whom republication would always represent an affront 
. . . to their suffering.”6 
This is not how Abraham Foxman, National Director of the Anti-
Defamation League, sees it. Foxman, despite having some sympathy 
for the European perspective, wrote an introduction to the Mariner 
Press edition of Mein Kampf appearing in the United States. Foxman 
called on his readers to: “Commit the evil to memory in order to 
                                                     
2 I Have No Regrets: An Interview with Geert Wilders, GEERT WILDERS WEBLOG (Jan. 
22, 2010, 3:48 PM), http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php?option=com_content&task 
=view&id=1642&Itemid=1. 
3 For an overview of the development of Holocaust denial laws in Europe, see Robert 
A. Kahn, Holocaust Denial and Hate Speech, in GENOCIDE DENIALS AND THE LAW 77–
108 (Thomas Hochmann & Ludovic Hennebel eds., 2011). 
4 David Gordon Smith, Should Germany Republish ‘Mein Kampf’?, SPIEGEL ONLINE 
(July 17, 2007, 3:19 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/putting-hitler-back 
-on-the-shelves-should-germany-republish-mein-kampf-a-494891.html. 
5 Id. (quoting Horst Möller of the Institute for Contemporary History). Möller hopes the 
scholarly edition will end “the oft simple-minded speculation about what is actually in the 
book.” Id. 
6 Id. (quoting the statement of ministry spokeswoman Judith Steiner). More recently, 
the Finance Ministry has blocked an effort of a newspaper to reprint lengthy excerpts of 
Mein Kampf. See also David Rising, German State Questions Mein Kampf Publication 
Plan, DESERT NEWS (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700216210 
/German-state-questions-Mein-Kampf-publication-plan.html. 
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reject it; reject the evil, but do not let yourself forget it.”7 In justifying 
the publication of Mein Kampf, Foxman referred to “two centuries of 
secure borders and political stability” in the United States.8 This 
stands in contrast to Europe where, in Faurisson v. France, the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee upheld the French Gayssot 
Act, which bans questioning the existence of the Holocaust, because 
of its potential to facilitate the spread of Nazism and anti-Semitism, 
both of which the court saw as continuing concerns in France.9 
The use of the Nazi past to justify European hate speech laws is not 
a doctrinal necessity. Hate speech laws predated the Holocaust and 
there are other ways of rationalizing them—including as offshoots of 
an earlier European tradition of using law to protect one’s honor.10 In 
fact, one can adopt bright line rules—the clear and present danger 
test, the gravity of the evil test—that, in theory, are at least indifferent 
to the type of “danger” or “evil” on offer.11 For example, the 
Amsterdam trial court, in acquitting Geert Wilders of comparing the 
Quran to Mein Kampf and calling Islam a “fascist” religion, relied on 
the general principle that hate speech and group defamation charges 
cannot rest on insults directed at ideas or objects of religious 
veneration.12 So, clearly, there are other ways of defending (or 
                                                     
7 Foxman, Introduction, supra note 1, at xiv. 
8 Id. 
9 Faurisson v. France, Communication No. 550/1993 U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993, ¶¶ 9.6–9.7 (Nov. 8, 1996). 
10 See James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE 
L.J. 1279 (2000) (describing Germany’s nineteenth century culture of dueling as a source 
of German insult laws). On the other hand, the decision to expand earlier traditions of 
speech restriction to cover speech based on anti-Semitism and racism may well owe 
something to the Nazi experience. See Robert A. Kahn, Cross-Burning, Holocaust Denial, 
& the Development of Hate Speech Law in the United States & Germany, 83 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 163, 184–86 (2006). 
11 For a brief overview of these doctrines, see HARRY KALVEN JR., A WORTHY 
TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 179–89, 195–99 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988). 
For an example of this categorical approach to speech in action consider Flemming Rose, 
culture page editor of the Jyllands Posten, who played a major role in the publication of 
the Danish cartoons. Speaking in Jerusalem after the controversy, Flemming—who has 
become something of a free speech advocate—asked Israel to end its ban of Mein Kampf. 
See Robert A. Kahn, Flemming Rose, the Danish Cartoon Controversy, and the New 
European Freedom of Speech, 40 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 253, 258–65 (2010). 
12 Amsterdam District Court, 23 June, 2011, Public Prosecution # 13/425046-09, at § 
4.3.2. [hereinafter Wilders Verdict] (“Since the suspect addresses the religion and not the 
people (Muslims) with these utterances, it cannot be proven beyond any reasonable doubt 
that he incites to hatred against and/or discrimination of Muslims with these utterances, as 
was charged against him.”) (emphasis in original). For a brief overview of how Wilders’s 
acquittal was seen in Dutch society, see Robert A. Kahn, The Acquittal of Geert Wilders 
and Dutch Political Culture, University of St. Thomas Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
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critiquing) European hate speech laws besides focusing their 
responsiveness to the Nazi past.13 
Yet references to the Nazi past loomed large at the Geert Wilders 
trial. While this owes something to Wilders’s explicit comparison of 
the Quran and Mein Kampf, it also reflects societies—the Netherlands 
and, more generally, Europe—that still view themselves through the 
prism of the Second World War. Thus Wilders was eager to portray 
himself as a participant in the “good war” against Nazism.14 On the 
other side, opponents called Wilders a fascist15 and argued that Dutch 
Muslims were in the same situation as Dutch Jews before the 
Holocaust.16 These references, paradoxically, occurred in a country 
where anti-Semitism remains prevalent in both the native Dutch and 
immigrant communities.17 
Before proceeding, let me offer a caveat. I am not saying 
references to the Nazi past drove the outcome of the trial—Wilders 
was acquitted and the Mein Kampf / Quran comparison was not the 
only charge Wilders faced.18 But the competing claims about Nazism 
and victimhood provide a way to frame the trial, one the participants 
seemed to find compelling. Was Geert Wilders a Nazi in training or 
were Muslim followers of the Quran the true Nazis? And were Dutch 
Muslims like Jews before the Holocaust, or was Israel continuing “the 
good war” the Western Allies waged against Hitler? 
The rest of this essay explores these questions in greater depth. Part 
II looks at the extent to which Wilders fits the model of the typical 
                                                                                                                  
11-31, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1956192 (posted Nov. 8, 
2011). 
13 See Robert Post, Hate Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 123–38 (Ivan 
Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009) (taking a critical view of European hate speech laws); 
Peter R. Teachout, Making “Holocaust Denial” a Crime: Reflections on European Anti-
Negationist Laws from the Perspective of U.S. Constitutional Experience, 30 VT. L. REV. 
655, 688 (2006) (viewing laws against Holocaust denial from the perspective of the First 
Amendment). 
14 See infra notes 51–70 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 71–104 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 105–15 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 32–50 and accompanying text. 
18 Wilders was also prosecuted for saying in an interview that if elected he would 
“[close the] borders, [and allow] no more Islamic people coming to the Netherlands.” 
Wilders Verdict, supra note 12 (describing utterance 11). Other comments targeted 
immigrants and Moroccans. For example, utterance 7 describes Moroccan boys as 
“violent,” while utterance 8 talks about the Netherlands facing a “tsunami” of foreign 
cultures. Id. For a list in English of the charges against Wilders, see Summons of the 
Accused, District Court Office of the Public Prosecutor, Jan. 20, 2010, available at 
http://www.geertwilders.nl/images/PDF/dagvaarding_ENG.pdf [hereinafter Wilders 
Summons]. 
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hate speech defendant. While opponents tried to pin the “fascist” label 
on him, Wilders’s opposition to anti-Semitism (among Europeans as 
well as Muslims) complicated this effort. To put Wilders’s opposition 
to anti-Semitism in context, Part III looks at the complex role Jews 
play in Dutch society—a role that far outstrips the numerical 
importance of the small Dutch Jewish community. 
Part IV looks at how Wilders, when discussing Islam, often makes 
references to the Second World War. In particular, he often represents 
himself as fighting the same struggle as the victorious Western Allied 
armies, especially the Americans. At times he also compares Muslims 
(and their leftist allies) to the defeated Nazi German forces. 
The next two sections turn the tables and look at how his 
opponents describe Wilders. Part V looks at efforts by opponents to 
label Wilders a fascist because of his blunt rhetorical style and his 
attacks on the left and Islam. Part VI turns to an indirect argument: 
even if Wilders is not a fascist, his victims—the Muslims—are like 
Jews before the Holocaust. 
Finally, the Conclusion looks at the implication of the Wilders trial 
for the anti-fascist consensus that helps uphold European hate speech 
laws. With the passage of time, it is tempting to argue that the 
Holocaust has become history and that Europe’s hate speech laws are 
outdated.19 The Wilders trial, however, points in a different 
direction—nearly seventy years after the end of World War II, 
Europeans still find the Nazi past (and hate speech laws) relevant. 
II 
GEERT WILDERS: A TYPICAL HATE SPEECH DEFENDANT? 
Geert Wilders, leader of the anti-immigrant Party for Political 
Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid—PVV), faced hate speech charges 
for comments targeting Muslims and Islam.20 While many of these 
comments directly invoked the Nazi era—as, for example, when 
Wilders said “walk in the street and see where this ends” and “a 
conflict is going on and we have to defend ourselves”21—other counts 
were different. For example, in a 2007 article that ran in De 
Volkskrant, a center-left Amsterdam-based paper, Wilders called for a 
ban of the Quran, which he called a “fascist” book and an “Islamic 
                                                     
19 Peter Teachout makes this argument. See Teachout supra note 13, at 688–92. 
20 For an overview of the Wilders trial and how the acquittal was received in Dutch 
society, see Kahn, supra note 12, at 2–4. 
21 Wilders Verdict, supra note 12, at § 4.3.2. The court found that these comments 
reached “the border of what is accepted pursuant to criminal law.” Id. 
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Mein Kampf.”22 In his film Fitna, Wilders shows video clips in which 
Muslims are saying “God Bless Hitler” and “[b]e prepared for the real 
Holocaust.”23 
Wilders’s comments, and the decision to prosecute them, raise an 
interesting question—who was the real fascist? Was it Wilders who, 
as the leader of a right-wing anti-immigrant party was often seen as 
following in the footsteps of Jean-Marie Le Pen and Jorg Haider, to 
say nothing of the “original Nazis?”24 This was certainly how Henk 
Bovekerk saw it. Bovekerk was a college student who received a “10” 
(the highest score possible) for an undergraduate thesis concluding 
that Wilders was a “fascist” and the PVV a “fascist” party.25 Nor was 
he alone. Job Cohen, former Amsterdam mayor (2001–10) and 
current leader of the Dutch Labor Party (Partij van de Arbeid—PvdA) 
has compared the situation of Dutch Muslims to Jews in the 1930s, a 
comparison that carries weight given that two of Cohen’s 
grandparents died in the Holocaust.26 
At the same time, however, Wilders uses anti-fascist rhetoric 
against his Islamic foes. In explaining why the Quran, like Mein 
Kampf, should be banned, Wilders says that the former “should never, 
absolutely never, be used as a source of inspiration or an excuse for 
                                                     
22 Geert Wilders, Enough is Enough: Ban the Koran, GEERT WILDERS WEBLOG (Aug. 
10, 2007, 10:04 PM), http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php?option=com_content&task 
=view&id=1117. 
23 Wilders Summons, supra note 18 (describing Fitna). 
24 In France, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s anti-immigrant National Front party rose to 
prominence in the 1980s. Since then Le Pen has repeatedly “let the mask drop” by 
referring to the Holocaust as “a point of detail in . . . history” and noting that the name of a 
center-right Jewish minister rhymed with crematoria. See Jonathan Marcus, THE 
NATIONAL FRONT & FRENCH POLITICS: THE RESISTIBLE RISE OF JEAN-MARIE LE PEN 
125–29 (1995). Likewise, in Austria Joerg Haider, who rose to prominence in the 1980s as 
the head of the Freedom Party, commented that the Third Reich had “an orderly 
employment policy” and that the Nazi SS should be honored. See Profile: Controversy 
and Joerg Haider, BBC NEWS (Feb. 29, 2000, 3:56 GMT), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe /464260.stm. For more on Haider, see THE HAIDER 
PHENOMENON IN AUSTRIA (Ruth Wodak & Anton Pelinka eds., 2002). 
25 Henk Bovekerk, Prototypical Fascism in Contemporary Dutch Politics (Fall 2011) 
(unpublished B.A. Thesis, Tilburg University, available at http://universonline.nl/wp         
-content/uploads/2012/01/BA-Thesis-Henk-Bovekerk.pdf). The high marks led to an 
outpouring of criticism. See Student Krijgt 10 voor Scriptie Over “Fascistische PVV,” DE 
VOLKSKRANT, Jan. 6, 2012; Jan Dirk Snel, Tien voor Scriptie Over PVV Schaadt 
Universiteit, DE VOLKSKRANT, Jan. 11, 2012. 
26 Cohen: Moslims Worden Buitengesloten, Zoals Joden in de Jaren Dertig, VRIJ 
NEDERLAND, Dec. 15, 2010. Cohen, whose paternal grandparents perished at Bergen-
Belsen, spoke about how the current situation was similar to the exclusion of Jews his 
mother witnessed during the Nazi occupation of the country. Id.; Russell Shorto, The 
Integrationist, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY MAG., May 28, 2010, at MM24. 
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violence”27—a message on one level quite similar to the Bavarian 
Finance Ministries’ justification of its ban on Mein Kampf. In his 
email interview with Human Rights Service, Wilders made the same 
argument: “both books are full of incitement of violence.”28 While 
one can argue that the very act of comparing the Quran and Mein 
Kampf itself had Nazi overtones,29 Wilders’s framing of nonviolence 
makes it harder to place him with right-wing extremists who see 
violence as acceptable and Mein Kampf as a source of inspiration.30 
But Wilders goes further. In a September 2011 speech in Berlin he 
said that Germany needed a right-wing party “not tainted by ties to 
neo-Nazis and by anti-Semitism,” adding that the cause of the war 
was not Germany, but “national-socialism.”31 In January 2012 he 
supported the unsuccessful call on the Dutch government to issue a 
formal apology for its “passivity” during the Holocaust.32 These 
statements would appear to separate Wilders from the kind of person 
the hate speech laws are supposed to protect against. 
                                                     
27 Wilders, supra note 22. 
28 Wilders, supra note 2. 
29 See Liz Fekete, The Muslim Conspiracy Theory and the Oslo Massacre, 53 RACE & 
CLASS 30, 36 (2011) (comparing Fitna to Joseph Goebbels’ film The Eternal Jew in the 
way both send “subliminal messages” about the other “through the juxtaposition of 
images”). 
30 Compare Wilders to Anders Breivik, who killed seventy-seven people in Norway to 
defend against a Muslim conspiracy. Breivik cited Geert Wilders 30 times in a manifesto 
justifying the killings. Id. at 32. Wilders took great pains to disassociate himself from 
Breivik after the event, stating that “we must never use violence” and that “Islam can be 
successfully fought with democratic means.” Geert Wilders, Speech in Berlin (Sept. 3, 
2011) (available at http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/component/content/article/87      
-news/1764-speech-geert-wilders-in-berlin-3-september-2011-english-version. This, 
however, did not upset Breivik who saw Wilders’s comments as “expected” and motivated 
primarily by Wilders’s need, as a politician, to protect his reputation. See Fekete, supra 
note 29, at 32. 
31 Wilders, supra note 30. 
32 The issue came to a head in January 2012. One of the charges involved the failure of 
Queen Wilhelmina or the Dutch government in exile to speak out about the Holocaust. 
According to Els Borst, former deputy prime minister and member of the left-liberal D66 
party, the Queen “hardly concerned herself with the persecution of the Jews” and the 
prime minister did not believe the Jews were “real Dutchmen.” Will Holland Finally 
Apologize for Passivity in the Holocaust?, ISRAEL NATIONAL NEWS (Jan. 5, 2012), 
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/151452#.UCuF09Ce7ZQ. 
According to the Dutch News, Wilders was “scathing” in his remarks about the passivity 
of Queen Wilhelmina’s government. Dutch State: Sorry, We’re Not Apologizing, 
DUTCHNEWS.NL (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.dutchnews.nl/features/2012/01/dutch_state 
_sorry_were_not_apo.php. 
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III 
THE SYMBOLIC ROLE OF JEWS AND THE HOLOCAUST IN DUTCH 
SOCIETY 
This brings us to the interesting role Jews and Israel play in 
Wilders’s discourse. One of the strange effects of the Holocaust has 
been to make the symbolic role of the Jews in postwar European 
societies increase, even as the absolute numbers decline. Protecting 
against anti-Semitism is a major reason for hate speech laws. For 
example, in 1979 the German Federal Supreme Court, in ruling that a 
Holocaust denial case could be brought under Germany’s laws against 
insult, held that the defendant’s estimate that only 2,000,000 Jews 
were killed in the Holocaust was a “direct attack” on the “self-
conception” of Jews living in Germany.33 The well being of German 
Jews, in turn, helped reassure Germans they were following their 
moral obligations arising out of the Holocaust.34 
A similar situation exists in the Netherlands where the large 
number of Jews who perished (74% of the prewar Jewish population, 
the highest percentage in Western Europe),35 the use of the Dutch 
civil service to prepare lists of Jews to deport36 and the willingness of 
many Dutch to “accommodate” the Nazi occupier led, by the 1960s 
and 70s, to considerable feelings of guilt.37 At the same time, 
however, a large minority of Dutch (31%) think Jews talk too much 
about the Holocaust, and a majority (53%) would find a Jewish prime 
minister unacceptable (even though Job Cohen was the Labor Party 
candidate for prime minister in 2003).38 To quote Manfred 
                                                     
33 See ROBERT A. KAHN, HOLOCAUST DENIAL AND THE LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 18 (2004) (describing the ruling). 
34 Id. 
35 Manfred Gerstenfeld, Anti-Semitism and Hypocrisy in Dutch Society, JERUSALEM 
CENTER FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS (July 2004), http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-22.htm. 
36 BOB MOORE, VICTIMS AND SURVIVORS: THE NAZI PERSECUTION OF THE JEWS IN 
THE NETHERLANDS, 1940–1945, at 194–99 (1997) (describing role of Dutch civil service 
in the Holocaust). 
37 For a good overview of the Holocaust in the Netherlands, see id. For a discussion of 
the playing out of the Holocaust in postwar Dutch society, see F.C. Brasz, After the 
Second World War: From “Jewish Church” to Cultural Minority, in THE HISTORY OF THE 
JEWS IN THE NETHERLANDS 336, 385–91 (J.C.H. Blom, R.G. Fuks-Mansfeld & I. Schöffer 
eds., Arnold J. Pomerans & Erica Pomerans trans., Litman Library of Jewish Civilization 
2002) (describing the extent of guilt feelings). According to Brasz, sentiments about the 
registration led many to sabotage the 1971 Dutch census after which further censuses were 
discontinued. Id. at 387. 
38 Manfred Gerstenfeld, Symbolic and Other Roles of Jews in Dutch Society, 
JERUSALEM CENTER FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS (Dec. 23, 2008), available at http://jcpa.org 
/article/symbolic-and-other-roles-of-jews-in-dutch-society/. 
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Gerstenfeld, a Holocaust survivor who grew up in the Netherlands, 
went into hiding, and is now one of the driving forces behind the 
request for an official apology: “Dead Jews and their past indeed 
often play a more important role in The Netherlands than the 
living.”39 
There have also been incidents of anti-Semitism. The newspaper 
Trouw last year left an anonymous comment on its website blaming 
Jews for the rise of Hitler.40 Another set of anti-Semitic incidents 
involve young immigrants, especially Moroccans—some of which 
have led to violence against “visible” Jews (i.e., those wearing 
religious clothing).41 Finally there are a number of Holocaust related 
anti-Semitic slogans used by soccer fans.42 These are directed at fans 
of the Ajax Amsterdam soccer team, who refer to themselves as “the 
Jews.”43 These slogans have been picked up and embellished by 
Moroccan and Turkish rappers, who also use “the Jew” as a symbol 
of “hegemonic Dutch society.”44 
There have been a variety of responses to the upsurge in anti-
Semitism. On the one hand, the government has used “decoy Jews” to 
catch potential wrongdoers.45 Others have been less supportive. For 
                                                     
39 Id. A similar logic led the Anne Frank House Museum to refuse a screening of an 
award winning film about Anne Frank’s time in the concentration camps. The Museum 
director based her objection on the following argument (according to the director of the 
film): “Anne Frank is a symbol. Symbols should not be shown dying in a concentration 
camp.” Id. 
40 See Tundra Tabloids, Dutch Christian Daily Allows Anti-Semitic Tropes in its 
Comments, VLAD TEPES (Oct. 11, 2011), http://vladtepesblog.com/?p=38875. 
41 See Gerstenfeld, supra note 35, at 5–6. 
42 One of the main chants goes “Hamas, Hamas, Jews to the Gas.” Wim Dohrenbusch, 
Anti-Semitic Incidents Spark Public Debate in the Netherlands, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Apr. 
23, 2011), available at http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,15023408,00.html. 
43 Consequently, many of the fans and players who use the chant deny its anti-Semitic 
content. For example, Lex Immers, a midfielder for the ADO Den Haag team who was 
banned for five games for using the chant, explained that “[he] didn’t mean it the way they 
think,” explaining “the Jews” is a nickname for Ajax Amsterdam. Id. The problem of 
offensive slogans is not limited to the Netherlands or the postwar context. See Sarah Lyall, 
Taking on Soccer Violence, One Derogatory Chant at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2012, 
at D1 (describing Scottish football slogans that refer back to seventeenth century events). 
44 See Remco Ensel, The Sound of Anti-Semitism in Dutch Society 8 (Sept. 2010) 
(unpublished draft presented at the Conference on Ethnic Relations, Racism and Anti-
Semitism at Queen’s University Belfast) (available at http://www.dutchantisemitism 
.nl/Content/Dutchantisemitism/The%20Sound%20of%20Antisemitism.pdf). On the other 
hand, some rappers have rejected anti-Semitic appeals. According to Ali B., a well-known 
rapper: “The Prophet Muhammad, by the way, has reproved of what these tough 
youngsters do. When you believe in Allah you would never shout ‘cancerous Jews.’” Id. 
45 Aliyah Shahid, An Unorthodox Approach: Dutch Use Decoy Jews to Stop Crime and 
Anti-Semitic Attacks in Amsterdam, DAILY NEWS (Jun. 23, 2010), http://articles.nydaily 
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instance, Fritz Bolkestein, notable for his 1991 call for a public 
critique of multiculturalism, has now called on “sensible Jews” to 
consider emigrating to Israel or the United States because “they have 
no future in the Netherlands.”46 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Wilders takes issue with Bolkestein. It is 
not the Jews, but violent Muslims, who should leave the 
Netherlands.47 Protection of Jews is a theme of his speeches, 
especially those given in the United States. In Nashville, Tennessee, 
Wilders spoke about how “Jews are no longer safe on our streets. In 
Amsterdam, the city of Anne Frank.”48 At the Four Seasons Hotel in 
New York, just after he learned he would stand trial for hate speech, 
Wilders complained of a Dutch “elite” that had “lost its decency” by 
financing or participating in demonstrations where “settlers” shout 
“Death to the Jews.”49 “Seventy years after Auschwitz,” he continued, 
“they know of no shame.”50 
Paul Sars, Dean of the Humanities Faculty at the University of 
Nijmegen, was also outraged at Bolkestein’s remarks but questioned 
Wilders’s motives: “He is against Islam . . . By taking this stance, he 
can say that [he] is pro-Israel and against . . . [e]verything that’s alien 
to the Netherlands.”51 But Wilders’s stance gets him something else 
as well. By opposing Bolkestein, who was once his mentor, Wilders 
reinforces his image as a defender of Dutch Jews—not just against 
Muslims, but also against Dutch anti-Semitism and passivity. This 
reinforces his worldview in which Dutch elites are unable to solve the 
nation’s problems, be they Nazi occupation or Islamic immigration. 
This, as well, makes Wilders an atypical hate speech defendant. 
                                                                                                                  
news.com/2010-06-23/news/27068034_1_anti-semitic-attacks-jews-decoy. The program, 
which has been successful, was the suggestion of a Moroccan born member of parliament. 
Id. 
46 Dohrenbusch, supra note 42. 
47 Id. 
48 Geert Wilders, Speech in Nashville, Tennessee, (May 12, 2011) (available at 
http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/in-english-mainmenu-98/in-the-press-mainmenu      
-101/77-in-the-press/1750-a-warning-to-america-speech-geert-wilders-cornerstone-church 
-nashville-12-may-2011). 
49 Geert Wilders, Speech at the Four Seasons Hotel, New York, (Feb. 23, 2009) 
(available at http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/component/content/article/87-news 
/1535-speech-geert-wilders-new-york-four-seasons-monday-feb-23-2009). 
50 Id. 
51 Dohrenbusch, supra note 42. 
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IV 
FIGHTING IN “THE GOOD WAR” 
There is a second way Wilders uses the past to build sympathy for 
his position. He often makes references to the Western Allies during 
Second World War, especially to the Americans. In this way, he 
shows himself as fighting alongside the Americans in “the good war” 
against Hitler and the Nazis.52 
Some of the references relate to Israel, where Wilders lived for two 
years as a teenager.53 On a grand historical level, these comparisons 
are not hard to follow. To the extent one views Islam as the next 
totalitarian movement, and Israel as a “frontline” state, it is not hard 
to see the Israelis fighting to protect “the West” from Islamic 
encroachment.54 But Wilders’s references to the Second World War 
are much more specific. For example, at an October 2009 speech at 
Columbia University, he compared young men and women defending 
Israel to “those brave American soldiers who landed in Sicily in 1943 
and stormed the Normandy beaches in 1944.”55 
Nor is this an isolated instance. Speaking again in New York City, 
this time on the ninth anniversary of 9/11, Wilders invoked the words 
of Ronald Reagan forty years after the D-Day landings: “We will 
always remember. We will always be proud. We will always be 
                                                     
52 The idea of referring to the Second World War as “the good war” comes in part from 
Studs Terkel’s oral history of Americans in the war. STUDS TERKEL, “THE GOOD WAR”: 
AN ORAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR TWO (1984). TOM BROKAW, THE GREATEST 
GENERATION (1998) similarly portrays American involvement in the war in a positive 
light. Not everyone shares the views of Brokaw and Terkel. See Ashley Smith, World War 
II: The Good War?, 10 INT’L SOCIALIST REV. (2000), available at http://www 
.isreview.org/issues/10/good_war.shtml (arguing that if one looks seriously the “good 
war” myth, the United States has nothing to boast about). 
53 For a brief overview of Wilders’s childhood and teenage years, see Christopher 
Dickey, Geert Wilders Says There’s No Such Thing as Moderate Islam, THE DAILY BEAST 
(Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/01/15/geert-wilders-says   
-there-s-no-such-thing-as-moderate-islam.html. 
54 For example, Tom A. Trento, founder of “The United West” has issued a call to 
“[s]tand with Israel” to “[p]rotect [f]reedom and [d]emocracy . . . [i]n America, [i]n Israel, 
and throughout Western Civilization.” Tom Trento, Stand With Israel – Protect Freedom 
and Democracy (May 23, 2011), http://theunitedwest.org/activism-alert/proclamation/. 
The group was formed by national security professionals “to change the ground game on 
how America protects liberty and freedom . . . from Shariah Islam.” Id. 
55 Geert Wilders, Speech at Columbia University, New York, (Oct. 21, 2009), 
(available at http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/component/content/article/87-news 
/1604-speech-geert-wilders-mp—columbia-university-new-york-october-21-2009) 
(quoting Ronald Reagan). 
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prepared, so that we may always be free.”56 Speaking to a Nashville, 
Tennessee audience in May 2011, Wilders noted that “[m]any 
American soldiers, including many young Tennesseans, played a 
decisive role in the liberation of the Netherlands from [N]azi 
tyranny,” and, speaking on behalf of the Dutch people, expressed 
thanks.57 
Now one might be tempted to dismiss these references as an 
attempt to please American audiences or, in the Nashville speech, as 
simple politeness. This is harder to do with Wilders’s remarks at the 
Four Seasons Hotel in 2009, in which he made an extended 
comparison between American forces during the Battle of the Bulge 
and the fight against Islam. It is worth quoting Wilders at length: 
Late December 1944 the American army was suddenly faced with a 
last-ditch effort by the Germans. In the Ardennes, in the Battle of 
the Bulge, Hitler and his national-socialists fought for their last 
chance. And they were very successful. Americans faced defeat, 
and death. 
In the darkest of winter, in the freezing cold, in a lonely forest with 
snow and ice as even fiercer enemies than the Nazi war machine 
itself, the American army was told to surrender. That might be their 
only chance to survive.  But General McAuliffe thought otherwise. 
He gave the Germans a short message. This message contained just 
four letters. Four letters only, but never in the history of freedom 
was a desire for liberty and perseverance in the face of evil 
expressed more eloquently than in that message. It spelled N-U-T-
S. “Nuts.” 
My friends, the national-socialists got the message. Because it left 
no room for interpretation! 
I suggest we walk in the tradition of giants like General McAuliffe 
and the American soldiers who fought and died for the freedom of 
my country and for a secular and democratic Europe, and we tell the 
enemies of freedom just that. NUTS! Because that’s all there is to 
it. No explanations. No beating around the bush. No caveats. 
Our enemies should know: we will never apologize for being free 
men, we will never bow for the combined forces of Mecca and the 
left. And we will never surrender.58 
                                                     
56 Geert Wilders, New York City Speech (Sept. 11, 2010) (available at 
http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/component/content/article/80-geertwildersnl/1712    
-nyc-speech-geert-wilders). 
57 Geert Wilders, A Warning to America—Speech at Cornerstone Church, Nashville, 
Tennessee (May 12, 2011) (available at http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/in-english    
-mainmenu-98/in-the-press-mainmenu-101/77-in-the-press/1750-a-warning-to-america       
-speech-geert-wilders-cornerstone-church-nashville-12-may-2011). 
58 Wilders, supra note 49. 
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The passage is noteworthy for several reasons. First, the wealth of 
detail about a World War II battle given in a speech about Islam is 
impressive.59 Wilders knows how to exaggerate to tell a good story. 
While the 1944 Ardennes offensive has been called Hitler’s last 
chance, and the 101st Airborne division was surrounded at Bastogne, 
it was only that unit, and not the entire American army, that was faced 
with “defeat and death.”60 
Second, Wilders picked a battle that has played a major role in 
American popular culture, as films like Battle of the Bulge (1965) and 
Patton (1970) attest. In choosing to focus on General McAuliffe’s 
rejection of the German surrender offer, Wilders selected an iconic 
memory from the Second World War.61 
Third, the way Wilders lionizes General McAuliffe helps to 
distinguish Wilders from traditional figures of the extreme right who 
seek to rehabilitate Hitler and the Nazis.62 This, in turn, makes it 
harder to cast him as a typical hate speech defendant. Fourth, Wilders 
used the brevity of McAuliffe’s response—“Nuts!”63—to undercut his 
cultural relativist foes64 who seek “explanations” and “caveats” when 
it comes to responding to the Islamic threat. Like McAuliffe, Wilders 
is a man of action. Finally, the passage directly links the German 
forces in the Ardennes to “Mecca” and “the left.” In taking this step, 
Wilders goes beyond his earlier passages, in which he identifies 
                                                     
59 Wilders’s self-identification with the victorious American forces also distinguishes 
him from other far-right supporters of Israel. For example, Filip Dewinter, head of the 
Vlaams Belang party in Belgium, combines his support of Israel with visits to the graves 
of Nazi soldiers and the use of the SS oath to open a 2001 speech. See, e.g., Robert 
Mackey, Support for Israel’s Settlements From Europe’s Right, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 
2010, 7:01 PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/22/support-for-israels                
-settlements-from-europes-right/. 
60 For a brief overview, see Donna Miles, Battle of the Bulge Remembered 60 Years 
Later, U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE (Dec. 14, 2004), 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=24591. 
61 Miles in her review referred to McAuliffe’s response as “now famous.” Id. 
62 It also distinguishes Wilders from former Senator Joe McCarthy, who first appeared 
on the national stage in connection with another part of the Battle of the Bulge story. 
McCarthy argued on behalf of the German SS troops who massacred captured American 
soldiers in the Belgian town of Malmedy on December 22, 1944. See ROBERT GRIFFITH, 
THE POLITICS OF FEAR: JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY AND THE SENATE 20–26 (1970). 
63 Apparently, when McAuliffe originally received the surrender order, he told a fellow 
soldier “Us surrender? Aw, nuts!” After a while, he realized some response was necessary 
at which point the soldier suggested McAuliffe use his original response. See “NUTS!” 
Revisited; An Interview with Lt. General Harry W. O. Kinnard, THE DROP ZONE, 
http://www.thedropzone.org/europe/Bulge/kinnard.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2012). 
64 Earlier in the speech, Wilders talked about “the surrender ideology of cultural 
relativism.” Wilders, supra note 49. 
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himself as the victorious Allies, and now compares his foes to the 
vanquished National Socialists. 
A final reference to “the good war” concerns one specific way 
Wilders justifies his comparison of the Quran with Mein Kampf. He 
notes that Winston Churchill, who in the 1930s advocated standing up 
to Hitler, made the same comparison. For example, in his 2009 
Columbia University speech, Wilders said that “the great Winston 
Churchill was fully right when he, in his book The Second World 
War, called Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf the new Koran of faith and 
war.”65 
It is worth noting that, as a factual matter, Wilders’s invocation of 
Churchill is subject to question. Churchill was referring to the Quran 
to call attention to Mein Kampf.66 Wilders is using a different 
understanding of Mein Kampf—one shaped by the Holocaust—to 
tarnish the Quran.67 Furthermore, Churchill—like Wilders—has very 
little to say about the comparison itself, aside from noting the “turgid, 
verbose [and] shapeless” nature of the prose in each book.68 This 
suggests a larger problem with the Quran / Mein Kampf comparison 
(and with the use of the term “Islamofascism” more generally): it is 
hard to compare “an 800 page monologue exposing Hitler’s insane 
worldview”69 to the founding text of a major world religion.70 
                                                     
65 Wilders, supra note 55. 
66 See WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THE GATHERING STORM 
50 (Mariner Books, 1986). In a page long description of Mein Kampf, the only reference to 
the Quran is in the “faith and war” sentence. Id. 
67 Churchill does have other negative comments about Muslims, which Wilders has 
used in other places. For example, in a speech entitled, “My message to Muslims,” 
explaining how he became anti-Islam, Wilders quoted Churchill’s description of the 
“fearful fatalistic apathy” of Muslims and his (Churchill’s) conclusion about the Quran 
that “No stronger retrograde force exists in the world.” Geert Wilders, My Message to 
Muslims, MUSLIMS DEBATE (Jul. 19, 2010), http://www.muslimsdebate.com/search 
_result.php?news_id=4399. The Churchill reference appears to be from 2 WINSTON 
SPENCER CHURCHILL, THE RIVER WAR: AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE RECONQUEST 
OF THE SOUDAN 247 (1899). The book describes the British campaign against the Madhist 
revolution in the Sudan. 
68 CHURCHILL, supra note 66, at 50. 
69 The comment comes from Wolfgang Benz, director of the Center for Antisemitism 
Research at the Technical University of Berlin, who was arguing against releasing a 
version of Mein Kampf with commentary. Smith, supra note 4. 
70 For a criticism of Islamofascism along these lines, see Gabrielle Marranci, A Wolf in 
Sheep’s Clothing: The Neologism ‘Islamofascism,’ 8–13, in Thinking Thru’ Islamophobia 
Symposium (May 2008), available at http://independent.academia.edu/YahyaBirt/Papers 
/742095/Governing_Muslims_after_9_11. Marranci, an Italian anthropologist, argues that 
fascism—unlike radical Islam—is characterized by “a nationalist movement, based on the 
strong leadership of a Dux” and “an autarkic and protectionist view of economy, and is 
very suspicious of any form of religion.” Id. at 9. She does, however, find an element of 
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On the other hand, just as Churchill was an early opponent of 
Hitler, Wilders can cast himself as an early opponent of Islam. This 
fits well with Wilders’s references to the Normandy beaches, the 
Battle of the Bulge, his support for Israel, and his call for the Dutch to 
re-examine their passivity during the Holocaust. Each of these 
references associates Wilders with the “good guys” in World War II. 
This positioning, in turn, not only makes it easier to lump Islam and 
national-socialism together, it makes it harder for Wilders’s political 
opponents to cast him as a right-wing extremist in the mold of Jean-
Marie Le Pen or Jorg Haider.71 
V 
PERHAPS WILDERS IS A FASCIST AFTER ALL 
And yet they do. As we have seen, Henk Bovekerk, a Dutch 
college student, received a “10” for a thesis stating that Wilders is a 
fascist. He is not alone. Bovekerk’s thesis relies heavily on a 
pamphlet titled, The Eternal Return of Fascism, a pamphlet Dutch 
philosopher Rob Riemen wrote and distributed to all members of the 
Dutch parliament in 2010.72 Riemen writes: 
What you can clearly see with Wilders is the cultivation of feelings 
of unease and fear in society. Societal unease is blamed on a single 
scapegoat: Muslims. He is also an authoritarian, charismatic leader 
who has little time for democracy. As with the fascists in the 1930s, 
                                                                                                                  
pre-fascist rhetoric in the tendency of neoconservative proponents of the Islamofascism 
concept to speak of “Civilization,” “Intellectual enemies,” and “real Truths.” Id. at 10. 
71 One interesting aspect of Wilders’s speeches about Islam is the absence of references 
to Soviet Communism, a comparison often made by proponents of the Islam = fascism 
position. For example, Andrew Bostom, in a 2010 blog post about Wilders, invokes a 
1954 article from Bernard Lewis that spoke of the similarities between Islam and Soviet-
style totalitarianism. See Andrew Bostom, Geert Wilders, Bernard Lewis, Free Speech, 
and Totalitarian Islam, ANDREWBOSTOM.ORG (Oct. 17, 2010), 
http://www.andrewbostom.org /blog/2010/10/17/geert-wilders-bernard-lewis-free-speech-
and-totalitarian-islam/. This also distinguishes Wilders from Flemming Rose, who in 
describing his views about Muslims draws on his experiences as a journalist in the Soviet 
Union. See Kahn, supra note 12, at 258–60. The difference here may relate to the 
historical experiences of the Netherlands and Denmark. While Denmark was a frontline 
state during the Cold War, the Netherlands was somewhat insulated from Cold War 
tensions. Conversely, the Nazi occupation was much harsher in the Netherlands than in 
Denmark. 
72 Bovekerk, supra note 25, at 5–6. For more on Riemen, see Michel Hoebink, 
“Wilders is a Fascist,” RADIO NETHERLANDS WORLDWIDE (Nov. 8, 2010, 6:19 PM), 
http://www.rnw.nl/english/article/wilders-a-fascist. Riemen is founder of the Nexus 
Institute, which has invited speakers such as Jürgen Habermas and Francis Fukuyama. 
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the Freedom Party is more a movement than a party and Wilders 
avoids all debate with his opponents outside of parliament.73 
In response, historian and former Member of Parliament for the 
center-right Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor 
Vrijheid en Democratie–VVD) Arend-Jan Boekestijn called the 
comparison a “conversation killer” noting that it would “cast doubts 
on the motives of one and a half million Wilders voters.”74 He added 
that “[f]ascism is a serious accusation” which involves “glorification 
of violence, political dictatorship and—in the German variety—
racism.”75 
Boekestijn does a great job of highlighting the stakes of an 
accusation of fascism.76 A fascist supports violence, is a potential 
dictator, and supports “German” racism. Wilders, who sides with the 
Americans in the Battle of the Bulge, opposes the Quran for its 
violence and opposes Dutch passivity during the Nazi occupation 
seems fairly insulated from this charge. And yet the charge persists. 
The question is why. To explore this, a look at recent Dutch history 
is helpful. In 1995 Hans Janmaat was tried, and convicted of hate 
speech charges. His offense was to say “we shall abolish the 
multicultural society as soon as we get a chance and get in power.”77 
A 2008 op-ed piece in the NRC, a Dutch newspaper, looking back on 
the Janmaat trial from the perspective of Wilders, called Janmaat’s 
comments “almost polite” and said that the prosecution was now seen 
as unwarranted.78 Yet the same author also pointed out that Janmaat 
was “an extreme right-wing member of parliament with an anti-
immigrant message,”79—qualities that before the rise of Pym Fortuyn 
and Geert Wilders were outside the anti-fascist consensus. 
A brief description of Janmaat and his Centre Democrat party may 
explain why. In addition to imposing curbs on immigration, Janmaat 
sought to restrict cabinet positions to Dutch nationals, a category for 
                                                     
73 Hoebink, supra note 72 (quoting Riemen). 
74 Id. (quoting Boekestijn). 
75 Id. 
76 There are other arguments about Wilders’s potential fascism that do not involve 
World War II. For example, a writer from a socialist perspective argued against the 
comparison given the PVVs lack of a “street presence”—a key part of earlier fascist 
movements. See Maina van der Zwan, Geert Wilders and the Rise of the New Radical 
Right, 131 INT’L SOCIALISM (June 28, 2011), available at http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=743. 
77 See Processen als die Tegen Wilders: Zij Werden Wél Veroordeeld, VOLKSKRANT 
(Neth.) (June 23, 2011) (describing prosecution of Janmaat). 
78 Folkert Jensma, Freedom of Expression or Freedom to Insult?, NRC.NL (Mar. 27, 
2008), http://vorige.nrc.nl/article1886350.ece. 
79 Id. 
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him that excluded Jews.80 This led to a perception that the Centre 
Democrats were a rightwing extremist party and led to a variety of 
actions being taken against them, including a concerted effort by 
mainstream parties to prevent the Centre Democrats from achieving 
parliamentary representation.81 This was not unusual—the electoral 
successes of right-wing extremists, such as Jean-Marie Le Pen and 
Jorg Haider met with a similar response.82 In a Europe traumatized by 
the Second World War, Nazi occupation, and the Holocaust, there 
was great effort placed on avoiding the type of elite toleration of 
right-wing extremists that scholars like Robert O. Paxton saw as 
easing Hitler’s path to power.83 As a result, politicians in Europe (and 
the Netherlands) were suspicious of parties that appear to follow in 
Hitler’s footsteps. 
While Janmaat seemed to fall in this category, applying this label 
to Wilders poses a much greater challenge. And yet a number of 
people made just that argument. For example, Jérôme Jamin, who 
studies politics and philosophy at the University of Liege, described 
Wilders as part of a “new” right-wing extremism in which racist 
appeals play a more covert role.84 This new images is well suited to a 
country like the Netherlands, which views itself as “open” and 
“tolerant.”85 But any change on Wilders’s part, says Jamin, is 
superficial—while the words and faces have changed, the need to 
identify an “other” as an enemy has not.86 
The desire to unmask Wilders as a “fascist” can lead to interesting 
results. For example, Bovekerk describes one of the qualifying 
aspects of fascism as an emphasis on “the gut rather than the brain,” 
                                                     
80 Guide to the Main Political Parties, NIS NEWS BULLETIN, (May 3, 1994), available 
at http://www.nisnews.nl/dossiers/immigration/030594_54.htm. 
81 Hans Janmaat (1934–2002), HISTORIEK.NET (Neth.) (Jan. 17, 2008), http://historiek 
.net/overige/personen/personen-algemeen/214?tmpl=_print&print=1&page=. 
82 See Cas Muddle, Conclusion: Defending Democracy and the Extreme Right, in 
WESTERN DEMOCRACIES AND THE NEW EXTREME RIGHT CHALLENGE 193, 194–95 
(Roger Eatwell & Cas Muddle eds., 2004) (describing efforts of French and Austrian 
mainstream parties to keep the National Front and Freedom Party out of power). 
83 Bovekerk, who relies heavily on ROBERT O. PAXTON, THE ANATOMY OF FASCISM 
(2004), makes this argument. See Bovekerk, supra note 25, at 25 (citing PAXTON, at 96–
97). Whether this argument is historically accurate—there are many competing 
explanations for Hitler’s rise to power (Versailles, the Great Depression, etc.)—matters 
less than its continuing hold on postwar European elites. 
84 Jérôme Jamin, Vieilles Pratiques, Nouveaux Visages: Geert Wilders et l’Extrȇme 
Droite en Europe, 55 VACARME 43–45 (2011). 
85 Id. at 43. 
86 Id. at 45. 
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an idea he takes from Paxton’s The Anatomy of Fascism.87 To show 
that Wilders satisfies this standard, Bovekerk relates how a journalist 
who infiltrated Wilders’s media operation was told not to “go too 
deep into the material” and not to discuss “nuance” with “outsiders” 
lest “[e]verybody . . . fall asleep,” starting with journalists.88 Another 
article, while not directly calling Wilders a fascist, noted his tendency 
to use short, direct sentences that lack clauses that attribute meaning 
away from the author of the sentence.89 
Bovekerk has other arguments, however, that carry more weight—
even if some of them apply better to Wilders’s supporters than to 
Wilders himself. For example, he argues that fascist leaders and 
parties have a tendency to “discredit” the left, the way fascist parties 
did during the interwar years.90 In making the argument with regard to 
the PVV, Bovekerk relies on De Schijn-Élite van de Valse Munters 
[The Fake Elite of the Counterfeiters] a book written by Martin 
Bosma, a PVV member who argues that the real lesson of the Second 
World War was not the racism, authority, or hostility of the Nazi 
state. Rather, it was, to use Bovekerk’s summary, that 
“[e]conomically, Hitler was a socialist and therefore a Left-winger.”91 
Bovekerk also quotes J.J. De Ruiter, who describes Bosma’s world 
view in similar words: “The current Left is the heir of Hitler and his 
band, and of the guilt of many of the deaths of World War II.”92 
While none of these comments are attributable to Wilders, he 
speaks of the “combined forces of Mecca and the left” as enemies in 
his Four Seasons speech where he took up the Battle of the Bulge.93 
Moreover, the Hitler = Socialist formula takes on a revisionist, neo-
Nazi cast to the extent that it shifts responsibility for Hitler’s crimes 
away from the National Socialists.94 This may be one reason why, 
despite his support for Israel, Dutch Jewry, and an apology for Dutch 
                                                     
87 Bovekerk, supra note 25, at 48. 
88 Id. at 48-49. 
89 Maarten Van Leeuwen, “Clear vs. “Woolly” Language Use in Political Speeches: 
The Case of the Controversial Dutch Politician Geert Wilders (2009), available at 
http://www.pala.ac.uk/resources/proceedings/2009/vanleeuwen2009.pdf. Van Leeuwen 
calls Wilders a “controversial” politician who addresses his audiences with “radical 
standpoints” that break through “political etiquettes.” Id. at 1, 2. 
90 Bovekerk, supra note 25, at 41. 
91 Id. at 47. 
92 Id. at 46 (quoting De Ruiter). 
93 Wilders, supra note 49. 
94 In this regard, Bosma’s arguments bear some resemblance to efforts the far right to 
deny the Holocaust and restrict Hitler’s involvement in it in order to undermine any 
“taboo” on anti-Semitism the Holocaust may have created. 
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passivity during the Holocaust, Wilders’s anti-fascist bona fides are 
still suspect.95 
Bovekerk’s final argument is that fascists have an “us versus them” 
view of the world.96 According to Bovekerk, Wilders distinguishes 
between “good, tolerant and democratic Holland” and “bad, intolerant 
and undemocratic Islam.”97 To that end, Wilders favors preventative 
detention of Muslims who threaten the state, closing the border to 
“non-western immigrants (Turks and Moroccans)” for five years, a 
ban on the construction of mosques, and a replacement of the ban in 
the Dutch constitution on religious discrimination with a statement 
that “[C]hristian/[J]ewish/humanistic culture should remain dominant 
in the Netherlands.”98 According to Bovekerk, these “exclusionary 
policies towards the ‘alien and the impure’” show how the PVV, 
“driven by nationalism and racism, divides the world along 
Manichean lines.”99 This characteristic, along with Wilders’s 
discrediting of the left and his penchant for speaking to the gut, 
qualifies Wilders, at least for Bovekerk, as a prototypical fascist.100 
But hidden in Bovekerk’s language there is a caveat. By 
“prototypical,” Bovekerk means “early stage.”101 In fact, in defending 
his thesis that Wilders is a “fascist” he is careful to explain that one 
should not expect him to act like Mussolini or Hitler; this only comes 
much later, if at all.102 It also turns out that, for Bovekerk at least, 
“[f]ascism exists at the level of Stage One [i.e. prototypical Fascism] 
within all democratic countries,” a concession that weakens his 
conclusion.103 What is more, there are other, rather critical ways of 
                                                     
95 The clash between the competing images of Wilders—participant in the Good War 
against Nazi Germany or potential fascist—came to a head following a visit by Wilders to 
Monschau, Germany, a town on the northern shoulder of the Battle of the Bulge. The 
mayor, citing Wilders’s right-wing populism, asked that he not return. Wilders Niet Meer 
Welkom in Monschau, DE TELEGRAAF (Neth.) (Mar 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/6295972/__Wilders_niet_meer_welkom_in_Monscha
u__.html. In response, Diana West wrote a letter to the mayor saying that her father visited 
the town in 1944 as part of the 102nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron where, like 
Wilders today, he fought to preserve liberty against “supremacist totalitarianism.” Letter 
from Diana West to Margareta Ritter, Mayor of Monschau (Mar. 16, 2010) (available at 
http://www.dianawest.net/Home/tabid/36/EntryId/1319/Dear-Mayor-of-Monschau.aspx). 
96 Bovekerk, supra note 25, at 31. 
97 Id. at 32. 
98 Id. at 32–33, 36–37 (quoting Wilders). 
99 Id. at 40. 
100 Id. at 59. 
101 Id. at 26. 
102 Id. at 19.  
103 Id. at 27. 
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viewing Wilders that do not rely on fascism. For instance, John 
Bowen makes the argument that Wilders’s anti-Islamic arguments—
especially those about toleration of gays and women’s rights—reflect 
how not too long ago “most Dutch people held religious views about 
homosexuality and women’s rights that were not too different from 
those now ascribed to Muslims by their opponents.”104 According to 
Bowen, Wilders—and others like him—are using the Muslim migrant 
as a space in which to work out their own heritage.105 One might 
argue with some force that the Dutch opponents of Wilders do much 
the same when they debate about whether or not he is a fascist. 
VI 
LIKE JEWS IN THE 1930S 
But there is a second, more telling parallel to the Nazi past. Are 
Muslims the new Jews? As we have seen, this comparison was made 
by Labor Party leader Job Cohen, who put an emphasis on the 
“singling out” process.106 Interestingly, he made this statement despite 
being well aware, as former mayor of Amsterdam, of the anti-
Semitism of some Muslim youth.107 Manfred Gerstenfeld, who has 
written at length about Muslim anti-Semitism, also gives credence to 
the comparison. He relates how Liesbeth van der Horst, director of 
the Resistance Museum in Amsterdam has to comfort Moroccan 
children who visit the museum and conclude: “The Jews were a group 
that stood apart in Dutch society and were deported. We are today a 
separate group so that could happen to us.”108 To hammer home the 
point, Gerstenfeld asks: if “[s]upposedly well-integrated Jews, those 
who resemble other Dutchmen so closely that they are often hardly 
recognizable as Jews, are not seen as authentic Dutch by many 
Dutchmen . . . what can Muslims expect regarding their integration 
into Dutch society?”109 
                                                     
104 John R. Bowen, Europeans Against Multiculturalism: Political Attacks Misread 
History, Target Muslims, and May Win Votes, BOS. REV. (July-Aug. 2011), http://boston 
review.net/BR36.4/john_r_bowen_european_multiculturalism_islam.php. 
105 Id. 
106 Cohen, supra note 26. 
107 For example, as mayor of Amsterdam Cohen had to determine what slogans could 
be allowed at a pro-Palestinian rally. Cohen accepted “anti-Israel slogans, but not anti-
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Jews. Id. 
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From this perspective, Arend-Jan Boekestijn’s explanation that 
more than a million and a half Dutch voted for Wilders is less 
reassuring. To the contrary, it reinforces the concern that the anti-
Muslim measures Wilders endorses have a fair measure of public 
support. The argument is further reinforced by public opinion surveys 
registering the fear of Wilders in the Muslim community. For 
example, Wilders’s weblog contains an article from the English 
language website of NRC Handelsblad, entitled “Half of Dutch 
Muslims wants [sic] to leave because of Wilders.”110 The article 
reports that 57% of Dutch Moroccans and Turks feel less comfortable 
given the growing popularity of the PVV, 75% thought Wilders had 
intensified negative feelings against Muslims, while nine in ten 
thought a Wilders government would be a “fiasco.”111 Moreover, the 
same survey that found only 53% of Dutch citizens would accept a 
Jew as prime minister, was even worse for Muslims—only 27% 
would accept a Muslim prime minister.112 
When one views the Nazi past not through Wilders’s status as a 
fascist, but from the perspective of Muslims as potential victims, the 
case for prosecuting Wilders becomes clearer. If the 75% of the 
survey were correct in thinking that Wilders “intensified negative 
feelings” against them, and this could be traced to specific comments 
Wilders made, then one has the basis of a hate speech prosecution.113 
The prosecution would rest on the power of Wilders’s comments to 
inspire acts of hate and discriminatory violence. The charges would 
not depend on whether Wilders satisfied Henk Bovekerk’s (or Robert 
Paxton’s) criteria for fascism. Nor could Wilders escape the charges 
by pointing to his support of Jews, his opposition to Muslim anti-
Semitism, or his appreciation of the acts of valor for the Western 
Allied soldiers in World War II. 
To a large extent, this is how the prosecution unfolded. Most of the 
charges against Wilders involved statements about immigration, street 
crime, and other subjects that—unlike the Mein Kampf / Quran 
comparison—did not directly invoke the Nazi past. And, as noted 
above, the court that ultimately acquitted Wilders had the most 
                                                     
110 Half of Dutch Muslims wants to leave because of Wilders, RADIO NETHERLANDS 
WORLDWIDE (June 30, 2009), available at http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php?option 
=com_content&task=view&id=1590. 
111 Id. 
112 Gerstenfeld, supra note 38. 
113 The threat is even greater given that Wilders posted an article about the polling data 
on his weblog, in effect sending the message that he is glad Muslims are scared. 
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trouble with his call to Dutch citizens to confront Muslims in the 
streets.114 (On the other hand, the Amsterdam Appeals court—which 
authorized the charges in 2009—placed great emphasis on Wilders’s 
use of the Mein Kampf and fascist labels. It mentioned “Mein 
Kampf,” “fascist,” or “Nazi” over 30 times in its opinion—although 
most of these references were not substantive).115 
And yet the prosecution of Wilders still took place in the shadows 
of the Holocaust. One of the legacies of the Holocaust is a heightened 
sensitivity to the power of words to cause harm. Small things that 
would not otherwise attract attention do so if they involve the Nazi 
past. For example, last winter a number of branches of the British 
bookstore Waterstones placed stickers on Mein Kampf, describing it 
as “the perfect Christmas present.”116 After complaints and newspaper 
coverage, the bookstore apologized. Likewise, the Amsterdam trial 
court’s conclusion that Wilders’s call to confront Muslims in the 
streets was at the border of the acceptable might reflect a sensitivity 
to the special status of Dutch Muslims in a society that has yet to fully 
work out its own issues with the Holocaust. 
CONCLUSION: THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF THE NAZI PAST 
The debate over “fascism” at the Wilders’s trial raises an 
additional, more general question, one about the discourse over 
European hate speech laws in the United States, home of the First 
Amendment. At first, this would seem to be a match made in heaven. 
Wilders himself has called for a First Amendment for Europe.117 In 
addition, proponents of free speech libertarianism, such as Robert 
Post, tend to downplay the role of Europe’s Nazi past in explaining 
the persistence of hate speech laws there. For example, in a recent 
book chapter, Post traces Europe’s hate speech laws to a number of 
factors, including “European habits of deference to political 
                                                     
114 Wilders Verdict, supra note 12, § 4.3.2. 
115 In reading the opinion one gets the sense that the judges were shocked by the 
comparison—which may be why, when the court turned to its analysis of the case it 
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authority,” but does not make direct reference to the Holocaust or the 
Nazi occupation.118 He adds that Holocaust denial bans are not only 
“problematic” but also “rare.”119 Treating such laws as rare is part of a 
larger strategy of placing European hate speech laws in a broader 
context, one that makes them seem unreasonable.120 
Peter Teachout, writing about Holocaust denial, takes a slightly 
different tack. He concedes that “[d]uring the period immediately 
following the War . . . there was real and important urgency in 
establishing once and for all that civilization would never again 
tolerate what had been done in the name of Aryan superiority.”121 
Now, however, more than sixty years after World War II, there have 
been “profound changes,”122 ones that make anti-denial laws less 
urgent. These include greater documentation of the Holocaust, the use 
of the European Union to bind Germany into a web of connections 
that make the re-emergence of the Nazi past inconceivable, and 
greater Holocaust education.123 This leads Teachout to wonder if anti-
denial laws “have not become anachronistic.”124 
Whatever one thinks of Post and Teachout’s views of hate speech 
laws from a normative perspective,125 they underestimate the extent to 
which the Nazi era, including the Holocaust, plays in European 
understanding of hate speech laws. Laws against Holocaust denial are 
not rare in Europe—to the contrary a number of European countries 
have such laws, and for a while Europe-wide bans were seriously 
                                                     
118 See POST, supra note 13, at 137. 
119 Id. at 127. 
120 For instance, Post’s analysis of hate speech laws refers to the first English 
translation of Machiavelli’s The Prince (which contained an admonition to avoid stirring 
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considered.126 And while Teachout is free to call the need for anti-
denial laws “anachronistic,” the laws themselves came into existence 
relatively recently. For example, the French Gayssot Act was passed 
in 1990, a time when—according to Teachout—concerns about the 
Holocaust should have been in decline.127 
The repeated references to the “fascists,” Mein Kampf, and the 
situation of the Jews in the 1930s at the Wilders trial suggest that 
fears about the Holocaust and the Nazi past, far from being 
“anachronistic,” are alive and well in postwar Europe nearly seventy 
years after V-E day.128 This does not mean one has to approve of this 
state of affairs129—one might, from a libertarian perspective, bemoan 
the impact that the events of the 1930s and 1940s have had on 
European hate speech law. In his book about Holocaust-related trials, 
Lawrence Douglas has questioned whether law is capable of speaking 
“adequately on behalf of humanity’s most traumatic histories.”130 One 
can ask the same question about speech regulation. Is a post-
Holocaust Europe ready for a First Amendment? Or is the anti-fascist 
consensus behind hate speech laws a sign of how the Holocaust has 
left a continuing rupture in the fabric of European society?131 
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130 LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW & HISTORY IN 
THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST 261 (2001). 
131 Perhaps the strongest evidence for a continuing rupture—one related to hate speech 
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praising defendant Günter Deckert—whom he had just found guilty of racial incitement by 
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Regardless of how one answers these questions, the questions 
themselves attest to the continuing influence of the Nazi past on 
debates in Europe over banning hate speech. Perhaps Europeans 
should try to move beyond the past, or—to use Teachout’s words—
perhaps “[i]t is time [for Europe] to trust again in democracy.”132 One 
might even agree with Teachout and Post that laws against Holocaust 
denial should be “rare.” Indeed, the rancor and confusion caused by 
the competing charges of fascism at the Wilders trial may well cause 
someone to long for a time when the Nazi era ceases to loom as large 
over European public life. 
But the time has not yet come. In 2012, Europeans are still dealing 
with the Holocaust. This year has already seen Manfred Gerstenfeld’s 
call for a Dutch apology for passivity during the Holocaust.133 In 
addition, a Dutch filmmaker is currently standing trial for filming a 
former Dutch Nazi in a German nursing home.134 Meanwhile, a 
German prosecutor is seeking prison for an 89-year-old man accused 
of war crimes in the Netherlands.135 Perhaps it will take another 
generation—one in which the last victims, perpetrators, or bystanders 
have passed away—to move to a genuinely post-Holocaust 
perspective on hate speech law. 
This may happen one day. But doubts remain, in part because of 
how the Nazi past (and especially the Holocaust) has become part of a 
broader discourse about the rejection of “racial and religious 
bigotry.”136 Here, Khaled Abou El Fadl’s essay on Geert Wilders—
written while El Fadl was in the Netherlands as a visiting professor—
is enlightening. El Fadl begins by discussing the rise of Geert 
Wilders.137 He notes that Islam bashing has become a “lucrative 
                                                                                                                  
denying the Holocaust—for raising questions about “Jewish pretensions about the 
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Wilders.137 He notes that Islam bashing has become a “lucrative 
industry”138 and asks whether Wilders realized that he and his 
supporters were “marching down the same path of every other fanatic 
who used fear and hate to demonize millions of people.”139 El Fadl 
refers to the Bosnian Genocide, the Serbian rape camps, and the 
Armenian Genocide,140 before concluding his article by describing 
how in the 1930s an “extreme and puritanical nationalism” led to the 
Holocaust.141 
Like Cohen and Gerstenfeld,142 El Fadl traces a connection 
between a history of European anti-Semitism culminating in the 
Holocaust and current anti-Muslim sentiment. In doing this, all three 
authors help bridge a divide between those who argue that anti-
Semitism and the Holocaust belong solely to history and those who 
argue that European Muslims—in part because of their lack of 
understanding of the Holocaust—are contributing to a new wave of 
anti-Semitism.143 The example of Jewish and Muslim writers 
accepting this comparison suggests that even if one argues that 
Islamophobia has replaced anti-Semitism as the primary expression of 
European xenophobia, the experience of the Nazi past will still inform 
Europeans’ understanding of racism and hate speech regulation.144 
In the meantime, sweeping the past under the rug in the name of a 
universal theory of speech protection (one based largely on the 
historically contingent experiences of the United States)145 will not 
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advance our understanding of the Wilders trial or of the current 
efforts by Flemming Rose146 and Geert Wilders to challenge hate 
speech laws and expand protections for freedom of speech in Europe. 
Nor will it fully explain the sensitive position of Muslims in Europe 
who are simultaneously seen as potential Nazi censors eager to rob 
Europeans of their liberties and, at the same time, as the new Jews, 
victims of the Nazis for whom hate speech laws are meant to 
protect.147 
To return to Abraham Foxman, Europeans have “experienced 
Nazism and other destructive social movements on their soil.”148 The 
depth of discussion about fascism at the Geert Wilders trial is a 
reminder that these movements have had a continuing impact. The 
same applies to Dutch (and European) hate speech laws. One can 
object to the methods and (speaking from the United States) point out 
that they are “not ours.”149 But the “legacy of extremism”150 these 
laws are meant to protect against is still—at least for many 
Europeans—quite real.151 
  
                                                     
146 For more on Rose, see Kahn, supra note 12. 
147 See, e.g., David A. Jacobs, Note, The Ban of Neo-Nazi Music: Germany Takes on 
the Neo-Nazis, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 563, 572–73 (1993) (describing how anti-Semitic 
songs from the 1930s were reprised with Turks as the new victims). 
148 Foxman, supra note 1, at xiv. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 For example, Groningen law professor Fokko Oldenhuis, calling Wilders a 
“hatemonger,” pointed out that the first Dutch hate speech law, passed in 1934, was 
directed to protect Jews against Hitler’s rise to power in Germany. Interview with Fokko 
Oldenhuis, University of Groningen Professor of Religion & Law, PVV Politician Wilders 
a Prime Example of Reprehensible Intolerance (Dec. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.rug.nl/corporate/nieuws/opinie/2009/opinie09_51. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Our founding fathers faced with perils that we can scarcely imagine, 
drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man, a 
charter expanded by the blood of generations. Those ideals still 
light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience’s 
sake.2 
This is a time for reflection, not retribution. . . . We have been 
through a dark and painful chapter in our history. But at a time of 
great challenges and disturbing disunity, nothing will be gained by 
spending our time and energy laying blame for the past.3 
President Obama’s 2009 inauguration speech emphasized the 
fundamental nature of America’s commitment to human rights and 
the rule of law in the country’s self-perception as an idealistic and 
inspirational society, where the rights of all are protected. Within the 
United States, such political rhetoric has long highlighted the nation’s 
 
2 President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-obama.html?pagewanted=all). 
3 Press Release, The White House, Statement of President Barack Obama on Release of 
OLC Memos (Apr. 16, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office 
/Statement-of-President-Barack-Obama-on-Release-of-OLC-Memos) [hereinafter OLC 
Press Release]. 
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potential to inspire other countries towards greater protection of 
individual rights. Despite America’s much discussed tendency 
towards “exceptionalism” with regard to the jurisdiction of 
international law towards U.S. citizenry,4 this rhetorical commitment 
has been substantiated by the leadership role that the United States 
has played in the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, and 
transitional justice5 around the world. For example, it has provided 
enormous financial, logistical, and technical support to the work of 
international and hybrid courts in Nuremberg, Tokyo, the former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Timor Leste, and Cambodia.6 
Indeed, according to Schabas, “[s]ince international criminal justice 
first became truly operational, in 1945, it has had no greater friend or 
promoter than the United States.”7 Through these actions, the United 
States has demonstrated support for legal accountability for human 
rights violations perpetrated by foreign warlords, dictators, and their 
foot soldiers. In addition, through the rule of law programs of 
agencies such as the U.S. State Department, the United States has 
provided considerable financial, personnel, and logistical resources to 
building rule of law capacity within numerous countries around the 
world.8 It has also contributed to the rule of law at the international 
 
4 American exceptionalism has been written about extensively by legal scholars, as well 
as researchers from other disciplines. See, e.g., AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005); DEBORAH L. MADSEN, AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM (1998); Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN L. 
REV. 1479 (2003). Part IV.B. explores in more detail the cultural and political aspects of 
American exceptionalism. 
5 There is no universally accepted definition of transitional justice, but the phrase refers 
to a field of research and praxis that explores how states that are transitioning from conflict 
and repression can address legacies of mass violence. See Anne-Marie La Rosa & Xavier 
Philippe, Transitional Justice, in POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING: A LEXICON 368 
(Vincent Chetail ed., 2009); Wendy Lambourne, Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding 
After Mass Violence, 3 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 28 (2009), for an analysis of 
transitional justice institutions and objectives. 
6 For example, the U.S. State Department 2011 budget for supporting transitional 
justice was $55,000,000. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, EXECUTIVE BUDGET SUMMARY: FISCAL 
YEAR 2012, available at http://transition.usaid.gov/performance/cbj/156214.pdf; see also 
JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL 
AFFAIRS (2004); Annie Bird, Comparing Cases of US Involvement in Transitional Justice 
(Aug. 2011) (presented at the 6th ECPR General Conference), available at 
http://www.ecprnet.eu/MyECPR/proposals/reykjavik/uploads/papers/180.pdf. 
7 William A. Schabas, United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It’s 
All About the Security Council, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 701, 702 (2004). 
8 A review of recent press releases on the State Department website indicates the 
breadth of the department’s work in this area. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. State Dep’t, 
Governance and Rule of Law: Two Year Fast Fact on the U.S. Government’s Work in  
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level through its leadership role in organizations such as the United 
Nations.9 
However, as has been extensively scrutinized in recent years, the 
lackluster pursuit of accountability for the widespread abuses 
committed by American personnel during the so-called “War on 
Terror”10 illustrates a disjuncture within domestic and international 
discourse between the dual perceptions of the United States as a law-
abiding nation and America as a law-breaking state. This article seeks 
to explore this disjuncture through investigating the rationales of the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) for limiting accountability for the 
widespread torture of detainees by CIA interrogators. The author 
acknowledges that this focus excludes other abuses, such as those 
committed against Iraqi and Afghani civilians by the U.S. military, 
which are liable for prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice.11 It also excludes the liability of other actors implicated in 
 
Haiti (Dec. 28, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/s/hsc/rls/179739.htm; Press 
Release), U.S. State Dep’t, Rule of Law Programs in Afghanistan (May 4, 2012), available 
at http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/189320.htm); Press Release, U.S. State Dep’t, Further 
Collaboration on Rule of Law Development in Moldova (May 21, 2012), available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/05/190513.htm); Press Release, U.S. State Dep’t, 
Pakistan Rule of Law (Nov. 23, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs 
/177705.htm). 
9 See United States Legal Counselor On Justice and the Rule of Law, Remarks at a 
Security Council Debate on Justice and the Rule of Law (June 29, 2010), available at 
http://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/06/30/justice-and-the-rule-of-law/. 
10 AMNESTY INT’L, USA: SEE NO EVIL 26 (2011). Amnesty International has 
contended that “impunity and leniency [have] been the hallmark of the USA’s response to 
abuses.” Id. at 31. To date, criminal accountability for detainee abuse within the U.S. has 
been characterized as “abysmal” by Human Rights Watch. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
GETTING AWAY WITH TORTURE: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND THE MISTREATMENT 
OF DETAINEES 6 (2011). 
11 As with the crimes of CIA interrogators, there has been impunity for crimes 
committed by military personnel. For example, a 2006 report authored jointly by three 
organizations documented “over 330 cases in which U.S. military and civilian personnel 
are credibly alleged to have abused or killed detainees . . . involv[ing] more than 600 U.S. 
personnel and over 460 detainees.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST AND 
THE NYU SCHOOL OF LAW, BY THE NUMBERS: FINDINGS OF THE DETAINEE ABUSE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT 2 (2006). Of the U.S. personnel identified, only fifty-four 
military personnel had been convicted, forty of whom had been imprisoned, and only ten 
of these sentences had been for more than one year. Id. at 24. The report further found that 
only half of the cases identified had been adequately investigated. Furthermore, the 
highest-ranking officer prosecuted for the abuse of prisoners was a lieutenant colonel, 
Steven Jordan, court-martialed in 2006 for his role in the Abu Ghraib scandal, but 
acquitted in 2007. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 10, at 6. In addition, in the 2010 
Universal Periodic Review of the United States’ human rights record by the U.N. Human 
Rights Council, several American and international human rights organizations made 
submissions denouncing the lack of accountability for prisoner abuse. See U.N. Human  
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prisoner abuse including contractors, government lawyers, and 
political officials as these groups are subject to distinct accountability 
requirements. It focuses on the CIA’s participation in coercive 
interrogations because, despite the domestic and international legal 
prohibitions on torture, these crimes have been subject to the greatest 
official effort to ensure impunity for the perpetrators. 
To explain why the United States has pursued only limited 
accountability for prisoner abuse, this article begins in Section II by 
providing an overview of the nature and extent of the prisoner abuse, 
its relationship to domestic and international prohibitions on torture, 
and the efforts by the Bush administration to avoid respecting these 
prohibitions. In Section III, the article explores the domestic law 
governing the federal government’s use of leniency for political 
offenses through pardon, amnesty, legislative immunity, and 
prosecutorial discretion. Given the international dimensions of the 
prisoner abuse scandal, this section will also explore the unilateral 
and multilateral involvement of the United States in the decisions of 
foreign governments to enact amnesty laws. Section IV examines the 
decisions of the DOJ not to pursue prosecutions for prisoner abuse in 
some detail by analyzing extensive data relating to the United States’ 
enactment of domestic amnesty laws and pardons, and its 
involvement in foreign amnesty negotiations. These examples of 
America’s attitudes towards amnesty laws are used to contextualize 
the current debates, and explain the decisions not to prosecute in light 
of America’s previous use of leniency for political offenses. That 
analysis is grouped under the following themes: amnesty, empire, and 
hegemony; amnesty, denial, and justificatory claimsmaking; law, 
politics, and pragmatism in the use of amnesties; and amnesty, mercy, 
and the public welfare. 
In analyzing American attitudes to amnesty laws, this article will 
draw on two overlapping datasets. Firstly, for domestic amnesties and 
pardons, the author has compiled a dataset of the texts of the relevant 
presidential proclamations. The universe of cases includes all the 
domestic amnesty laws since independence. In addition to amnesties, 
each president typically pardons a broad cross-section of offenders,12 
and a small number of these federal pardons are included in this 
dataset where the motivations, recipients, and/or offenses involved 
 
Rights Council, Summary Prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/9/USA/3/Rev.1 (Oct. 14, 2010). 
12 See, e.g., JEFFREY CROUCH, THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER (2009). 
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could be considered “political.” This dataset focused only on political 
pardons because, as this article will explore, many of the decisions to 
grant pardons in these cases faced similar political risks and rewards 
as the decisions not to pursue prosecutions for prisoner abuse. The 
selection of the political pardons included in the analysis is drawn 
from a review of the literature. The author acknowledges, however, 
that other “political” pardons may have been issued but have not been 
identified for inclusion, either because they have not been subject to 
extensive academic scrutiny or due to the subjectivity that can exist 
when distinguishing “criminal” from “political” offenses.13 The 
amnesties and pardons contained in this dataset are listed in Appendix 
1. 
Secondly, for the analysis of American engagement with foreign 
amnesty laws, this article will draw upon the Amnesty Law Database 
constructed by the author. This database compiles data on amnesties 
in all parts of the world that have been enacted since the end of the 
Second World War in response to conflict, repression and political 
transition. At the time of writing, the Amnesty Law Database contains 
information on 537 amnesty laws in 129 countries that were 
introduced between 1945 and June 2011.14 This article will use the 
database to identify and analyze instances where the United States has 
engaged with amnesties in other countries, either by acting 
unilaterally or through multilateral organizations. In compiling the 
information on U.S. state practice, the Amnesty Law Database 
collates a variety of materials, including U.N. Security Council 
resolutions, State Department press statements, newspaper articles, 
and academic writings. The cases identified will only paint a partial 
picture, however, due to the difficulties of accessing detailed 
information on American involvement in negotiations, particularly for 
earlier amnesty laws, when many of the political agreements would 
have been negotiated behind closed doors. 
The article will argue that although amnesties and pardons are 
products of and regulated by law, their use creates exceptions to the 
law that are motivated by a range of inter-related political concerns, 
 
13 See, for example, LOUISE MALLINDER, AMNESTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL 
Transitions: Bridging the Peace and Justice Divide 135–44 (2008), for a discussion of the 
inclusion of political offenses in leniency measures. 
14 See Louise Mallinder, Amnesties’ Challenge to the Global Accountability Norm? 
Interpreting Regional and International Trends in Amnesty Enactment, in AMNESTY IN 
THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 69, 79 (Leigh A. Payne & Francesca Lessa eds., 2012); MALLINDER, supra 
note 13, for further information on the Amnesty Law Database. 
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such as power, sovereignty, legitimacy, and national security. These 
concerns have been evident in America’s historical engagement with 
amnesty laws and continue to be central to contemporary debates on 
accountability for prisoner abuse. 
I 
LAW AND TORTURE IN THE “WAR ON TERROR” 
The “coercive interrogation” strategies15 developed by the Bush 
administration to question terror suspects in the wake of September 
11, 2001, have become the source of much controversy, both within 
the United States and internationally.16 According to the abundant 
documentation that has become available, it is now established that 
thousands of foreign prisoners in U.S. detention were routinely 
subjected to a range of repressive interrogation techniques, which in 
some cases resulted in the deaths of prisoners.17 The techniques 
included waterboarding, stress positions, beatings, wall-slamming, 
and choking.18 In addition, prisoners were subjected to forced nudity, 
extended sleep deprivation and isolation, mock executions, religious 
and sexually degrading treatment, and threats to torture, rape, or kill 
detainees or their families.19 Interrogations were carried out by U.S. 
military personnel, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) interrogators, 
 
15 See ABU GHRAIB: THE POLITICS OF TORTURE (Meron Benvenisti et al. eds., 2004); 
MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON 
TERROR (2004); LAUREL E. FLETCHER & ERIC STOVER, GUANTANAMO AND ITS 
AFTERMATH: U.S. DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON 
FORMER DETAINEES (2008); K.J. GREENBERG & J.L. DRATEL, THE TORTURE PAPERS 
(2005); SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND (2004); Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. 
Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 689 (2004), for a 
detailed discussion of the rationales, development, and nature of the “coercive 
interrogation” strategies. 
16 This ongoing contestation was apparent in debates resulting from the information 
released by Wikileaks showing that U.S. officials were aware of prisoner abuse in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. See, e.g., Phil Stewart, WikiLeaks Show U.S. Failed to Probe Iraqi Abuse 
Cases: Reports, REUTERS, Oct. 22, 2010. In addition, it was visible in the debates on 
whether information obtained through coercive interrogation permitted the U.S. authorities 
to locate and assassinate Osama Bin Laden. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, Bin Laden Dead, 
Torture Debate Lives On, NEW YORKER, May 2, 2011. 
17 The exact number of detainees who died because of coercive interrogation is 
unknown, but by 2005 a U.S. Army report noted that 108 persons had died in U.S. 
custody. See Report: 108 Died in U.S. Custody, CBSNEWS.COM (Feb. 11, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-244_162-680658.html. 
18 CAROLYN PATTY BLUM, LISA MAGARREL & MARIEKE WIERDA, PROSECUTING 
ABUSES OF DETAINEES IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS 3 (2009). 
19 Id. 
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and private military contractors, and were sanctioned by the highest 
levels of government.20 
The severity and systematic nature of the coercive interrogation 
practices arguably violated America’s obligations under international 
and domestic law. Torture is prohibited in international criminal law, 
international humanitarian law, and international human rights law, 
which compositely regulate the treatment of prisoners by the United 
States during its military occupation of Iraq, its conflict-related 
activities within other states, and even its actions outside conflict.21 
Within international criminal law, torture has been recognized as a 
crime by the Convention Against Torture. Under this Convention, 
where a State official is accused of torture, the State party is required 
to investigate the facts, and if appropriate, “submit the case to its 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution” or extradite the 
suspect.22 Under international humanitarian law, all four Geneva 
Conventions relating to international armed conflicts and occupation 
state that “torture or inhuman treatment” and “willfully causing great 
suffering or serious injury to body or health” are “grave breaches,” 
which require states to prosecute or extradite suspects accused of 
these crimes.23 In addition, under Common Article 3 to the Geneva 
Conventions, relating to non-international armed conflicts, 
“mutilation, cruel treatment and torture” and “outrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment” breach the 
minimum standards that state parties must respect.24 Finally, the main 
international and regional human rights conventions recognize 
freedom from “torture or [from] cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment” as a non-derogable human right.25 For all 
three branches of international law, freedom from torture is an 
absolute right that cannot be limited or restricted in conflict or other 
times of “public emergency which threaten[] the life of the nation.”26 
 
20 In his memoir, former President George W. Bush recalled that when asked by CIA 
Director George Tenet to approve the waterboarding of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, he 
responded “[d]amn right.” GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 170 (2010). 
21 See Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War 
and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 580 (2006). 
22 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
23 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
24 Id. at art. 3. 
25 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
26 Id. at art. 4. 
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These bodies of law can trigger different oversight mechanisms, 
ranging from human rights treaty monitoring institutions that hold 
states accountable for violating human rights conventions, to 
international courts or courts in third states that can pursue individual 
criminal responsibility for torture. 
Within the American legal tradition international law is often 
viewed as having a subsidiary status to domestic law. However, the 
international prohibition on torture is reflected in domestic law. For 
example, the Torture Statute criminalizes torture committed by U.S. 
citizens overseas and creates obligations to investigate and punish 
those responsible, with possible sentences of life imprisonment or 
death.27 In addition, the War Crimes Act of 1996 defines war crimes 
as grave breaches and violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions, including torture where either the victim or the 
perpetrator is a U.S. national or member of the U.S. military forces.28 
It imposes similar penalties to the Torture Statute. 
Historically, state sovereignty meant that executive governments in 
all countries had considerable discretion on whether to prosecute 
serious human rights violations committed within their borders. 
However, the growth of international law and its incorporation into 
American domestic law meant that, by 2002, the Bush administration 
became concerned that by ordering coercive interrogation techniques, 
it could expose its officials to serious legal penalties before domestic 
and international courts.29 As a result, the government pursued 
various strategies to prevent this, beginning by trying to conceal these 
practices through extraordinary renditions30 and the “juridical 
othering” of terrorist suspects.31 It addition, it tried to obfuscate the 
legal status of coercive interrogation techniques, through the now 
 
27 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2340 (West 2012) (“torture statute”). 
28 Id. at § 2441. 
29 KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS 
ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS 191–92 (2011). 
30 See, for example, Joan Fitzpatrick, Rendition and Transfer in the War Against 
Terrorism: Guantanamo and Beyond, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 457 (2002); 
Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War 
on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200 (2006); David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, 
Extraordinary Rendition and the Torture Convention, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2005), for 
detailed discussion of extraordinary renditions. 
31 See Ruth Jamieson & Kieran McEvoy, State Crime by Proxy and Juridical Othering, 
45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 504 (2005). This article explores the concept of juridical 
othering as processes by which there are efforts to define “individuals or groups as 
juridical others to whom normal rules do not apply,” by for example using terminology 
such as unlawful combatant. Id. at 517. 
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infamous “torture memos.”32 These memos, which continue to 
provide the justification for not pursuing prosecutions in the majority 
of cases of prisoner abuse, were a series of initially classified 
documents drafted by government lawyers working within the Justice 
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). The first memos, 
drafted in January 2002, argued that under the American constitution, 
the U.S. President had the authority to “suspend” the application of 
the Geneva Conventions to prisoners who were labeled as “enemy 
combatants,” rather than prisoners of war. This argument was 
designed to reduce the scope for prosecution not just under the 
Geneva Conventions, but also under the War Crimes Act of 1996.33 
A further memo dated August 1, 2002, and authored by Assistant 
Attorney General Jay S. Bybee, sought to undermine the applicability 
of the international prohibition of torture within U.S. law. It argued 
that U.S. obligations under the Convention Against Torture do not 
apply to acts committed outside U.S. territory; that torture constitutes 
only acts specifically intended to inflict severe pain or suffering; and 
that the doctrine of necessity could supersede national or international 
laws prohibiting torture.34 Further memos and letters produced by the 
OLC detailed what were deemed to be acceptable forms of coercive 
interrogation.35 
The reasoning contained in the torture memos was unpersuasive for 
military lawyers and legal advisers in the State Department, and “[b]y 
2005, a clear consensus was starting to emerge among jurists that the 
memos were faulty as a matter of law, and would not hold up under 
international legal scrutiny.”36 The Bush administration responded to 
these concerns by seeking to ensure legislative immunity for state 
officials engaged in coercive interrogations through the Detainee 
 
32 See MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN 
TIMES OF CRISIS 181-200 (2010); see also DAVID P. FORSYTHE, THE POLITICS OF 
PRISONER ABUSE: THE UNITED STATES AND ENEMY PRISONERS AFTER 9/11, 60–94 
(2011), for an analysis of the role of the government lawyers in providing legal cover for 
the practices of coercive interrogation. See also Ross L. Weiner, Note, The Office of Legal 
Counsel and Torture: The Law as Both a Sword and Shield, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 524 
(2008), for a description and analysis of the memos. 
33 Michael P. Scharf, International Law and the Torture Memos, 42 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 321, 343 (2009); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Torture 
Under the Bush Administration, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 389 (2005). 
34 Scharf, supra note 33, at 344–45. 
35 See DAVID COLE, THE TORTURE MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINKABLE 
(2009) (interpreting the torture memos); see also David Cole, The Torture Memos: The 
Case Against the Lawyers, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (2009). 
36 SIKKINK, supra note 29, at 206. 
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Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Treatment Act of 2006, which 
will be explored below. In short, following September 11, 2001, the 
Bush administration sought to establish a legal regime under which 
serious crimes were perpetrated systematically by state officials 
across numerous locations and against large numbers of individuals. 
During his initial months in office, President Obama was sensitive 
to the opposition that had developed to coercive interrogation. For 
example, soon after his inauguration he took a number of measures to 
end the policy, including stopping extraordinary renditions, closing 
“Black Sites” where the CIA conducted clandestine interrogations, 
declaring null and void legal memos issued by the Bush 
administration, and forbidding the use of enhanced interrogation 
techniques.37 These policies did not extend, however, to closing the 
Guantánamo detention center or trying terrorist suspects in civilian 
courts rather than military commissions.38 Furthermore, the 
administration has consistently been reluctant to pursue investigations 
and prosecutions for prisoner abuse. Instead, as the next section will 
explore, two prosecutorial decisions were taken to prevent 
prosecutions for the majority of CIA interrogators. To the extent that 
these decisions have granted impunity for torture, they can be 
compared to the use of amnesties and pardons. 
II 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF AMERICA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH 
AMNESTIES 
This section will explore America’s power to grant leniency 
domestically. In addition, as Section IV will supplement the 
consideration of domestic amnesties with data relating to American 
attitudes to amnesty laws enacted abroad, this section will also 
consider America’s ability to engage in debates on amnesty laws 
around the world. 
A. Leniency for Political Offenses Within U.S. Domestic Law 
This discussion will explore the following forms of domestic 
leniency for political offenses: pardon, amnesty, legislative immunity, 
and prosecutorial discretion. While these are clearly not the sole 
 
37 Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
38 See Kenneth Roth, Empty Promises? Obama’s Hesitant Embrace of Human Rights, 
89 FOREIGN AFF. 10, 11 (2010), for a discussion of the failures of the Obama 
administration to substantially change the executive policies on human rights. 
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forms of leniency that are available to domestic politicians and legal 
professionals,39 they have been selected here as they have all been 
used to grant leniency for offenders responsible for political offenses, 
either in America’s past or as a result of prisoner abuse. This section 
will contrast how these forms of leniency are understood within 
scholarly literature and U.S. practice, and it will analyze the legal 
basis for their use. 
1. Presidential Pardons 
Legal scholars generally define pardons as “acts of legal leniency 
that remove only the consequences but not the prospect of adverse 
court proceedings.”40 This means that pardons are granted to 
individuals who have been convicted to release them from all or part 
of their sentence. However, within the United States, pardoning 
powers are broader than this definition. 
Following American independence from British colonial rule,41 the 
power to grant pardons initially resided with the states.42 However, at 
the 1787 Constitution Convention, the power to pardon federal crimes 
was included in the Constitution and vested in the President.43 States 
retained the power to pardon offenses under state laws.44 Among the 
main lobbyists for the creation of the federal pardon power was 
 
39 Other forms of leniency commonly used within the American criminal justice system 
include statutes of limitations, plea agreements, sentence reductions, and the use of 
immunity. See generally 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 213, 217, 221, 227, 229 (West Supp. 2000 & 
Supp. 2012). 
40 MARK FREEMAN, NECESSARY EVILS: AMNESTIES AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 14 
(2009). 
41 See Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power 
from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 585–90 (1991), for a discussion of the power to 
pardon under British colonial rule. 
42 Robert Nida & Rebecca L. Spiro, The President as His Own Judge and Jury: A Legal 
Analysis of the Presidential Self-Pardon Power, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 197, 204 (1999). 
43 Id. at 205. 
44 As Krug notes “[f]ifty-two jurisdictions—the federal government, each of the fifty 
states, and the District of Colombia—are competent to enact their own criminal laws and 
laws of criminal procedure, and to establish their own criminal justice systems. . . . [M]ost 
criminal laws are those of the states, and the vast majority of criminal cases are prosecuted 
by the state and local authorities.” Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Limits, 50 
AM. J. COMP. L. 643, 644 (2002) (footnote omitted). State pardoning powers remain 
significant and play a major role in the U.S. criminal justice process, but they are beyond 
the scope of this article. The delimitation of the pardon power between the federal and 
state-level governments is reviewed at length in Kobil. Kobil, supra note 41. See also 
LARRY N. GERSTON, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION (2007); 
ALISON  L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010); W. 
W. Thornton, Pardon and Amnesty, 6 CRIM. L. MAG 457 (1885), for a more general 
discussion of the powers of the state within the U.S. federalist system. 
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Alexander Hamilton,45 who argued that “in seasons of insurrection or 
rebellion there are often critical moments when a well timed offer of 
pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the 
commonwealth.”46 As will be explored below, pardons and amnesties 
were soon used in the way that Hamilton suggested within the United 
States. For other supporters of the pardon power, its inclusion was 
necessary to introduce an element of flexibility into an otherwise rigid 
criminal justice system.47 For domestic pardons, both these rationales 
have become less pressing, as the federal government now faces 
substantially fewer challenges to its authority than in the early 
decades of the Union, and greater discretion has been introduced at all 
stages of the criminal justice process. As a result, presidential pardons 
for all types of federal offenses (and indeed, state pardons for 
violations of state law) are used far less often today.48 
Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides 
“[The President] shall have the Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons 
for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of 
Impeachment.”49 This power has been interpreted broadly to enable 
the President to pardon any crime, with the exception of 
impeachment50 or offenses under state laws. To obtain a pardon, 
individual recipients must consent to being pardoned, with admissions 
of guilt being viewed as consent. Although during and after the Civil 
War Congress sought to restrict the President’s power to pardon,51 in 
 
45 William F. Duker, The President’s Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 501 (1977). 
46 THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 339 (Alexander Hamilton) (Pa. State Univ. ed., 2001). 
47 Duker, supra note 45, at 502–03. 
48 See Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics and Collar Buttons: Reflections on 
the President’s Duty to be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483, 1484 (2000). 
49 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. See also United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150 (1833), 
for a definition of pardons. 
50 The extent to which this exception prevents presidents pardoning themselves for 
criminal acts committed before or during their term of office is unclear. According to Nida 
and Spiro, the administrations of President Richard Nixon (for Watergate) and President 
George Bush Sr. (for the Iran-Contra Affair) both considered issuing self-pardons. See 
Nida & Spiro, supra note 42. 
51 See JONATHAN TRUMAN DORRIS, PARDON AND AMNESTY UNDER LINCOLN AND 
JOHNSON: THE RESTORATION OF THE CONFEDERATES TO THEIR RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES, 
1861–98 (1953); Duker, supra note 45, at 475, for an overview of these struggles between 
Congress and the President. It should also be noted that during the Civil War, Congress 
itself issued amnesties, and during later debates on an amnesty for Vietnam-era draft 
dodgers and deserters, there was some discussion of whether Congress was empowered to 
issue amnesty laws. See Harrop A. Freeman, An Historical Justification and Legal Basis 
for Amnesty Today, L. & SOC. ORD. 515, 529 (1971). 
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the 1866 Ex Parte Garland case, the Supreme Court found the power 
to be “unlimited.”52 It continued by interpreting its effects broadly: 
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence 
and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases 
the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the 
eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never 
committed the offence. If granted before conviction, it prevents any 
of the penalties and disabilities consequent upon conviction from 
attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and 
disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as 
it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.53 
This Supreme Court judgment underscores the fact that pardons with 
U.S. law differ from understandings of the notion of pardon within 
the international academic literature on pardons in a number of 
respects. In particular, in the U.S. context, pardons can be granted 
before as well as after conviction. Though the Constitution does not 
explicitly mention amnesty laws, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted 
the pardon power to include the ability to grant amnesties, as will be 
discussed below. 
2. Amnesties 
Developing a general definition of an amnesty law is problematic 
as within national legal systems, the term “amnesty” may be defined 
differently, and different bodies may be empowered to grant 
amnesties.54 Furthermore, no accepted definition has yet been 
developed within international law. As a result, the scope and legal 
effects of amnesty laws around the world can look very different. 
However, Mark Freeman has developed a broad and useful definition 
of an amnesty law as: 
[A]n extraordinary legal measure whose primary function is to 
remove the prospect and consequences of criminal liability for 
designated individuals or classes of persons in respect of designated 
types of offenses irrespective of whether the persons concerned 
have been tried for such offences in a court of law.55 
This definition illustrates that amnesties are typically distinguished 
from pardons in that they can apply pre-conviction. However, this 
 
52 Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866). 
53 Id. at 380–81. 
54 See René Lévy, Pardons and Amnesties as Policy Instruments in Contemporary 
France, 36 CRIME & JUST. 551 (2007). 
55 FREEMAN, supra note 40, at 13. 
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distinction is not so pronounced within the United States, where 
pardons can be granted pre-conviction. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, when interpreting amnesties as falling 
within the presidential pardon power, has explored the distinction 
between the two forms of leniency within U.S. law. For example, in 
1877, Justice Field, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court in 
Knote v. United States, wrote: 
Some distinction has been made, or attempted to be made, between 
pardon and amnesty. It is sometimes said that the latter operates as 
an extinction of the offense of which it is the object, causing it to be 
forgotten, so far as the public interests are concerned, whilst the 
former only operates to remove the penalties of the offense. This 
distinction is not, however, recognized in our law. The Constitution 
does not use the word ‘amnesty;’ and, except that the term is 
generally employed where pardon is extended to whole classes or 
communities, instead of individuals, the distinction between them is 
one rather of philological interest than of legal importance.56 
Since independence, successive presidents have issued amnesty 
laws and pardons for American citizens who have refused to adhere to 
federal laws. As illustrated in Appendix 1, the dataset compiled for 
this research on U.S. domestic practice has identified forty-three 
amnesties and pardons for political offenses enacted between 1795 
and 1999. However, as will be explored below, since the 1990s, 
national sovereignty to grant amnesty for serious human rights 
violations has been eroded by the growth of international human 
rights law and international criminal law. As a result, when seeking to 
protect its armed forces and intelligence personnel from prosecution, 
the Bush administration turned to other mechanisms to deliver 
immunity. 
3. Legislative Immunity and “Pseudo” Amnesties 
As amnesty laws are generally intended to achieve political 
objectives such as encouraging rebels to surrender and abide by 
national laws, the stated goal of granting amnesty is often clearly 
expressed in the legislation. However, where states seek to grant 
immunity for human rights violations or for crimes committed by the 
state itself, often such states try to avoid criticism by concealing that 
they are in fact granting an amnesty. Such measures can be 
characterized as “pseudo amnesties,” which Freeman defines as “legal 
measures that have the same juridical effect as amnesties but are 
 
56 Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 152–53 (1877). 
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drafted in a disguised form and given titles that explicitly omit the 
word amnesty.”57 Arguably, such “pseudo” amnesties have been used 
within the United States to grant legislative immunity to U.S. 
personnel implicated in prisoner abuse through the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006. 
The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 was initiated by John McCain 
and other members of Congress responding to allegations of prisoner 
abuse. The Act was originally designed to prohibit and prevent such 
abuse. However, it was bitterly resisted by the Bush administration, 
which eventually had language inserted into the legislation that 
granted immunity to U.S. personnel engaged in interrogations.58 
Section 1004(a) of the Act states “[i]n any civil action or criminal 
prosecution against an officer, employee, member of the Armed 
Forces, or other agent of the United States Government” who engaged 
in the interrogation of terror detainees and who 
were officially authorized and determined to be lawful at the time 
that they were conducted, it shall be a defense that such officer, 
employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent did not 
know that the practices were unlawful and a person of ordinary 
sense and understanding would not know the practices were 
unlawful. Good faith reliance on advice of counsel should be an 
important factor, among others, to consider in assessing whether a 
person of ordinary sense and understanding would have known the 
practices to be unlawful.59 
The inclusion of this section was intended to “circumvent” the 
prohibitions on the mistreatment of detainees in sections 1002 and 
1003 of the Act.60 It implicitly provides that where U.S. personnel 
acted within the parameters outlined in the torture memos, they would 
be deemed to be unaware that their actions were unlawful, even 
though the memos had deliberately sought to reinterpret the law to 
limit prosecutions.61 
In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court found in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
that the military commissions that had been established to try “enemy 
combatants” violated the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice and 
 
57 FREEMAN, supra note 40, at 13 (emphasis in original). 
58 Arsalan M. Suleman, Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 257, 
257–58 (2006). 
59 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 101–104, 119 Stat. 2680 
(2005) (emphasis added). 
60 Suleman, supra note 58, at 264. 
61 SIKKINK, supra note 29, at 207. 
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the Geneva Conventions of 1949.62 Although this case did not relate 
to the policy of coercive interrogations, the decision nonetheless 
prompted the Bush administration to enact the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006.63 Section 5 provided that: 
No person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any protocols 
thereto in any habeas corpus or other civil action or proceeding to 
which the United States, or a current or former officer, employee, 
member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States is 
a party as a source of rights in any court of the United States or its 
States or territories.64 
This provision has been criticized as creating further impunity for 
prisoner abuse by blocking detainees’ access to U.S. courts.65 In 
addition, Section 6 of this act revised the War Crimes Act of 1996 to 
amend the definition of war crimes with retroactive effect. These 
changes narrowed the definition of “cruel and inhuman treatment” 
and eliminated the crime of “outrages upon personal dignity, 
particularly humiliating and degrading treatment.”66 Matheson 
contends that as U.S. military personnel remained liable under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, these changes primarily benefited 
civilian officials and CIA personnel.67 The changes have been 
described as providing “amnesty to any violation of Common Article 
 
62 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 624–25 (2006); see generally JONATHAN 
MAHLER, THE CHALLENGE: HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD AND THE FIGHT OVER PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER (2008); Regina Fitzpatrick, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Implications for the Geneva 
Conventions, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 339 (2007); Mathew Happold, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
and the Law of War, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 418 (2007); Eran Shamir-Borer, Revisiting 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld’s Analysis of the Laws of Armed Conflict, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
601 (2007). 
63 See Julia Y. Capozzi, Note, Hamdan v Rumsfeld: A Short Lived Decision? 28 
WHITTIER L. REV. 1303 (2006); Jill K. Lamson, Comment, Hamdan v Rumsfeld and the 
Government’s Response: The Military Commissions Act of 2006 and its Implications on 
the Separation of Powers, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 497 (2008). 
64 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 5, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) 
(emphasis added). This provision was not amended by the Military Commissions Act of 
2009. 
65 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Orwellian Military Commissions Act of 2006, 5 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 10, 18 (2007). 
66 See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6. This did not, however, change liability 
for murder and torture. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 10, at 49. 
67 Michael J. Matheson, The Amendment of the War Crimes Act, 101 AMER. J. INT’L L. 
48, 52 (2007). 
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3 . . . that does not rise to the level of MCA-specified ‘grave 
breaches.’”68 
The provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006 cannot be considered—strictly 
speaking—amnesty laws, but their effects are similar to those of an 
amnesty, as they are designed to shield individuals from prosecution 
for crimes they have committed. Their provisions decriminalized 
several forms of abusive treatment and created an assumption that 
officials implicated in acts of torture were doing so on the 
understanding that their actions were lawful. This assumption has 
been adopted by the Department of Justice in justifying its first 
decision not to prosecute. 
4. Decisions Not to Prosecute and “De Facto” Amnesties 
Decisions not to prosecute can be taken at many points within a 
criminal justice system. As discussed above, the United States, like 
other countries, empowers both the executive and the legislature to 
enact measures to restrict prosecutions. Beyond these formal acts of 
clemency, immunity can arise from actors within the criminal justice 
system, such as prosecutors, deciding to refrain from exercising 
jurisdiction. Even in cases where prosecution would be clearly 
justified, most legal systems allow for selectivity in the identification 
of persons against whom the law will be enforced and in the charges 
to be brought. As Cryer notes, “[s]elective enforcement of the law is 
not inherently wrong,” particularly since no criminal justice system 
has the capacity to prosecute all offenses.69 Therefore, “the question is 
not whether selective prosecution should occur . . . but when selective 
enforcement is unacceptable.”70 
Today it is widely recognized that American prosecutors have 
substantial discretion,71 which may be exercised for a wide range of 
reasons. Sarat and Clarke distinguish between decisions made by 
prosecutors on “predictions about success” based on the availability 
of sufficient evidence and witnesses, and decisions concerning the 
 
68 Arsalan M. Suleman, Military Commissions Act of 2006, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 
325, 335 (2007); cf. Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Military Commissions Act, the Geneva 
Conventions and the Courts: A Critical Guide, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 73, 92 (2007). 
69 Robert Cryer, Selectivity in International Criminal Law, in BUILDING PEACE IN 
POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS 153, 153 (Faria Medjouba ed., 2012). 
70 Id. at 154. 
71 Austin Sarat and Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of 
Sovereignty, and the Limits of Law, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 389 (2008). 
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“desirability and appropriateness” of prosecution.72 They argue that 
the second type of decision can be influenced by a wide range of 
exceptional factors, which do not necessarily “derive from legal 
norms,” nor correspond to the viability of the prosecution.73 Indeed, 
as Sarat and Clarke note, “[l]ike executive power in times of 
emergency or clemency, these decisions bring us to law’s limit.”74 
Prosecutorial discretion within the United States is thus “broad” 
and “generally unregulated” by the courts.75 However, the Department 
of Justice has developed the Principles of Federal Prosecution to 
guide federal prosecutors towards objective decision-making when 
exercising discretion. The principles recognize that prosecutors can 
exercise discretion at all stages of criminal prosecution; however, this 
section will focus on decisions to decline prosecutions that would 
otherwise be viable.76 The principles permit federal prosecutors to 
decline “because no substantial Federal interest would be served by 
prosecution,” and they identify several grounds to justify such 
decisions.77 For example, prosecutors are encouraged to consider “the 
actual or potential impact of the offense on the community,” which 
can include economic harms; physical danger to citizens or public 
property; or the “erosion of the inhabitants’ peace of mind and sense 
of security.”78 In addition, prosecutors may consider “what the public 
attitude is toward prosecution under the circumstances of the case,” 
but that “public interest . . . should not be used to justify a decision to 
prosecute, or to take other action, that cannot be supported on other 
grounds.”79 As will be explored below, both public opinion and the 
impact of coercive interrogation on public security have featured 
prominently within debates on the desirability of pursuing 
accountability for prisoner abuse. 
 
72 Id. at 391. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Krug, supra note 44, at 643; see also ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE 
POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 5 (2007). 
76 The Principles of Federal Prosecution note the following moments in which 
prosecutors can exercise discretion: initiating and declining prosecution, selecting charges, 
entering into plea agreements, opposing offers to plead nolo contendere, entering into non-
prosecution agreements in return for cooperation, and participating in sentencing. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-27.000, available at http://www 
.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm. 
77 Id. at § 9-27.230 (emphasis added). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
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The principles also encourage federal prosecutors to consider the 
economic, physical, and psychological impact of the offense on the 
victim. The crime of torture is widely recognized as creating profound 
and long-lasting harms for victims,80 which under these principles 
would seem to indicate that federal prosecutors should, where the 
evidence permits, err in favor of prosecution. The principles also note 
that where the accused “occupied a position of trust or responsibility 
which he/she violated in committing the offense, [this] might weigh 
in favor of prosecution.”81 Therefore, for official personnel 
committing acts of torture, this provision also seems to guide federal 
prosecutors towards pursuing prosecutions. 
When federal prosecutors decline prosecution, the principles state 
that the prosecutor should “ensure that his/her decision and the 
reasons therefore are communicated to the investigating agency 
involved and to any other interested agency, and are reflected in the 
office files.”82 However, there is no obligation that the reasons for the 
decision be communicated to victims or the public.83 The principles 
are non-binding and do not “require a particular prosecutorial 
decision in any given case.”84 Adherence to the standards can only be 
enforced internally within the DOJ, and Podgor has found perhaps 
unsurprisingly that prosecutors “do not always adhere to these 
guidelines.”85 The absence of public reasons for the decisions 
arguably results in a lack of transparency and accountability. The 
obvious danger is that prosecutors may appear to decline prosecution 
for arbitrary or self-serving reasons, such as shielding perpetrators of 
serious crimes from public scrutiny, or succumbing to political 
 
80 See, e.g., MANU ACTIS ET AL., THAT INFERNO: CONVERSATIONS OF FIVE WOMEN 
SURVIVORS OF AN ARGENTINE TORTURE CAMP (2006); TORTURE: A COLLECTION 
(Sanford Levinson ed., 2004); Gabriela Fried, Piecing Memories Together After State 
Terror and Policies of Oblivion in Uruguay: The Female Political Prisoner’s Testimonial 
Project (1997–2004), 12 SOC. IDENTITIES 543 (2006); Derrick Silove, The Psychosocial 
Effects of Torture, Mass Human Rights Violations, and Refugee Trauma: Toward an 
Integrated Conceptual Framework, 187 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 200 (1999). 
81 United States Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 76, at § 9-27.230. 
82 Id. at § 9-27.270. 
83 See Sarat & Clarke, supra note 71, at 392. See also MICHELLE MADDEN DEMPSEY, 
PROSECUTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 82 (2009), for a 
discussion of the need for prosecutions to justify their decisions not to pursue prosecutions 
in cases where there is a prima facie case. 
84 U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 76, at § 9-27.120. Podgor describes the 
principles as “policy statements and not legislative rules.” Ellen S. Podgor, Department of 
Justice Guidelines: Balancing “Discretionary Justice,” 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
167, 169 (2004). 
85 Podgor, supra note 84, at 169. 
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pressure. It can also be problematic where there is a “conflict of 
interest” resulting in DOJ lawyers investigating crimes that were 
sanctioned by the Department, as was the case with the torture 
memos.86 
The absence of prosecution where it results from an active decision 
not to prosecute made for arbitrary reasons can be interpreted as a “de 
facto” amnesty, where it creates “a situation in which there is 
impunity in practice, notwithstanding the absence of a legally-enacted 
amnesty law.”87 Impunity has been defined in the U.N.’s Principles to 
Combat Impunity as “the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of 
bringing the perpetrators of violations to account—whether in 
criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings.”88 As the 
decisions taken by the DOJ in 2009 and 2011 not to prosecute CIA 
personnel for prisoner abuse where taken in the absence of any 
alternative forms of accountability,89 they appear to fall within this 
definition of impunity, and hence could be considered “de facto” 
amnesties. 
Although President Obama signed an Executive Order repudiating 
the legal advice in the torture memos,90 in its first decision not to 
prosecute, the DOJ relied on them to justify its decision. On April 16, 
2009, the DOJ announced that “intelligence community officials who 
acted reasonably and relied in good faith on authoritative legal advice 
from the Justice Department that their conduct was lawful, and 
conformed their conduct to that advice, would not face federal 
prosecutions for that conduct.”91 The DOJ further stated that it had 
informed the CIA that the government would provide free legal 
 
86 David Cole, The Torture Memos: The Case Against the Lawyers, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 
(Oct. 8, 2009), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/oct/08/the       
-torture-memos-the-case-against-the-lawyers/?pagination=false. 
87 FREEMAN, supra note 40, at 17. 
88 Comm. on Human Rights, Econ. and Soc. Council, Updated Set of Principles for the 
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity 6 (2005). 
89 There have been some attempts by victims of prisoner abuse to sue U.S. state 
officials for torture. However, U.S. federal courts held that torture fell within the “scope of 
employment” of federal officials and is hence subject to the absolute immunity doctrine. 
See, e.g., Rasul v Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); see also Elizabeth A. Wilson, Is Torture All 
in a Day’s Work? Scope of Empoyment, the Absolute Immunity Doctrine, and Human 
Rights Litigation Against U.S. Federal Officials, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 198–
99 (2008). 
90 Exec. Order No. 13,491, supra note 37. 
91 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Releases Four Office of Legal 
Counsel Opinions (Apr. 16, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009 
/April/09-ag-356.html. 
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representation to all employees accused of prisoner abuse in domestic, 
international or foreign courts, or congressional investigations, and 
would indemnify employees for any financial penalties they 
incurred.92 In justifying such strong support for intelligence personnel 
who had acted within the parameters of the torture memos, the 
Attorney General proclaimed that “[i]t would be unfair to prosecute 
dedicated men and women working to protect America for conduct 
that was sanctioned in advance by the Justice Department.”93 This 
decision left open the possibility for prosecution for those 
interrogators who exceeded the guidance in the memos. 
The exception from liability based on the torture memos was 
challenged on July 29, 2009, when the DOJ’s Office of Professional 
Responsibility (OPR) released a report describing the memos as 
containing “seriously flawed arguments” and not constituting 
“thorough, objective or candid legal advice.”94 On this basis, the OPR 
report recommended that the DOJ “review certain declinations of 
prosecution regarding incidents of detainee abuse.”95 This suggests 
that even where CIA personnel acted according to the torture memos, 
there may be grounds to reopen investigations against them. The 
Attorney General responded by announcing in August 2009 that he 
was appointing a special prosecutor to conduct “a preliminary review 
into whether federal laws were violated in connection with the 
interrogation of specific detainees at overseas locations.”96 In his 
statement, despite the OPR’s recommendations, he reiterated that the 
review would not focus on those who had acted under the advice in 
the OLC memos, but would instead only focus on those who had 
exceeded it. 
Based on the two-year “preliminary review,” which investigated 
the treatment by CIA interrogators of 101 prisoners, on June 30, 2011, 
the Attorney General announced full criminal investigations were 
warranted in only two cases relating to deaths in custody.97 The 
 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROF. RESP., INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF 
LEGAL COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S USE OF “ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON 
SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 226 (2009). 
95 Id. at 261. 
96 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Eric Holder Regarding a 
Preliminary Review into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees (Aug. 24, 2009), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-0908241.html. 
97 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Attorney General Regarding 
Investigation into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees (June 30, 2011), available at  
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announcement did not provide any details on the nearly 100 cases 
where the investigations had been dropped and it was not clear 
whether they related to any deaths in detention.98 
Given the severity of these abuses and the official status of those 
alleged to be responsible, the DOJ’s decisions not to prosecute seem 
to deviate from its Principles of Federal Prosecution and have been 
characterized as granting impunity to those responsible for ordering, 
perpetrating and providing legal validation for prisoner abuse.99 As 
such, they can be viewed as “de facto” amnesty for crimes committed 
by U.S. personnel against non-nationals. As the following section will 
explore, the United States has also at times been willing to support 
foreign amnesties for crimes committed by non-U.S. nationals. 
B. America, International Law, and Foreign Amnesties 
As noted above, unlike many exercises of leniency within the 
United States, the abuse of prisoners by CIA personnel is not purely a 
matter of domestic law. Torture is criminalized by international law 
that is binding on the United States, the victims were foreign 
nationals, and most of the crimes were committed outside American 
territory. This means that international legal requirements on amnesty 
and the duty to prosecute serious crimes are applicable to debates on 
the extent to which prosecutions have been pursued for prisoner 
abuse. Therefore, to evaluate America’s attitude towards amnesty 
laws, it is necessary to examine not only domestic practice, but also 
the United States’ international engagement with amnesties. 
Until recent decades, amnesty laws were primarily viewed as 
exercises of state sovereignty that were largely unrestrained by 
international law, but international actors regularly became involved 
 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/June/11-ag-861.html. In his statement, the Attorney 
General did not identify the two cases that will be investigated, but it has been reported 
that one case concerns Gul Rahman, who froze to death in 2002 after being stripped and 
shackled to a cold cement floor in a secret American prison in Afghanistan known as the 
Salt Pit. See Marjorie Cohn, Avoiding Impunity: The Need to Broaden Torture 
Prosecutions, JURIST (July 8, 2011), available at http://jurist.org /forum/2011/07/marjorie 
-cohn-torture-investigation.php. The other case is reported to concern Manadel al-Jamadi, 
who died in 2003 at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. He was suspended from the ceiling by his 
wrists, which were bound behind his back. See id. On June 16, 2011, the U.S. Department 
of Justice opened a grand jury investigation in the death of Manadel al-Jamadi. U.S. Opens 
Grand Jury on CIA Detainee’s Death, RADIO NETH. WORLDWIDE (June 16, 2011). 
98 Eric Lichtblau & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Widens Inquiries Into 2 Jail Deaths, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 2011, at A1. 
99 Cohn, supra note 97. 
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in mediating and implementing foreign amnesties. Since the late 
1990s, three distinct legal regimes—international humanitarian law, 
international human rights law, and international criminal law—have 
arguably evolved to impose some restrictions on the ability of states 
to grant amnesties for crimes under international law.100 At present, 
none of these regimes explicitly prohibits amnesties. The restrictions 
must therefore “be ‘read into’ a unified narrative of what the 
differentiated regimes collectively require.”101 For crimes against 
humanity and war crimes committed in non-international armed 
conflicts, such interpretations are reliant on customary international 
law.102 
Under the Charming Betsy doctrine, U.S. courts are required, 
wherever possible, to construe national statutes to “be consistent with 
international law so as to avoid interpretations that will give rise to 
international discord.”103 The absence of international restrictions on 
national amnesty laws until the late 1990s meant that previously, U.S. 
enactment of amnesties or legislated support for foreign amnesties 
rarely risked conflicting with its international obligations. However, 
under the Charming Betsy doctrine, the evolutions in the duty to 
prosecute require U.S. courts to impose greater scrutiny on national 
legalization that conflicts with this duty. 
As has been extensively explored in academic literature, America’s 
relationship to international law, and particularly to international 
 
100 CHRISTINE BELL, ON THE LAW OF PEACE: PEACE AGREEMENTS AND THE LEX 
PACIFICATORIA 243 (2008); see also FREEMAN, supra note 40; OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH 
COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, RULE-OF-LAW-TOOLS FOR POST-CONFLICT STATES: 
AMNESTIES, HR/PUB/09/1 (2009); Charles P. Trumbull IV, Giving Amnesties a Second 
Chance, 25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 283 (2007); Louise Mallinder, Peacebuilding, the Rule 
of Law and the Duty to Prosecute: What Role Remains for Amnesties?, in BUILDING 
PEACE IN POST-CONFLICT STATES 9 (Faria Medjouba ed., 2012). 
101 BELL, supra note 100, at 249. 
102 Article 38 of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute requires that 
determinations of whether such a duty to prosecute exists under customary international 
law must be based on state practice and opinio juris. The ICJ Statute also provides that 
judicial decisions and academic research can be ‘subsidiary’ sources of international 
custom. At present, some subsidiary sources strongly support the existence of the duty to 
prosecute crimes against humanity and serious violations committed in non-international 
armed conflicts. However, State practice appears much less supportive of such a duty. See 
Mallinder, supra note 100, for a more detailed discussion of the status of amnesty laws 
under customary international law. 
103 Roger P. Alford, Foreign Relations as a Matter of Interpretation: The Use and 
Abuse of Charming Betsy, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1339, 1352 (2006). In its judgment, the 
Supreme Court held “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of 
nations, if any other possible construction remains.” Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 
6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). 
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treaties, is often described as “exceptionalist.”104 For example, 
Ignatieff has identified the American habit of “support[ing] 
multilateral agreements and regimes, but only if they permit 
exemptions for American citizens or U.S. practices.”105 This has been 
evident in U.S. engagement with international legal regimes, such as 
the International Criminal Court, that could result in foreign 
prosecutions of U.S. nationals.106 This exceptionalism suggests that 
American attitudes to crimes committed by foreign nationals against 
foreign victims will not translate neatly onto the attitudes that may 
motivate domestic legal and policy decisions on leniency for crimes 
committed by U.S. personnel. Nonetheless, where the United States 
has called for, endorsed, or assisted in the implementation of foreign 
amnesties, it does reveal that although America may support 
accountability and rule of law programs around the world, in certain 
contexts and for certain crimes, it feels that amnesty may be necessary 
and permissible. Consequently, this section will consider unilateral 
pressure applied by the United States on other states in relation to 
amnesties, and its engagement in amnesty negotiations through 
participation in multilateral institutions. 
1. Unilateral Involvement in Foreign Amnesties 
As the author has explored elsewhere,107 within conflicted or 
transitional states, domestic debates on whether to enact amnesty laws 
are often subject to international scrutiny and involvement. This 
involvement can come through international actors proposing that an 
amnesty be introduced; mediating peace negotiations that result in an 
 
104 Tara J. Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 389, 433 (2009); see also Jamie Mayerfeld, Playing by 
our Own Rules: How U.S. Marginalization of International Human Rights Law Led to 
Torture, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 89 (2007); Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification 
of International Human Rights Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 347 (2000), for a discussion of 
U.S. ratifications of human rights treaties. 
105  AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 4. 
106 See, e.g., Giovanni Conso, The Basic Reasons for US Hostility to the ICC in Light of 
the Negotiating History of the Rome Statute, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 314 (2005); M.E. 
Lantto, The United States and the International Criminal Court: A Permanent Divide, 31 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 619 (2007); Gerhard Hafner, An Attempt to Explain the 
Position of the USA Towards the ICC, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 323 (2005); Schabas, supra 
note 7; Ruth Wedgwood, The International Criminal Court: An American View, 10 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 93 (1999). 
107 MALLINDER, supra note 13, at 323–59. 
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amnesty;108 providing technical assistance during the drafting of 
amnesty legislation; or granting financial, logistical, or technical 
support to the amnesty’s implementation.109 At each of these stages, 
international support or opposition to an amnesty can be expressed 
through diplomatic, economic, legal, and military means. For 
individual states, involvement in foreign amnesties is often 
inconsistent with the result that the same state may endorse an 
amnesty in one country, while criticizing or failing to respond to a 
similar amnesty in another state. Furthermore, even within a state, 
different parts of the government may take divergent approaches. For 
example, during the later years of the Cold War, the U.S. Congress 
tried to condition aid to South American countries on their protection 
of human rights, whilst the U.S. armed forces and the CIA trained and 
supported amnesties for groups involved in perpetrating human rights 
violations in the region.110 
Within the Amnesty Law Database, data has been collated on 
American unilateral involvement in twenty-nine amnesty laws 
enacted between 1977 and 2011. These amnesty laws ranged from 
amnesties for serious human rights violations to amnesties for 
political dissidents. This involvement has been categorized into 
diplomatic, economic, legal and military actions, and one amnesty 
process may have triggered multiple forms of involvement. As noted 
in the introduction, the author does not suggest that this data is 
comprehensive; but nonetheless, as summarized in Table 1, it does 
indicate some trends in U.S. involvement. 
  
 
108 See Jacob Bercovitch & Gerald Schneider, Who Mediates? The Political Economy 
of International Conflict Management, 37 J. PEACE RES. 145 (2000); SAMUEL FLAGG 
BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1965), for discussions of 
America’s role as a mediator. 
109 For example, in January 2012, the U.S. State Department urged that an amnesty be 
granted to the former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Although the amnesty was 
condemned by the U.N., the U.S. State Department spokesperson stated: “This is part and 
parcel of giving these guys confidence that their era is over and it’s time for Yemen to be 
able to move forward towards a democratic future.” United States Defends Immunity Law 
for Yemeni President Saleh, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 10, 2012, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/10/us-backs-yemen-immunity-for-saleh. This 
amnesty was approved by the Yemeni Parliament on January 21, 2012, and President 
Saleh arrived in the United States on January 26, 2012, a few weeks before he was due to 
formally step down. See Tim Fitzsimons, Amnesty Plan for Yemen President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh Supported by US, GLOBAL POST (Washington), Jan. 10, 2012; Sebastian Smith, 
Yemen’s President Saleh Arrives in US for Treatment, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 29, 
2012. 
110 CHANDRA LEKHA SRIRAM, CONFRONTING PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: 
JUSTICE VS PEACE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION 26 (2004). 
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Table 1. American Unilateral Involvement in Foreign Amnesties 
 For Against 
Diplomatic 18 5 
Economic 4 2 
Legal 3 1 
Military 6 0 
Total 31 8 
As will be explored in Part IV, U.S. unilateral action has at times 
focused on encouraging the negotiating parties to enact broad, 
unconditional amnesties that encompass the most serious human 
rights violations, which Trumbull has interpreted as suggesting a 
belief among U.S. government officials that amnesties do not violate 
customary international law.111 In contrast, in other contexts, the 
United States has pressured the negotiators to exclude the most 
serious crimes from amnesty laws112 and to pursue prosecutions for 
human rights violations.113 Overall, however, Table 1 indicates that 
where the United States has become actively involved in foreign 
amnesty processes, through exercising diplomatic, legal, financial, or 
military pressure, it has been considerably more likely to encourage 
or coerce states to enact amnesty laws than to withhold them. The 
global military and economic dominance of the United States makes it 
difficult for weak, conflicted, or transitional states to resist such 
pressure.114 American involvement in the amnesty decisions of other 
states can have significant consequences, not just for the states in 
question, but also for the development of international law as state 
practice can shape the emergence of customary international law in 
relation to amnesties for violations of international offenses. 
 
111 Trumbull, supra note 100, at 297. Trumbull makes this argument in relation to all 
third-party negotiation, rather than just U.S. diplomatic interventions. 
112 For example, in 1996 international mediators in Guatemala, including the United 
States, lobbied against the enactment of a blanket amnesty law, see Douglass Cassel, 
Lessons from the Americas: Guidelines for International Response to Amnesties for 
Atrocities, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 202 (1996). 
113 For example, Cassel highlights that acting “under Congressional pressure, the U.S. 
has at times used aid leverage to insist on prosecution of particular human rights cases in 
such countries as Chile, El Salvador, and Guatemala.” Id. at 207. 
114 See, e.g., infra text accompanying n.151 (discussing the Haitian amnesty process). 
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2. Multilateral Involvement in Foreign Amnesties 
The United States can also influence foreign amnesty decisions 
through its participation in multilateral institutions, notably as a 
permanent member of the U.N. Security Council (UNSC).115 The 
Security Council is the world’s “central site of law-making and law-
enforcement in matters related to peace and security,” and through 
participation in it, its permanent members, including the United 
States, can “control it much more easily than the typical processes of 
international lawmaking and [-]enforcement.”116 This can enable the 
United States and the other permanent members “to make law merely 
for others, without being bound themselves.”117 
From the creation of the United Nations to the end of the Cold 
War, the Security Council was deadlocked between the two 
superpowers.118 This caused inaction, which combined with a 
tendency among states and international actors to view amnesty laws 
as matters of state sovereignty.119 As a result, for the first few decades 
of its existence, the UNSC did not routinely engage in amnesty 
debates within conflicted or transitional states. Following the fall of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Security Council became more active in 
responding to serious human rights violations. This was particularly 
evident in the creation of the ad hoc tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda,120 and the increased willingness to authorize 
peacekeeping troops to intervene in situations of mass violence.121 
These developments were mostly “actively furthered by U.S. 
governments interested in the added legitimacy that Council actions 
and authorizations confer.”122 Concurrently to these developments, 
 
115 Cassel, supra note 112, at 206–07. 
116 Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the 
Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 369, 398 (2005). 
117 Id. 
118 See, e.g., JOHN PRADOS, KEEPERS OF THE KEYS: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY COUNCIL FROM TRUMAN TO BUSH (1991); THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM 
THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY (David M. Malone ed., 2004). 
119 See Max Pensky, Amnesty on Trial: Impunity, Accountability, and the Norms of 
International Law, 1 ETHICS & GLOBAL POL. 1 (2008). 
120 See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
121 See, e.g., ROBERT M. CASSIDY, PEACEKEEPING IN THE ABYSS: BRITISH AND 
AMERICAN PEACEKEEPING DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE AFTER THE COLD WAR (2004); 
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Peacekeeping Operations, 19 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 245 (1996). 
122 Krisch, supra note 116, at 398. 
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the UNSC also began to involve itself more directly in the amnesty 
decisions of nation states. 
The Amnesty Law Database has collated data on UNSC resolutions 
and statements on its involvement in eleven amnesty laws enacted 
between 1996 and 2009.123 As with the United States’ unilateral 
involvement, the UNSC’s involvement has been categorized into 
diplomatic, economic, legal, and military actions, and one amnesty 
process may have triggered multiple forms of involvement. For each 
of these actions to have been taken, the United States had to refrain 
from exercising its veto, from which it can be inferred that the U.S. 
either supported the action or acquiesced to it. Again, the data 
collected is not a comprehensive sample of UNSC decisions on 
amnesty, but the results are shown in Table 2: 
Table 2. United Nations Security Council involvement in amnesty laws 
 For Against 
Diplomatic 6 2 
Economic 0 0 
Legal 0 4 
Military 3 0 
Total 9 6 
This table illustrates that the UNSC has been more likely to 
endorse amnesty laws than to object to them. However, on four 
occasions the UNSC objected to amnesty on legal grounds. These 
objections relate to amnesties in Croatia in 1996, Sierra Leone and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo in 1999, and Darfur in Sudan in 2006. 
These instances indicate that the UNSC members were willing to state 
that amnesty laws for genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity violated international law. However, as discussed below, 
the United States’ unilateral approach contradicted the position of the 
UNSC regarding the 1999 amnesty in Sierra Leone. This conflicting 
embrace by America of both accountability and amnesty will be 
 
123 This does not include U.N. Security Council resolutions that referred to amnesty 
laws in general, but rather specific laws that were proposed or enacted in a particular 
country. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1325, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000) 
(“[E]mphasiz[ing] the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to 
prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes 
including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this 
regard stresses the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty 
provisions.”). 
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explored in section IV in relation to domestic amnesties and support 
for foreign amnesties. 
III 
INSTRUMENTALIZING AMNESTY: AMERICA’S USE OF CLEMENCY 
PAST AND PRESENT 
The above sections have demonstrated that within the domestic 
legal system of the United States there are several mechanisms by 
which different organs of the state grant leniency to offenders. 
Furthermore, the United States has at times been willing to endorse 
foreign amnesty laws, even for crimes under international law. This 
acceptance of leniency conflicts with the leadership role America has 
played in the development of international justice. However, it does 
demonstrate a continuity of approach with the limitations placed on 
accountability for prisoner abuse. This section will examine this 
continuity by exploring the motivations for American enactment of or 
support for amnesties, which will be used to contextualize and explain 
the legal and political rationales used to justify limiting the pursuit of 
justice for torture. 
Part V will draw upon the pardons and amnesties included in two 
datasets relating to the United States’ engagement with amnesty laws. 
These historic examples will be analyzed in relation to four broad, 
overlapping themes that are drawn deductively from scholarly 
literature on presidential pardons and international law, together with 
the texts of the pardons and amnesties. These are amnesty, empire, 
and hegemony; amnesty, denial, and justificatory claimsmaking; law, 
politics, and pragmatism in the use of amnesties; and amnesty, mercy, 
and the public welfare. The themes are not to be viewed as precise 
categories, but rather as Weberian “ideal” types or heuristic models, 
and aspects of individual amnesty or pardon processes may relate to 
multiple themes. The relevance of each theme to the contemporary 
efforts to limit accountability will also be explored. 
A. Amnesty, Empire, and Hegemonic Power 
The concept of empire has its roots in the ancient Roman idea of 
imperium, which can be translated as the power to command. Within 
different aspects of Roman law, imperium referred to statutes, the 
legal authority of public officials, and to the territory over which the 
Roman Empire exercised power.124 Thus, Roman imperium entailed 
 
124 ADOLF BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW 493–4 (1953). 
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the direct exercise of power by a state over its subjects. With the 
onset of the Industrial Revolution, European nations hungry for both 
raw materials and markets developed a form of imperialism that was 
based on the overwhelming military, economic, and political power of 
the colonial state over the peoples it subjugated. This power was often 
justified by a belief in the racial, intellectual, and religious superiority 
of the colonizing nations.125 Empire during the colonial period shared 
with the Roman Empire an understanding of imperialism as supreme 
political power exercised by the metropolis over defined territories 
within its control. 
The granting of amnesties has long been closely associated with 
the exercise of power and sovereignty.126 For example, in 1922 Carl 
Schmitt developed his now famous definition of the sovereign as “he 
who decides on the exception” to the law.127 Similarly, Strange has 
argued that “officially sanctioned mercy, like severity, ultimately 
expresses the politics of rule.”128 Within these approaches, there is an 
assumption that by granting amnesty, the sovereign is expressing 
power that he or she already holds. However, of course, amnesties 
may be granted at moments when the sovereign has been weakened 
and wishes to reassert his or her power. As will be explored below, 
the use of amnesties to assert power and ensure compliance with laws 
imposed by the state were featured in the building of the American 
“empire” from independence until the end of the World War I. 
World War I marked the apex of direct territorial forms of empire, 
and in the following decades, historic empires were dismantled and 
most colonial peoples gradually gained their independence. Although 
territorial control has remained central to understandings of 
 
125 There are diverse theories of this era of imperialism. For example, Marxist traditions 
emphasize economic dominance. See, e.g., VLADIMIR ILYICH LENIN, IMPERIALISM THE 
HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM (1939); J.A. HOBSON, IMPERIALISM: A STUDY (1967). 
Other scholars have placed more emphasis on cultural aspects of colonialism. See, e.g., 
EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978). For a compelling history of this period of 
Empire, see also E.J. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EMPIRE, 1875–1914 (1987). 
126 The relationship of mercy to power has been explored more fully in KATHLEEN 
DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1989); Kieran 
McEvoy & Louise Mallinder, Amnesties, Transitional Justice and Governing through 
Mercy, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PUNISHMENT AND SOCIETY (Jonathan Simon & 
Richard Sparks eds., 2012). 
127 CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 5 (George Schwab trans., 1985). 
128 Carolyn Strange, Introduction to QUALITIES OF MERCY: JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT AND 
DISCRETION 3, 5 (Carolyn Strange ed., 1996). 
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imperialism,129 in the latter half of the twentieth century the concept 
evolved to recognize the diverse ways powerful states can exert 
dominance indirectly over the politics and economies of other 
countries. These indirect methods can entail powerful states forcing 
less powerful nations to bend to their will through granting or 
withholding military, financial, or political support. Alternatively, 
where the powerful states are hegemonic, they may exert “consensual 
dominance,” whereby weaker states adopt the ideological positions of 
the powerful.130 As will be explored below, following World War II, 
America attained the status of a hegemonic state, and has used this 
status to influence or directly impose amnesties in other parts of the 
world in order to enhance its own power. 
1. Amnesty and the Building of the American “Empire” 
The United States has long been reluctant to acknowledge its 
potential or actual role as an empire. As a nation that was forged in a 
struggle for independence against the tyrannies of the British Empire, 
the United States seeks to portray itself rather as “the friend of 
freedom everywhere.”131 Indeed, unlike the empires of Rome, the 
Ottomans, the Hapsburgs, Napoleon, or the British, America does not 
seek to establish expansive colonies across the world.132 Nonetheless, 
the issue of “empire” arose early in America’s history. For example, 
George Washington, whilst leader of the Continental Army following 
its victory in the American Revolutionary War, referred to the 
“foundation of our Empire” in his Circular to the States, on June 8, 
1783.133 At this stage, the term “empire” was used to denote 
Americans’ mission of settling the landmass of the continent, rather 
 
129 Mona Domosh, Selling Civilization: Toward a Cultural Analysis of America’s 
Economic Empire in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 29 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE INST. OF BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 453, 455 (2004). Indeed, in the 
post-World War II era, new territorial empires emerged, for example, the Soviet Union. 
130 See Christine Bell et al., The Battle for Transitional Justice: Hegemony, Iraq, and 
International Law, in JUDGES, TRANSITIONS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 147, 153 (John 
Morison et al. eds., 2007) (discussing Gramsci’s theory of hegemony). 
131 Michael Ignatieff, The American Empire (Get Used to It), N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003. 
132 It does, however, retain control over the following islands: Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin 
Islands, American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and several other outlying 
islands. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/OGC-98-5, U.S. INSULAR 
AREAS: APPLICATION OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1997). Furthermore, it exercises 
administrative control over dependent territories, including Guantánamo Bay in Cuba. See 
Agreement for the Lease to the United States of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval 
Stations, Feb. 16–23, 1903, T.S. No. 418. 
133 GEORGE WASHINGTON, CIRCULAR TO THE STATES (1783), reprinted in THE 
FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION 218, 219 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
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than overseas expansion. From this period until the Civil War, U.S. 
territory gradually expanded through a series of treaties with the 
British, Spanish, and French who had all exercised control over parts 
of the North American continent. By 1861, the United States already 
claimed control over most of the landmass of present-day America.134 
During this expansionist period, the federal government sought to 
employ amnesty laws to entrench its power against those who 
challenged it and to encourage insurgents to adhere to national laws. 
For example, in 1795 President George Washington proclaimed a 
“full, free and entire pardon . . . of all treasons, misprisions of treason, 
and other indictable offenses against the United States” for the 
participants in the Whiskey Rebellion.135 During this rebellion, 
farmers in the western counties of Pennsylvania rioted against the 
imposition of an excise tax on whiskey. This violence was viewed as 
a direct threat to the government’s authority, causing President 
Washington to respond by “[r]aising an army larger than the troops he 
commanded during most of the war with England and leading them 
himself into Pennsylvania”136 In the face of such concerted action, the 
rebellion soon collapsed and an agreement was reached on September 
2, 1794, which proclaimed that if the rebels adhered to the laws of the 
United States and paid the taxes on whiskey, they would be granted a 
pardon the following July. Washington duly complied with this 
promise and pardoned two leaders of the rebellion who had been 
convicted,137 along with the other participants. The pardon was, 
however, conditional on the recipients continuing to adhere to the 
laws, and it excluded every convicted person who failed to comply 
with the agreement.138 When a similar rebellion erupted in 1799, 
President Adams followed Washington’s example by enacting an 
amnesty for the insurgents.139 For both the 1795 and 1800 amnesty 
 
134 In addition, from 1822 to 1847 Liberia was a protectorate of the United States. 
135 Proclamation of Pardons in Western Pennsylvania (July 10, 1795) [hereinafter 
Washington Proclamation], reprinted in I A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897 [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS 
VOL. I], at 181 (James C. Richardson ed., 1899) (proclamation by George Washington 
granting pardon to certain persons formally engaged in violence and obstruction of justice 
in protest of liquor laws in Pennsylvania). 
136 ALFONSO J. DAMICO, DEMOCRACY AND THE CASE FOR AMNESTY 27 (1975). 
137 P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Executive Clemency in the United States: Origins, Development, 
and Analysis (1900–1993), 27 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 251, 253–54 (1997). 
138 Washington Proclamation, supra note 135. 
139 Proclamation (May 21, 1800), reprinted in PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS VOL. I, 
supra note 135, at 303–04 [hereinafter Adams Proclamation] (proclamation by John  
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proclamations, government forces had suppressed the rebellions 
several months before the proclamations were issued, which meant 
that the amnesties were not used to encourage the insurgents to end 
their violent struggle, but rather to encourage them to continue to 
abide by the law once the government forces had returned to barracks. 
The outbreak of the American Civil War between 1861 and 1865 
triggered a series of amnesty laws for draft dodgers and rebels. The 
first amnesty for the insurgents was offered in 1863, while the war 
was raging, in order “to suppress the insurrection and to restore the 
authority of the United States.”140 It was conditional on the 
beneficiaries taking an oath to “henceforth faithfully support, protect, 
and defend the Constitution of the United States . . . and . . . abide by 
and faithfully support all” congressional acts and presidential 
proclamations relating to slavery.141 Following the war’s conclusion, 
several subsequent amnesty laws were issued culminating in an 
unconditional amnesty for treason proclaimed by President Johnson in 
1868, when many in the South were resentful of the Reconstruction 
government and federal occupying forces, and paramilitary groups 
sought to resist the integration of freed slaves into the nation’s 
political life. Johnson’s 1868 amnesty proclamation sought to 
overcome these lingering resentments and “to secure a complete and 
universal establishment and prevalence of municipal law and order in 
conformity with the Constitution of the United States.”142 This 
 
Adams granting pardon to certain persons engaged in insurrection against the United 
States in the counties of Northampton, Montgomery, and Bucks, in the state of 
Pennsylvania). This insurrection, known as the “Fries” or “House Tax” rebellion, arose in 
the counties of Northampton, Montgomery, and Bucks in eastern Pennsylvania in 1799. It 
was aimed at preventing the execution of a law directed at the valuation of houses, land, 
and slaves for the purposes of taxation. German-American farmers who protested against 
the law had been arrested by a federal marshal, which prompted 100 men, led by Jacob 
Fries, to assail the marshal to demand the release of the farmers. The federal government 
again gathered a large number of troops, causing the insurgents to surrender without 
resistance. Fries and one other leader of the rebellion were convicted of treason and 
sentenced to be hanged. However, in May 1800, President Adams, acting against the 
advice of his cabinet pardoned the convicted men and the other insurgents. See Ruckman, 
supra note 137, at 254. 
140 Proclamation No. 111 (Mar. 26, 1864), reprinted in VI A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897, at 218 (James D. Richardson 
ed., 1907) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS VOL. VI] (proclamation by 
Abraham Lincoln concerning amnesty); see also Proclamation No. 108 (Dec. 8, 1863), 
reprinted in PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS VOL. VI, supra, at 213–15 (proclamation by 
Abraham Lincoln regarding amnesty and reconstruction). 
141 Proclamation No. 108, supra note 140. 
142 Proclamation No. 170 (July 4, 1868), reprinted in PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS 
VOL. VI, supra note 140, at 655–56 (proclamation by Andrew Johnson granting pardon to  
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illustrates that during the first phase of American “empire” in which 
the United States sought to consolidate its control over the continent; 
amnesties were used as a means of reducing dissent against federal 
power and ensuring compliance with federal laws. 
Following the end of the post-Civil War Reconstruction period, 
America’s “empire” began to spread beyond its landmass with the 
Spanish-American War. This war resulted in the Paris Peace Treaty of 
1898, in which Spain ceded to the United States control over Cuba, 
Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines.143 As the United States ruled 
over its new territories, it intermittently used amnesties to undermine 
dissent similar to how amnesties had been used within the United 
States. For example, in 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt 
proclaimed under his constitutional pardoning powers “a full and 
complete pardon and amnesty” to all persons in the Philippines who 
participated in insurrections against Spanish and American rule. To 
benefit, individuals were required to pledge to “recognize and accept 
the supreme authority of the United States of America in the 
Philippine Islands” and to “maintain true faith and allegiance” to the 
United States.144 As the American empire spread overseas, amnesty 
laws continued to be used to ensure adherence to federal laws and 
acceptance of the power of the government. 
2. Amnesty and the Exercise of Hegemonic Power 
From World War II, American power on the international stage 
shifted from direct exercises of power over peoples and territories, 
towards more hegemonic forms of dominance. This conception of 
empire resulted in the United States intervening financially, 
diplomatically, and militarily in the governance of states around the 
world. Following the end of the Cold War, America became the 
world’s sole superpower. This power means that even though 
America became “an empire without consciousness of itself as 
such,”145 or “[a]n [e]mpire in [d]enial,”146 it nonetheless was and is 
 
all persons participating in the late rebellion, except those under indictment for treason or 
other felony). 
143 Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754. The treaty itself 
contained an amnesty in Article VI. Subsequently, the United States also had protectorate 
control over Nicaragua between 1912 and 1933. 
144 Proclamation No. 483 (July 4, 1902), reprinted in A SUPPLEMENT TO A 
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1902, at 392–94 
(George Raywood Devitt ed., 1903) (proclamation by Theodore Roosevelt granting pardon 
and amnesty to participants in insurrection in the Philippines). 
145 Ignatieff, supra note 131. 
342 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 14, 307 
capable of (and frequently does) influencing the domestic policies of 
other states. 
Although America’s dominance enables it to influence the 
formation of global norms, it too is affected by evolution of those 
norms.147 In relation to amnesty laws, it is significant that the United 
States’ emergence as a global hegemonic power coincided with the 
growth of transitional justice and international criminal law, in which 
America became a leader. As noted above, these emerging legal 
frameworks arguably created restrictions of the use of amnesty laws, 
which the United States invoked in arguing against amnesties in 
contexts such as Bosnia, which will be explored below. In contrast, 
during and after the Cold War, the United States frequently endorsed 
foreign amnesties for its “allies” in the fight against communism148 or 
where it wished to broker peace settlements. In these instances, U.S. 
invocations of international law contradicted its statements elsewhere, 
as the amnesties were described by U.S. officials as protecting human 
rights, rather than violating them. Such pragmatism was also evident 
in domestic pardons for crimes relating to the Iran-Contra affair, 
which related to questions of presidential involvement in selling 
weapons to Iran while contravening congressional enactments by 
funneling the proceeds of weapons’ sales to the Contra death squads 
in Nicaragua.149 The domestic pardon for the American officials 
 
146 Niall Ferguson, An Empire in Denial: The Limits of US Imperialism, 25 HARV. 
INT’L L. REV. 64, 64 (2003). 
147 SIKKINK, supra note 29, at 204–05. 
148 For example, during the Cold War, the United States provided diplomatic and 
financial support for dictatorial regimes and in some cases, the United States was directly 
implicated in horrific episodes of human rights abuses, such as Operación Cóndor in Latin 
America, which received American financial and technical support (many of the personnel 
involved were trained to inflict terror at the American-run School of the Americas). See, 
e.g., J. PATRICE MCSHERRY, PREDATORY STATES: OPERATION CONDOR AND COVERT 
WAR IN LATIN AMERICA (2005); Katherine E. McCoy, Trained to Torture? The Human 
Rights Effects of Military Training at the School of the Americas, 32 LATIN AM. PERSP. 47 
(2005); Russell W. Ramsey & Antonio Raimondo, Human Rights Instruction at the U.S. 
Army School of the Americas, 2 HUM. RTS. REV. 92 (2001). 
149 Criminal proceedings were brought against executive branch officials, and Oliver 
North was convicted for his role in the scandal. The political implications of this pardon 
were explored in several contemporary articles. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Iran-
Contra Pardon Mess, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 883 (1992); Harold Hongju Koh, Begging Bush’s 
Pardon, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 889 (1992); Carl Levin & Henry Hyde, The Iran-Contra 
Pardons: Was it Wrong for Ex-President Bush to Pardon Six Defendants?, 79 A.B.A. J. 44 
(1993); Lawrence E. Walsh, Political Oversight, the Rule of Law, and Iran-Contra, 42 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 587 (1994). 
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implicated in the affair sought to legitimize American support for the 
Contras.150 
In some cases, motivated by domestic and international policy 
priorities, American involvement in foreign amnesties moved beyond 
endorsement of the amnesty legislation to actively pressuring local 
actors to grant amnesties. For example, in 1994, when America was 
faced with a stream of Haitian refugees fleeing the military junta, the 
U.S. government responded by pressuring deposed, democratically-
elected president Jean Bertrand Aristide to agree to a peace deal 
granting a broad amnesty and permitting the junta leaders to go into 
exile. In this instance there was strong resistance to the amnesty 
policy from the Haitian officials, with the result that U.S. involvement 
extended to drafting the text of the amnesty legislation.151 The U.N. 
and the Organization of American States endorsed America’s amnesty 
proposal, but their acquiescence was described as “the usual post cold 
war charade . . . in which the US uses a tame UN to give international 
legitimacy to the pursuit of its own very particular foreign policy 
objectives.”152 This example highlights the difficulties faced by 
smaller states in resisting American pressure to introduce amnesty 
laws. 
At first glance, American engagement with amnesties as an 
exercise of its hegemonic power contrasts with the domestic 
amnesties enacted during its empire-building phase. The latter were 
introduced to encourage law-abiding behavior, whereas the former 
amnesties were often used to reward the law-breaking behavior of 
ideological allies. However, there are commonalities in that for both 
phases of U.S. empire, involvement in amnesty debates was designed 
to influence the outcome of political conflict in order to suit the 
priorities of the United States, and to weaken the opponents of 
American power. 
The language of “empire” underwent a resurgence during the Bush 
presidency. For example, Charles Krauthammer proclaimed a few 
months before September 11, 2001, that “America is no mere 
international citizen. It is the dominant power in the world, more 
dominant than any since Rome. Accordingly, America is in a position 
 
150 See Proclamation No. 6518, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,145 (Dec. 24, 1992) (proclamation by 
George H.W. Bush granting executive clemency). 
151 Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was there a Duty to Prosecute 
International Crimes in Haiti?, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 7 (1996). 
152 Dominic Lawson, The Pressure of Gunboat Diplomacy: Britain Has Offered the 
U.S. Two Warships to Help Invade Haiti, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1994. 
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to reshape norms, alter expectations and create new realities. How? 
By unapologetic and implacable demonstrations of will.”153 More 
directly, as a Bush administration official told investigative reporter 
Ronald Suskind, “We are an empire. We make our own reality.”154 
Unlike the preceding decades, during the Bush presidency, America’s 
“empire” once again engaged in territorial domination in the military 
invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Following the 
“regime changes” in these countries, the United States used amnesties 
to weaken insurgencies that challenged its interests. For example, on 
January 7, 2004, the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority,155 Paul Bremer, declared an amnesty for over 500 Iraqis156 
who were being held by coalition forces for suspected involvement in 
insurgency. The amnesty offer excluded anyone who was accused of 
having “blood on their hands” by, for example, causing death or 
serious physical injury to an Iraqi citizen or member of the coalition 
forces.157 Mr. Bremer, when announcing the amnesty, said that it was 
expected to contribute to American efforts to win the “hearts and 
minds” of the Iraqi people, following complaints about heavy-handed 
tactics.158 In short, the amnesty was designed to support broader U.S. 
strategies of governance and control over Iraq. 
3. Torture, Hegemony, and Creating Exceptions to the Law 
As this section has explored, since independence the United States 
has grown from establishing control over its current territorial 
boundaries, through gaining increasing power on the international 
 
153 Charles Krauthammer, The Bush Doctrine, TIME, Mar. 5, 2001. 
154 See Raymond Michalowski, Power, Crime and Criminology in the New Imperial 
Age, 51 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 303, 310 (2009). 
155 Following the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq by the United States and its 
allies, the occupying powers established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) as a 
transitional government, which was empowered to exercise executive, legislative, and 
judicial authority over Iraq. The allies cited U.N. Security Council “Resolution 1483 
(2003) and the laws and usages of war” as the legal basis to establish the CPA. Coalition 
Provisional Authority, Reg. No. 1 (May 16, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition 
.org/regulations/. 
156 This number represented only four percent of the Iraqis believed to be in U.S. 
custody at that time. See Luke Harding & Richard Norton Taylor, U.S. Frees Iraqis After 
British Protest, GUARDIAN (London) Jan. 8, 2004. 
157 James Rupert, U.S. Hopes Key Policy Reversal Will Help to Quell Iraq Insurgency, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 24, 2004. 
158 Stephen Farrell, Prisoners Freed in Bid for Hearts and Minds, TIMES (London), Jan. 
8, 2004, at 20; US to Release 506 Iraqi Prisoners, BBC NEWS, Jan. 7, 2004; U.S. Begins 
Releasing Iraqi Prisoners: At Least One Vows Revenge, WHITE HOUSE BULLETIN, Jan. 8, 
2004. 
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stage, to becoming the world’s sole superpower. This dominance 
enables the United States to use international law as an instrument of 
power, to regulate the behavior of other states and entrench its 
policies and worldview.159 However, the regulations of international 
law also apply to the United States, and can constrain its exercises of 
dominance. Where this occurs, powerful states, like the United States, 
have a range of “soft and hard options,” including violating the law, 
creating an exceptional legal regime that applies to the hegemonic 
state, and changing the applicable rules to suit the hegemon’s 
interests.160 
As was explored above, torture is explicitly prohibited in multiple 
international treaties and U.S. domestic law. This constrained the 
legality of the Bush administration’s policy of coercive interrogation. 
As a result, the administration’s political and strategic goals came into 
conflict with the state’s obligations under international law. Through 
the framing of the struggle against terrorism as a “war,” and 
reinterpreting America’s legal obligations in the torture memos, the 
Bush administration attempted to assert its hegemonic power by 
reshaping applicable international law to create an exception for the 
United States. 
At the domestic level, the decisions not to prosecute prisoner abuse 
by CIA interrogators differ from the amnesties enacted during the 
United States’ empire-building phase, as, although both benefited 
persons who were acting outside the United States’ federal laws, the 
rebels in the earlier amnesties were challenging the authority of the 
federal government, whereas the CIA interrogators committed torture 
as part of a federally sanctioned policy. Consequently, the rationale 
for granting the interrogators amnesty is not to dissuade them from 
future law breaking, but to protect official institutions and personnel 
and to limit challenges to their legitimacy. In this way, the decisions 
not to prosecute can be compared to the United States’ support for 
Cold War amnesties, which were designed to protect U.S. allies from 
accountability. Such forms of amnesty are designed to create 
exceptions to the law, by exempting those who usually deserve 
punishment from criminal sanction. By creating such exceptions from 
its international and domestic legal obligations, the United States has 
 
159 Krisch, supra note 116, at 371. 
160 Bell et al., supra note 130, at 153–4 (citing Michael Byers, Presumptive Self-
Defense: Hegemony, Equality and Strategies of Legal Change, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 171, 171–
74 (2003)). 
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demonstrated not just its ability to assert its power to commit serious 
human rights violations, but also to evade international standards on 
accountability that it seeks to encourage nations in other parts of the 
world to uphold. As the following section will explore, this double 
standard challenges the United States’ self-image as an exemplary 
state. 
B. Amnesty, Denial, and Justificatory Claimsmaking 
America has been described as an “exceptional” society since 
Alexis de Tocqueville wrote Democracy in America in 1831.161 This 
study, and much of the subsequent literature, has found that in 
comparison to other developed nations, “the United States was 
created differently, developed differently, and thus has to be 
understood differently–essentially on its own terms and within its 
own context.”162 This perception has given rise to a rich literature 
exploring the uniqueness of different aspects of America’s political, 
cultural, religious, and economic life that is too vast to be explored in 
this article. Instead, this section will restrict itself to exploring, 
through the lens of amnesties, how America’s perception of itself as 
an exceptional society has influenced its justifications for 
involvement in human rights violations and the legal responses to 
these crimes. 
From the earliest Puritan settlements in the “New World,” a self-
understanding of America’s national values and global role has 
resonated through the nation’s political discourse. This view was 
presciently encapsulated in 1630 in a sermon by Puritan leader (and 
later New England Governor), John Winthrop, who described the 
society that the Puritans sought to create as a “city upon a hill,”163 
which would provide a shining example for the world through its 
commitments to liberty, democracy, equality, and religious devotion. 
Furthermore, he suggested that the success of this society that they 
were trying to establish would be ensured by the promotion of these 
goals at home and abroad. This concept, which Goodhart has termed 
“[p]rovidential exceptionalism,” refers to “a commonplace American 
belief that theirs is a chosen nation, one upon which Providence has 
bestowed special blessings and which has been charged with a special 
 
161 E.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835). 
162 Byron E. Shafer, Preface to IS AMERICA DIFFERENT? A NEW LOOK AT AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM, at v (Byron E. Shafer ed., 1991). 
163 John Winthrop, Sermon, A Modell of Christian Charity (1630). 
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world-historical mission to cultivate and promote its values.”164 Such 
conceptions of exceptionalism have been invoked in the rhetoric of 
nearly every American president, and Presidents Kennedy and 
Reagan explicitly cited Winthrop in speeches.165 It was particularly 
evident in the “Bush Doctrine,”166 and has continued into the Obama 
presidency.167 This self-perception of America as a nation of values 
has affected why and how clemency has been used by different 
administrations. 
As noted above, amnesty laws seek to prevent specified crimes or 
offenders being investigated, but when they are issued, they generally 
entail an assumption that crimes have been committed, and indeed, in 
some cases, the beneficiaries have been convicted prior to the 
amnesty’s proclamation.168 Where amnestied acts are labeled as 
crimes, this has the potential to convey social disapproval of the acts 
in a similar manner to the expressivist functions of prosecution.169 
However, in some contexts, states may seek to use the enactment of 
amnesty legislation to reinterpret or justify these crimes, in order to 
alter how they are perceived by society.170 Such forms of denial are 
prevalent where the state has responsibility for violence.171 Amnesties 
 
164 Michael Goodhart, Reverting to Form: American Exceptionalism and International 
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165 Koh, supra note 4, at 1481 n.4. 
166 For example, in his second inaugural speech, President George W. Bush 
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liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best 
hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.” President 
George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2005), available at http://www 
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can contribute to such by “wiping the slate clean” regarding the 
offenders’ criminality, limiting the scope of investigations into 
particular allegations, or using amnesty legislation to privilege the 
official account of disputed historical narratives. In this way, an 
amnesty law may not be simply a tool for forgetting the crimes, but 
rather a legal means to reinterpret and re-present them as unworthy 
of punishment. Where amnesties are used to promote such 
reinterpretations, they are part of official claimsmaking discourse,172 
whereby states hope that by using a legal measure such as amnesty to 
assert a clear position on the deserving nature of the crimes, this 
portrayal will become accepted and established within the nation’s 
collective memory.173 Drawing on Stan Cohen’s seminal account of 
denial, this section will explore how America’s engagement with 
amnesty laws has been used to reinforce its national self-image 
through reinterpretation and justification of amnestied crimes. 
1. Amnesty and Interpretative Denial 
Interpretative denial entails arguing “what happened is really 
something else.”174 It can take many forms, ranging from developing 
euphemisms to conceal or minimize the true nature of particular 
crimes (for example, labeling torture with the more neutral sounding 
term “enhanced interrogation”) to developing legal strategies to 
undermine internationally accepted legal definitions and principles 
(the torture memos provide a clear example of this approach). Among 
the amnesties enacted or endorsed by the United States, 
reinterpretations have included describing crimes as the misguided 
actions of normally patriotic and law-abiding citizens. 
Several of America’s domestic amnesty laws and pardons have 
reinterpreted offenders’ actions in order to portray them as deserving 
of mercy due to their heroic or misguided behavior. For example, 
President Adams’ 1800 amnesty proclamation characterized 
participants in a rebellion against taxation as “the ignorant, 
misguided, and misinformed,” who had “returned to a proper sense of 
their duty.”175 Subsequently, in 1815, President Madison pardoned a 
 
172 For a discussion of claimsmaking, see MALCOLM SPECTOR & JOHN I. KITSUSE, 
CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL PROBLEMS (2000); Joel Best, Rhetoric in Claims-Making: 
Constructing the Missing Children Problem, 34 SOC. PROBS. 101 (1987). 
173 For a discussion of how law can shape collective memory, see OSIEL, supra note 
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174 COHEN, supra note 171, at 103. 
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group of 800 smugglers in Louisiana, known as “the Barataria 
pirates,” who had traded illegally with foreign states in violation of 
American acts on revenue, trade, and navigation. As part of the War 
of 1812 between the United States and British Empire, Britain tried to 
capture New Orleans, and they offered the leader of the Barataria 
pirates, Jean Laffite, “$30,000, a pardon, and a captaincy in exchange 
for assistance in the attack.”176 He refused and his pirates fought with 
the U.S. government to defend the city.177 In recognition of their 
actions, President Madison proclaimed a pardon for them on February 
6, 1815, stating: 
[T]hey have abandoned the prosecution of the worse cause for the 
support of the best, and . . . they have exhibited in the defense of 
New Orleans unequivocal traits of courage and fidelity. Offenders 
who have refused to become the associates of the enemy in the war 
upon the most seducing terms of invitation and who have aided to 
repel his hostile invasion of the territory of the United States can no 
longer be considered as objects of punishment, but as objects of a 
generous forgiveness.178 
In this way, the amnesty proclamation transformed the pirates from 
criminals, who violated the laws of the United States, to patriotic 
heroes, who fought to protect America from external enemies. 
A similar approach was taken in an 1863 amnesty for Civil War 
draft evasion and desertion, in which those who surrendered and 
partook of the amnesty were described as “patriotic and faithful 
citizens” in contrast to the “evil-disposed and disloyal persons” who 
engaged in desertion.179 Similarly, President Johnson’s 1867 amnesty 
proclamation described the population of the former Confederation as 
having become “well and loyally disposed” and as conforming, “or, if 
permitted to do so, will conform” to state or federal law.180 Patriotic 
language was also invoked in later pardons. For example, the 
preamble to President Bush Sr.’s pardon for the Iran-Contra Affair 
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extolled at length the “true American” patriotism and service of U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who had been indicted for 
perjury and obstruction of justice.181 While it is true that Secretary 
Weinberger had worked in public service for almost three decades, by 
emphasizing this aspect of his background, rather than repudiating his 
role in selling missiles to Iran to fund death squads in Nicaragua, the 
pardon was used to frame his actions as having been motivated by 
patriotism, and therefore, justifiable. 
2. Amnesty and Justificatory Denial 
Cohen identified a second form of denial (which he terms 
“implicatory” denial) as denial that partially acknowledges criticism 
of the state’s actions, but argues “what happened is justified.”182 In 
this approach, crimes come to be seen as acts that, although excessive 
or disproportionate, were carried out for a greater public good, such 
as defeating communism or global terrorism. America’s belief in its 
own inherent righteousness has at times resulted in it developing 
justificatory forms of denial to explain its involvement in violence or 
support for repressive foreign allies. For example, politicians often 
frame America’s participation in international conflicts as a fight 
against evil, in which all those who act with America, despite their 
methods, are portrayed as heroes, whereas their opponents are 
described as “evil.”183 
 
181 “Some of the best and most dedicated of our countrymen were called upon to step 
forward. Secretary Weinberger was among the foremost.” Proclamation No. 6518, supra 
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of Defense throughout most of the Reagan Presidency, Caspar Weinberger was one 
of the principal architects of the downfall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union. 
He directed the military renaissance in this country that led to the breakup of the 
communist bloc and a new birth of freedom and democracy. Upon his resignation 
in 1987, Caspar Weinberger was awarded the highest civilian medal our Nation can 
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Justificatory forms of denial are present in the language of 
numerous American amnesties and political pardons. For example, 
President Adams’ 1800 amnesty described the 1799 uprising as the 
“wicked and treasonable insurrection against the just authority of the 
United States of America,” which the state had suppressed “speedily  
. . . without any of the calamities usually attending rebellion.”184 Later 
in the wake of the Civil War, the preamble to President Johnson’s 
1867 amnesty proclamation for those who participated in the 
“rebellion” opened by affirming the official narrative of the conflict: 
[T]he war then existing was not waged on the part of the 
Government in any spirit of oppression nor for any purpose of 
conquest or subjugation, nor purpose of overthrowing or interfering 
with the rights or established institutions of the States, but to defend 
and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and to preserve the 
Union, with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States 
unimpaired.185 
In this context, the terms of the amnesty were used to articulate the 
righteousness of the state’s cause. 
As Cohen notes, justificatory claimsmaking can also include 
contextualizing events by asserting that “normal standards of 
judgment cannot apply because the country’s circumstances—
terrorism, isolation, nuclear threats—are unique.”186 Such 
contextualization was evident in America’s struggle against the threat 
of communism during the Cold War, which, as noted above, caused 
the United States to endorse or even demand broad amnesties for its 
allies that covered their most atrocious crimes. For example, in 1988, 
commenting on the agreement of a ceasefire in the Nicaraguan civil 
war, in which all political prisoners would be released and the Contras 
would be permitted to participate in national reconciliation, U.S. 
Secretary of State, George P. Schultz, described the actions of the 
Contras in Nicaragua as the “determination and sacrifice of the 
freedom fighters.”187 In a similar way to domestic U.S. amnesties and 
pardons, the text of these foreign amnesties often sought to portray a 
particular narrative of a conflict. For example, following the “dirty 
 
184 Adams Proclamation, supra note 139. 
185 Proclamation 167, supra note 180. 
186 COHEN, supra note 171, at 111. 
187 Nicaragua: U.S. Keeps Arm’s Length from Ceasefire Accord, INTER PRESS 
SERVICE, Mar. 24, 1988. 
352 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 14, 307 
wars” in South America,188 military crimes that were amnestied were 
often framed as having been committed in response to the threat from 
left-wing terrorism, an approach known within South America as the 
“theory of the two demons.”189 These narratives chimed with 
America’s own rationales for its involvement in human rights 
violations in the hemisphere and elsewhere, and by supporting these 
amnesties, it may have sought to bolster its own justifications. 
More recently, in his 1992 pardon for Caspar Weinberger and 
others for their conduct related to the Iran-Contra affair, President 
Bush Sr. used the amnesty legislation to highlight what the State 
perceived to be America’s achievements in the previous six years. In 
the preamble to the pardon, he stated that, during that period, “the last 
American hostage has come home to freedom, worldwide terrorism 
has declined, the people of Nicaragua have elected a democratic 
government, and the Cold War has ended in victory for the American 
people and the cause of freedom we championed.”190 Each of these 
events had taken place, but they were not directly related to the 
amnestied acts, or the individuals benefiting from the pardon. It 
therefore seems that President Bush Sr. included this celebration of 
official triumphs in the pardon to justify and minimize the granting of 
clemency to perpetrators of serious offenses. 
3. Denial, Claimsmaking, and Prisoner Abuse 
The officially sanctioned policies of torture, rendition, and 
arbitrary detention during the Bush administration are clearly at odds 
with America’s self-image as a society uniquely founded on 
commitments to liberty, democracy, equality, and the rule of law. It 
can be argued that these values were debased by the policies of 
torture.191 However, rather than focusing on accountability to reassert 
these values, the politics of denial and claimsmaking have featured in 
the legal responses to the abuses. For example, when announcing that 
no prosecutions would be pursued for those who had acted within the 
 
188 Greg Grandin, The Instruction of Great Catastrophe: Truth Commissions, National 
History, and State Formation in Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 46, 
48 (2005). 
189 The theory of the two demons has been written about extensively with reference to 
Argentina. See, e.g., Carina Perelli, Settling Accounts with Blood Memory: The Case of 
Argentina, 59 SOC. RES. 415, 431 (1992); Grandin, supra note 188, at 52–53; see also 
Mark Osiel, The Making of Human Rights Policy in Argentina: The Impact of Ideas and 
Interests on a Legal Conflict, 18 J. LATIN AM STUD. 135 (1986).  
190 Proclamation No. 6518, supra note 150. 
191 Paul Krugman, Reclaiming America’s Soul, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2009, at A27. 
2012] Power, Pragmatism and Prisoner Abuse: 353 
Amnesty and Accountability in the United States 
parameters of the legal advice given in the torture memos, President 
Obama took care to note that: 
[t]he men and women of our intelligence community serve 
courageously on the front lines of a dangerous world. Their 
accomplishments are unsung and their names unknown, but because 
of their sacrifices, every single American is safer. We must protect 
their identities as vigilantly as they protect our security, and we 
must provide them with the confidence that they can do their 
jobs.192 
In this statement, President Obama sought to contextualize prisoner 
abuse within the unique security threats faced by the United States in 
the post-9/11 world. By emphasizing the work of the intelligence 
community in “keeping America safe,” the decision not to prosecute 
reinforced the arguments made by some commentators that coercive 
interrogation methods extracted some useful information from 
detainees.193 This demonstrates an official reluctance to consider 
empirical evidence on international experiences, which demonstrate 
that torture rarely produces useful information,194 and may have been 
counterproductive for American national security. 
In contrast to the official discourse of the federal government, 
legislators195 and human rights organizations within the United 
States196 have argued that investigations and prosecutions are 
necessary. These campaigns contend that greater accountability would 
“convey to citizens a disapproval of violations and support for core 
democratic values”;197 communicate to the world America’s 
commitment to its international legal obligations;198 and enhance 
legitimacy, accountability, and transparency within domestic 
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institutions. These arguments have both legal and political weight, but 
it seems that, to date, they have been trumped in official 
policymaking by more pragmatic concerns. 
C. Law, Politics, and Pragmatism in the Use of Amnesty 
Doctrinal approaches to the production of legal knowledge 
emphasize the value of consistency, continuity, universality, 
objectivity, and fairness offered by law.199 Here, law is portrayed as 
“separate from—and ‘above,’”—decisions motivated by politics, 
economics, culture, or religion.200 Where issues are characterized as 
“legal questions” rather than matters of political or social policy, they 
are deemed to be “settled and not debatable.”201 However, this 
conceals the extent to which law is constituted by politics and can be 
instrumentalized within political decision-making. Indeed, as studies 
of law and politics reveal, “[l]aw is one of the central products of 
politics and the prize over which many political struggles are 
waged.”202 Under such pragmatic or instrumentalist views, laws are 
not honored or valued for their intrinsic nature or status, but rather 
because of the outcomes that law can help policymakers achieve.203 
This complex interplay between law and politics is often starkly 
revealed in public or legislative debates on the need for, and the scope 
of, amnesty legislation. Indeed, as noted by French jurist, Joseph 
Barthélemy, enacting an amnesty “is an act of high politics.”204 As 
this section will explore, pragmatic approaches to resolving domestic 
political disputes, responding to domestic public opinion, and 
delivering foreign policy priorities have all influenced America’s 
engagement with amnesty laws. 
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1. Amnesty and the Role of Law in National Politics 
Among the amnesties proclaimed by American presidents for 
political offenses committed within the United States, amnesty was 
often described as necessary to unite the country and focus on the 
future. For example, President Johnson, in his 1867 amnesty 
proclamation contrasted the positive outcomes of amnesties with the 
risks of prosecutions: “[A] retaliatory or vindictive policy, attended 
by unnecessary disqualifications, pains, penalties, confiscation, and 
disenfranchisements, now, as always, could only tend to hinder 
reconciliation among the people and national restoration, while it 
must seriously embarrass, obstruct, and repress popular energies and 
national industry and enterprise . . . .”205 Here, rebuilding the country 
after the Civil War was viewed as a political task, in which law could 
be subordinated to the achievement of political goals. 
Although, since the Civil War, the United States has not faced such 
serious threats to its national unity, subsequent U.S. amnesties have 
continued to be justified as necessary to end divisive, domestic 
political contestation. However, such contestation though damaging, 
poses little threat of armed conflict erupting on American soil. For 
example, thirty days after President Nixon was forced to resign due to 
the Watergate scandal, his chosen successor, President Ford, 
pardoned his predecessor.206 Unsurprisingly, this pardon was 
criticized as being politically motivated, prompting President Ford to 
appear before the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice to justify his decision.207 He 
argued that the pardon was necessary to “change our national focus    
. . . [t]o shift attention from the pursuit of a fallen president to the 
pursuit of urgent needs of a rising nation.”208 He continued that, 
without pardon, “[d]uring this long period of delay and potential 
litigation, ugly passions would again be aroused. And our people 
would again be polarized in their opinions. And the credibility of our 
free institutions of government would again be challenged at home 
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and abroad.”209 In this statement, President Ford identified multiple 
threats posed by prosecutions including polarizing public opinion, 
undermining the legitimacy of the state, and weakening national 
recovery. Here, as with the post-Civil War era, these priorities are 
primarily political challenges, and hence the pardon was used to 
create exceptions to the rule of law that would arguably serve political 
goals. 
President George Bush Sr. raised similar arguments in his pardon 
for the Iran-Contra Affair, in which, after citing a number of historical 
American amnesties, he declared: “[M]y predecessors acted because it 
was time for the country to move on. Today I do the same.”210 He 
further highlighted the complex relationship between crime and 
politics by arguing: 
The prosecutions of the individuals I am pardoning represent what I 
believe is a profoundly troubling development in the political and 
legal climate of our country: the criminalization of policy 
differences. These differences should be addressed in the political 
arena, without the Damocles sword of criminality hanging over the 
heads of some of the combatants. The proper target is the President, 
not his subordinates; the proper forum is the voting booth, not the 
courtroom.211 
This quote is surprising, given that the beneficiaries were being 
investigated for involvement in criminal acts at the time the pardon 
was proclaimed. By introducing the pardon, President Bush was 
clearly trying to transform a legal matter—namely, whether 
individual acts of criminality should be prosecuted—into a political 
matter focusing on the government policies under which the crimes 
were committed. 
2. Amnesty to Satisfy Public Opinion 
Political pragmatism can cause pardons to be enacted to satisfy 
public demands for leniency. Among domestic amnesties in the 
United States, pro-amnesty public opinion is most evident for 
amnesties for draft evasion and desertion. For example, soon after the 
end of World War II, a campaign emerged to demand amnesty for 
persons who had been imprisoned or were liable for punishment for 
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violating the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.212 A 1946 
Gallup poll showed that an amnesty for conscientious objectors was 
supported by 69 percent of the American public.213 The high degree of 
public support forced a reluctant White House to respond, and on 
December 23, 1947, President Truman granted pardon for a limited 
number of imprisoned deserters.214 
Pro-amnesties public opinion became a controversial issue again as 
mass protests against the Vietnam War erupted in the late 1960s, 
prompting thousands of conscripts to evade the draft or desert, often 
by leaving the United States.215 The protests prompted the judiciary 
and armed forces to take a more lenient approach to the penalties 
imposed, but this did not resolve the issue.216 By September 16, 1974, 
one year after the last U.S. serviceman had left Vietnam, President 
Ford granted amnesty to encourage the deserters to return. However, 
the amnesty was conditioned on the applicants performing up to two 
years of “alternative service in the national interest.”217 Many “viewed 
the demand for alternative service as a form of punishment” and only 
a fraction of deserters or draft evaders applied for amnesty.218 Their 
ongoing resistance prompted a subsequent amnesty in 1977, in which 
these conditions were removed, allowing most affected persons to 
return home.219 This example suggests that, where sufficient sections 
of the public resist government policies, it can correspond to public 
support for amnesties for those who violate the law by their 
resistance. Where the state responds to public pressure by enacting 
amnesties, it may be a pragmatic decision to enhance the state’s 
legitimacy where the opposition to its policies had weakened it. 
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3. Amnesty and Foreign Policy Priorities 
In addition to pragmatic decisions resulting from national policies 
or domestic public opinion, the United States has chosen to enact or 
endorse amnesties as a response to international events. For example, 
following World War II, America led the establishment of the 
international tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo. With the onset of the 
Cold War, America’s enthusiasm for these tribunals waned as Japan 
and Germany came to be perceived as potentially useful allies in the 
struggle against communism. These strategic concerns caused the 
American head of the occupying forces in Japan, General MacArthur, 
to shield Emperor Hirohito from prosecution and to press for the 
introduction of an amnesty. The law was enacted on March 28, 1948, 
and resulted in unconditional amnesty being granted to all Japanese 
soldiers, including those accused of serious crimes.220 Consequently, 
despite an early commitment to prosecute Japanese war crimes, 
political concerns took precedence over law. 
This pattern continued during the Cold War. For example, nearly 
all the countries that participated in the United States-backed 
Operación Cóndor program of repression of political dissent in South 
America also enacted amnesty laws to shield the agents of state terror 
from prosecution. Many of these amnesties received America’s tacit 
backing or even vocal support. For example, following General 
Pinochet’s 1978 amnesty decree, which granted unconditional 
impunity to perpetrators of serious human rights violations, the U.S. 
State Department proclaimed that the decree was “a positive 
contribution by the government of Chile to the improvement of the 
human rights situation in that country.”221 Here, U.S. officials invoked 
the language of human rights law, but used it to endorse an amnesty 
that benefited only those who had violated human rights. In doing so, 
America sought to shield its supporters from criminal proceedings 
that would potentially reveal America’s complicity in the violence. 
More positively, Cold War ideology also caused the United States 
to pressure Soviet bloc countries to issue amnesties for dissidents 
whose political views were perceived as more in tune with American 
policy than with their own governments’. For example, on November 
25, 1977, President Carter said it was a “wise and generous act” of 
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Yugoslavia to grant amnesty to political prisoners.222 Similarly, in 
1984, the United States made the release of dissidents a condition for 
any warming of relations with Poland, and on July 23, 1984, the 
American State Department welcomed a prisoner amnesty as a 
“positive step.”223 The position America took in relation to the harms 
inflicted on political prisoners in Eastern Europe during the 1970s and 
1980s stands in stark contrast to its policies on amnesties for those 
who perpetrated disappearances, extrajudicial executions, and torture 
on dissidents in South America during the same period. 
Such Janus-faced approaches to amnesty continued to be featured 
in American foreign policy during the 1990s. For example, at the 
same time as the United States was pressuring the Haitian government 
to grant amnesty for the crimes of the military junta, it provided 
considerable financial, human, and political aid to the creation and 
functioning of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). Hazan argues that this support sprung from a 
desire to play “the Tribunal as a moral card against the virulent 
criticism” from the media and the public of American reluctance to 
intervene militarily to stop ethnic cleansing.224 However, with regards 
to the Balkans, American support for the ICTY led the U.S. 
Ambassador to the U.N., Madeleine Albright, to proclaim that the 
United States would “oppose vigorously any . . . amnesty” for war 
crimes.225 Ultimately, the U.S. Secretary of State, Warren 
Christopher, personally negotiated the provisions relating to 
accountability for war crimes in the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord that 
ended the conflict in Bosnia. The accord required the parties to the 
agreement to cooperate with the ICTY and to enact amnesty laws that 
excluded crimes that fell within the tribunal’s jurisdiction.226 Whilst 
these measures represent laudable achievements for justice, 
America’s pronouncements on the legality of amnesties for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity were not applied to its 
involvement in other conflicts. 
 
222 Yugoslavia Frees Mihajlov, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., Dec. 17, 1977. 
223 U.S. Holds Fire on Lifting Sanctions on Poland; Political Prisoner Amnesty 
Welcomed by the U.S., GUARDIAN (London), July 24, 1984. 
224 Pierre Hazan, The Revolution by the ICTY: The Concept of Justice in Wartime, 2 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 533, 536 (2004). 
225 Madeleine K. Albright, We Won’t Let War Criminals Walk; With or Without a 
Balkan Peace Deal, the U.S. Won’t Relent, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1995, at C01. 
226 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 4: 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995) art. IX, Dec. 12, 1995. 
360 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 14, 307 
One year after the Dayton Peace Accords, America helped to 
negotiate the Abidjan Peace Accord for Sierra Leone that offered an 
unconditional amnesty for the serious human rights violations that 
had occurred there.227 It repeated its support for broad amnesties in 
Sierra Leone in 1999 when it helped to broker the Lomé Accords.228 
The 1999 accords prompted Madeleine Albright, who was by now 
Secretary of State, to deviate from her position on the Balkans, by 
describing the amnesty as “the price of peace [that had been] so 
desperately needed.”229 By 1999, the United States had spent $250 
million on humanitarian aid to Sierra Leone, and it appears to have 
run out of patience. As a result, it deviated from the position of the 
U.N. Security Council to push for a peace agreement including 
amnesty to end the conflict.230 The contrast between American 
approaches to amnesty in the Balkans, and the amnesties in Sierra 
Leone and Haiti, reveal that during the Clinton administration, the 
United States declined to adopt legalistic and uniform positions on 
amnesty laws for serious human rights violations. Instead, the U.S. 
took a more malleable approach that was adopted to suit its political 
priorities. Arguably, the privileging of political concerns over legal 
obligations continues to be evident in the response to prisoner abuse. 
4. Prisoner Abuse, National Unity, and the Risks of Politicalization 
Part C has demonstrated how America deployed or encouraged the 
deployment of amnesty laws to achieve a range of political goals. In 
some instances, the United States used international law to legitimize 
its preferred policy approaches by, for example, invoking the 
language of human rights to endorse amnesties for human rights 
abuses as a means to end abuses. Where international law’s 
requirements came into conflict with U.S. policy goals, America’s 
international legal obligations were marginalized. This privileging of 
pragmatic political concerns has also been evident in the debates on 
prosecutions for prisoner abuse. For example, in his 2009 statement 
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on the release of the torture memos, President Obama emphasized the 
need for national unity, rather than accountability: 
This is a time for reflection, not retribution. We have been through a 
dark and painful chapter in our history. But at a time of great 
challenges and disturbing disunity, nothing will be gained by 
spending our time and energy laying blame for the past. That is why 
we must resist the forces that divide us, and instead come together 
on behalf of our common future.231 
Speaking to the press a few days later, President Obama, endorsing 
the DOJ decision that prosecutions would not be pursued for those 
who had acted within the guidance outlined in the memos, stated: “As 
a general view, I do think we should be looking forward, not back. I 
do worry about this getting so politicised that we cannot function 
effectively and it hampers our ability to carry out national security 
operations.”232 This position reveals two arguments related to 
pragmatism: firstly, that prosecutions “would criminalize policy 
differences,” and would create a negative precedent of a U.S. 
administration launching prosecutions based on the policies of its 
predecessor.233 And secondly, that prisoner abuse was committed to 
protect national security, and that, given the serious challenges faced 
by the nation, national unity should be privileged over retribution. 
The former argument has primarily been articulated by the political 
right in the United States, which, according to Forsythe, would view 
prosecutions as being “motivated by partisan politics.”234 In contrast, 
the American political left would see limited prosecutions as 
insufficient, as they would “scapegoat[e] the little fish while letting 
policy makers and lawyers off the hook.”235 Therefore, at opposite 
ends of the spectrum there is an assumption that decisions on the 
extent to which prosecutions should be conducted would be 
influenced by political concerns. As torture is criminalized within 
domestic and international law—and, in ordinary circumstances, its 
punishment should be perceived as an exclusively legal matter—the 
emphasis placed on politics in these debates is striking. Outside 
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political circles in Washington, D.C., it seems that there was some 
public support for investigations. For example, a Gallup poll 
conducted in early February 2009 indicated that thirty-eight percent 
of respondents said that they supported criminal investigations of 
torture claims by the Justice Department, and a further twenty-four 
percent said they would prefer a non-criminal investigation by an 
independent panel. In addition, there was international pressure for 
prosecutions. For example, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture 
repeatedly called upon America to investigate accusations of 
torture.236 Furthermore, investigations of torture and rendition were 
launched in the courts of foreign states under the principle of 
universal jurisdiction.237 Nonetheless, the Obama administration 
seems to have attempted to sidestep both domestic and international 
calls for accountability, preferring instead to avoid the anticipated 
“political storm” that risks undermining the government’s ability to 
fulfill its other policy priorities, such as economic recovery and health 
care reform (on which the President needed the cooperation of 
Congressional Republicans to deliver).238 
The second argument for pragmatism relates to the need for 
national unity in the face of security threats. For example, following 
the Attorney General’s announcement in June 2011 that investigations 
into CIA interrogators would only proceed in two cases, the CIA 
Director, Leon Panetta, said “I have always believed that [the CIA’s] 
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primary responsibility is not to the past, but to the present and future 
threats to the nation.”239 This view chimes with the approach of the 
right wing in American politics that prosecutions would be “unwise in 
the light of national security needs.”240 A more centrist position was 
adopted by Senator Patrick Leahy (Democrat-Vermont), Chairman of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, who justified his calls for a truth 
commission to investigate prisoner abuse by portraying a truth 
commission as “a middle ground” between divisive prosecutions and 
impunity. He argued that such a commission was necessary “to get to 
the bottom of what happened—and why—to make sure it never 
happens again,” and “to bind up the nation’s wounds” and develop “a 
shared understanding of the failures of the recent past.”241 However, 
this proposal shared with the position of the right wing that 
prosecutions would undermine national unity, and hence should not 
be pursued. 
These debates on the risks of prosecutions are similar to the 
problems often faced by newly elected governments in countries that 
are transitioning from conflict or repression. These fledgling 
transitional regimes must balance an inclination towards asserting the 
rule of law with the pragmatic realities of governance. However, for 
transitional states, disunity often poses a genuine and substantial 
threat of a return to armed conflict or dictatorial rule, and hence, 
amnesties are offered to reduce this risk. However, these concerns do 
not allow “states to sidestep or suspend their fundamental 
obligations” under international law.242 For the United States, disunity 
poses the prospect of difficult legislative battles, rather than violent 
ones. Such political contestations are often a central feature of public 
discourse in democratic states, and there are a wide number of issues 
for which it is unrealistic to expect consensus to be reached. As such, 
the avoidance of contestation does not seem to be a sufficient 
rationale for failing to fulfill America’s international legal 
obligations. 
Furthermore, failing to hold its torturers accountable may actually 
undermine American security. For example, it arguably risks 
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enhancing the credibility of anti-American propaganda, which seeks 
to incite further terrorist attacks on U.S. targets. This argument was 
made by Alberto Mora, a former general counsel for the Navy, who 
contended that “some flag-rank officers believe that Abu Ghraib and 
Guantánamo constitute ‘the first and second identifiable causes of 
U.S. combat deaths in Iraq’ because they galvanized jihadis.”243 
Similarly, an Air Force major told Harper’s Magazine that “hundreds 
but more likely thousands of American lives [were lost because of] 
the policy decision to introduce the torture and abuse of prisoners.”244 
In addition, by abusing the prisoners within its control, America 
arguably removed the incentive for its enemies to respect the lives of 
captured American military personnel. Furthermore, although U.S. 
counter-insurgency operations are dependent on relations with 
Muslim communities in the United States and abroad, the abuse of 
prisoners may have made these communities less willing to 
cooperate,245 and it reportedly made some foreign governments 
reluctant to share intelligence.246 
D. Amnesty, Mercy, and the Public Welfare 
The sovereign’s prerogative of mercy has been an intrinsic part of 
criminal justice systems around the world for thousands of years. In 
previous centuries, pardons were necessary “to soften the harshness 
and correct the injustice of” relatively rigid bodies of criminal law.247 
Today, however, pardons have a less central role in many criminal 
justice systems, as criminal law has developed to incorporate what 
were previously grounds for pardon (such as insanity and self-
defense) into more flexible systems, and to ensure greater due process 
rights for defendants.248 As a result, pardons have evolved to be 
proclaimed primarily to serve the “public welfare.”249 This is an 
amorphous concept that can encompass pardons granted due to the 
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personal circumstances of the offender.250 Pardons can be used to 
recognize and remedy injustices, such as where individuals have been 
punished for their political or religious beliefs, or alternatively, to 
prevent abuses of the rule of law where offenders are unlikely to 
receive a fair trial. As this section will demonstrate, mercy and the 
public welfare have often been invoked in the proclamation of 
political amnesties and pardons within the United States. 
1. Amnesty as a Recognition of Personal Circumstances 
The personal circumstances of pardon beneficiaries have often 
been used to justify granting mercy for their offenses. For example, 
when President Harding commuted the sentence of socialist activist 
Eugene V. Debs on December 24, 1921, he stated it was because “I 
want him to eat his Christmas dinner with his wife.”251 In 1918, Debs 
had been convicted of sedition under the Espionage Act of 1917 and 
was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for making speeches 
denouncing the United States’ participation in World War I. In 
addition, it appears that sympathy for Richard Nixon played a role in 
President Ford’s decision to pardon him, as the proclamation 
describes Nixon as “a man who has already paid the unprecedented 
penalty of relinquishing the highest elective office of the United 
States.”252 In addition, when appearing before the House Justice 
Committee to explain his decision, President Ford stated “it is 
common knowledge that serious allegations and accusations hang like 
a sword over our former President’s head, threatening his health as he 
tries to reshape his life, a great part of which was spent in the service 
of this country and by the mandate of its people.”253 He further 
demonstrated his sympathy by characterizing the Watergate scandal 
as “an American tragedy in which we all have played a part.”254 
Similarly, in pardoning Caspar Weinberger, President Bush Sr. 
noted that he was “pardoning him not just out of compassion or to 
spare a 75-year-old patriot the torment of lengthy and costly legal 
proceedings, but to make it possible for him to receive the honor he 
deserves for his extraordinary service to our country.” The 
proclamation further stated that President Bush could not “ignore the 
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debilitating illnesses faced by Caspar Weinberger and his wife.”255 
This pardon was also extended to five other public officials who had 
been implicated in the Iran-Contra Affair. As with Weinberger, the 
proclamation praised their patriotism and argued that they had each 
“already paid a price—in depleted savings, lost careers, anguished 
families—grossly disproportionate to any misdeeds or errors of 
judgment they may have committed.”256 The pardon proclamation 
also characterized the Iran-Contra affair as “the most thoroughly 
investigated matter of its kind in our history,” thereby rationalizing 
that further investigations were not warranted.257 In the expressed 
motivations for these pardons, the presidents seemed to suggest, in the 
words of President Coolidge, that further application of the penalties 
would produce “no good results,” because either the offenders had 
suffered in other ways for their offenses, or that their offenses should 
be weighed against their previous contribution to American society.258 
2. Amnesty to Address Criminal Justice Deficiencies 
Decisions to grant amnesty or pardon have also been justified on 
the grounds of addressing the deficiencies within the criminal justice 
system. For example, in explaining his rationales for pardoning 
Richard Nixon, President Ford stated that he had been advised that 
“many months and perhaps more years will have to pass before 
Richard Nixon could obtain a fair trial by jury in any jurisdiction of 
the United States under governing decisions of the Supreme Court.”259 
He continued that, were a prosecution to proceed, 
a former President of the United States, instead of enjoying equal 
treatment with any other citizen accused of violating the law, would 
be cruelly and excessively penalized either in preserving the 
presumption of innocence or in obtaining a speedy determination of 
his guilt in order to repay a legal debt to society.260 
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The need to intervene in a harsh criminal justice system was also 
invoked by President Clinton to justify his 1999 pardon of sixteen 
members of the Armed Forces of Puerto Rican National Liberation 
(FALN), an armed movement that opposed U.S. control over Puerto 
Rico.261 The pardoned individuals had been convicted and imprisoned 
for seditious conspiracy relating to the planting of 130 bombs in 
public places across the United States.262 The pardons were deeply 
politically controversial, and both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives passed motions condemning the act of clemency.263 
In justifying his decision, President Clinton stated that “[t]he 
prisoners were serving extremely lengthy sentences—in some cases 
90 years—which were out of proportion to their crimes.”264 
3. Mercy, Fairness, and the “Torture Memos” 
Within contemporary debates on non-prosecution for torture, the 
concept of mercy has not been mentioned explicitly, but the 
justifications given by the Obama administration have resonances 
with the types of mercy outlined above. For example, both President 
Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder have talked of the service 
and patriotism of the U.S. intelligence community, and the need to 
protect their identities so that they can continue their work when 
announcing decisions not to prosecute.265 
The idea of fairness and due process has repeatedly been raised in 
relation to the politicized legal advice given in the torture memos. As 
noted above, section 1004(a) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
provided that any American officials who were involved in 
interrogations of terrorist suspects would be shielded from 
prosecution when they “did not know that the practices were unlawful 
and a person of ordinary sense and understanding would not know the 
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practices were unlawful.”266 It further stated, in determining whether 
they knew their actions were unlawful, the extent to which they relied 
on the advice from counsel should be taken into account.267 This act 
attempted to create an ignorance or mistake of the law defense that 
assumed that officials implicated in acts of torture were doing so on 
the understanding that their actions were lawful. 
Despite this repudiation of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) 
legal advice under the Obama administration, the assumption of 
ignorance of the law for past interrogation practices arguably remains 
in place. For example, in June 2011, Eric Holder restated the position 
he had held from 2009 that the Justice Department “would not 
prosecute anyone who acted in good faith and within the scope of the 
legal guidance given by the [OLC] regarding the interrogation of 
detainees.”268 Weiner has argued this decision not to prosecute may 
have been influenced by the view that such persons “would have a 
strong defense to any prosecution under the ‘reasonable reliance’ 
doctrine.”269 Under this doctrine, an accused can invoke the defense 
of ignorance of the law where he or she acted 
in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, 
afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in (i) a 
statute or other enactment; (ii) a judicial decision, opinion or 
judgment; (iii) an administrative order or grant of permission; or 
(iv) an official interpretation of the public officer or body charged 
by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or 
enforcement of the law defining the offense.270 
At face value, this defense would seem to apply to intelligence 
personnel who followed the official interpretation provided by the 
OLC.271 However, this does not take into account that torture is 
prohibited under both domestic and international law. Furthermore, 
under international criminal law, defendants are not permitted to use 
the defense of “superior orders” to escape accountability for actions 
that were “manifestly illegal.”272 Given the severity of acts such as 
waterboarding, which both President Obama and Eric Holder have 
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recognized as torture, such actions could be deemed manifestly 
illegal, and hence ignorance of the law may not be a sufficient 
defense. Furthermore, it is established law that “advice of counsel—
the ‘my lawyer said it was OK defense’—cannot serve as an excuse 
for violating the law,” particularly where the legal advice is 
deliberately designed to provide that excuse.273 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored why the United States has sought to limit 
accountability for prisoner abuse, despite longstanding domestic and 
international prohibitions on torture. Through exploring American 
approaches to amnesty and pardon within the United States and 
abroad, it has argued that American governments have an established 
tradition of using legal clemency to exercise and enhance their power, 
to assert the legitimacy of the state, to justify their policies, to ensure 
compliance with laws, and to control public discourse and the shaping 
of public memory. These findings run counter to theoretical 
assumptions within international law on amnesties in which the 
concept of amnesty is more frequently associated with forgetting, 
rather than memory, and with impunity, rather than encouraging 
lawful behavior. However, what the exploration of American attitudes 
has revealed is that such binary divisions may be overly simplistic, 
and that, instead, the relationship between amnesty and power, the 
rule of law, and memory is much more complex. 
Nations, such as the United States, profit from the stability, 
consistency, and uniformity offered by legal regulation in their 
relationships within each other and with their citizens. These benefits 
have prompted the United States to play a leading role in the 
development of international criminal law and provide considerable 
support to the prosecutions of human rights abusers in other countries. 
However, its adherence to international norms has occurred 
predominantly when they did not conflict with its policy objectives or 
strategic interests. Instead, as this Article has argued, where the 
United States selected to pursue policies that ran counter to 
obligations under domestic or international law, amnesties were 
among the tools used to create exceptions to the law. 
For many offenses under domestic law, creating such exceptions is 
unproblematic. Within the United States, the Supreme Court has 
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found that the president’s power to grant amnesties and pardons is 
unlimited, except where it conflicts with the Constitution. At the 
international level, however, torture has been widely accepted to be 
“non-derogable,” which means that states are required to abide by 
their obligations to prohibit torture and investigate allegations of state 
involvement in such crimes even “in time of war, public danger, or 
other emergency that threatens the [state’s] independence or 
security.”274 Furthermore, within certain contexts, systematic and 
widespread torture can constitute a crime against humanity or war 
crime.275 
The United States has often sought to promote individual criminal 
responsibility for crimes under international law committed in 
conflicted or transitional states through its support for international 
tribunals and rule of law programs. In these contexts, transitional 
regimes often face severe legal, political, moral, and practical 
challenges that inhibit their ability or desire to conduct prosecutions. 
However, states’ invocations of these challenges as justifications for 
non-prosecution can trigger international criticism, including from the 
United States. In contrast, although at the time coercive interrogations 
were being conducted the U.S. was engaged in conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, as well as the metaphorical “War on Terror,” it 
nonetheless was a consolidated liberal democratic state. As a result, 
pursuing prosecutions for torture, although politically difficult, did 
not threaten the stability of the state, nor risk overburdening non-
existent or corroded legal systems. The United States therefore did 
not face equivalent challenges to fragile and under-resourced 
transitional regimes in pursuing prosecutions. However, similar 
justifications for non-prosecution were used by emphasizing the risk 
posed by prosecutions to national unity, the threats to national 
security, and the need to look forward rather than back. 
Experiences of transitional states such as Spain, Argentina, 
Cambodia, and Bangladesh suggest that the decisions not to prosecute 
are unlikely to close the door permanently on the policy of prisoner 
abuse. The reopening of investigations and limited prosecutions in 
these states, decades after the crimes took place and amnesties had 
been granted, indicates that even where the executive decides not to 
prosecute systematic human rights violations, this rarely ends 
demands for truth and accountability. Instead, over the longer term, 
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the legacy of systematic abuse of prisoners is likely to remain a 
divisive issue within the United States, and one which may require the 
adaptation of existing legal and policy responses. 
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APPENDIX 1 
AMERICAN AMNESTY LAWS AND “POLITICAL” PARDONS, 
1795–PRESENT276 
Date Issued by Persons Affected Nature of Action 
July 10, 1795 Washington Whisky 
insurrectionists 
(several hundred) 
General pardon to all who 
agreed to thereafter obey 
the law 
 
May 21, 1800 Adams Pennsylvania 
insurrectionists 
Prosecution of participants 
ended; pardon not extended 
to those indicted or 
convicted 
 
Oct. 15, 1807 Jefferson Deserters Given full pardon if they 
surrendered within 4 
months 
 
Feb. 7, 1812 
Oct. 8, 1812 
June 14, 1814 
Madison Deserters 3 proclamations; given full 
pardon if they surrendered 
within 4 months 
 
Feb. 6, 1815 Madison Pirates who fought 
in War of 1812 
Pardoned of all previous 
acts of piracy for which any 
suits, indictments or 
prosecutions were initiated 
 
June 12, 1830 Jackson (War 
Department) 
Deserters Deserters, with provisions: 
(1) Those in confinement 
returned to duty; (2) those 
at large under sentence of 
death discharged, never 
again to be enlisted 
 
Feb. 14, 1862 Lincoln (War 
Department) 
 
Political prisoners Paroled 
July 17, 1862 
(Confiscation 
Act) 
Congress Rebels President authorized to 
extend pardon and amnesty 
to rebels 
 
 
 
 
 
276 Amnesties laws enacted between 1795 and 1952 are taken from a list in Gregory 
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2012] Power, Pragmatism and Prisoner Abuse: 373 
Amnesty and Accountability in the United States 
Date Issued by Persons Affected Nature of Action 
Mar. 10, 1863 Lincoln Deserters Deserters restored to 
regiments without 
punishment, except 
forfeiture of pay during 
absence 
 
Dec. 8, 1863 Lincoln Rebels Full pardon to all 
implicated in or 
participating in the 
“existing rebellion” with 
exceptions and subject to 
oath 
 
Feb. 26, 1864 Lincoln (War 
Department) 
Deserters Deserters’ sentences 
mitigated, some restored to 
duty 
 
Mar. 26, 1864 Lincoln Certain rebels Clarification of Dec. 8, 
1863, proclamation 
 
Mar. 3, 1865 Congress Deserters Desertion punished by 
forfeiture of citizenship; 
President to pardon all who 
return within 60 days 
 
Mar. 11, 1865 Lincoln Deserters Deserters who returned to 
post in 60 days, as required 
by Congress 
 
May 29, 1865 Johnson Certain rebels of 
Confederate States 
 
Qualified 
July 3, 1866 Johnson (War 
Department) 
Deserters Deserters returned to duty 
without punishment except 
forfeiture of pay. 
 
Jan. 21, 1867 Congress  Sec. 13 of Confiscation Act 
(authority of President to 
grant pardon and amnesty) 
repealed 
 
Sept. 7, 1867 Johnson Rebels Additional amnesty 
including all but certain 
officers of the Confederacy 
on condition of an oath 
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Date Issued by Persons Affected Nature of Action 
July 4. 1868 Johnson Rebels Full pardon to all 
participants in “the late 
rebellion” except those 
indicted for treason or 
felony 
 
Dec. 25, 1868 Johnson All rebels of 
Confederate States 
 
Universal and 
unconditional 
May 23, 1872 Congress Rebels General amnesty law re-
enfranchised many 
thousands of former rebels 
 
May 24, 1884 Congress Rebels Lifted restrictions on 
former rebels to allow jury 
duty and civil office 
 
Jan. 4, 1893 Harrison Mormons Liability for polygamy 
amnestied 
 
Sept. 25, 1894 Cleveland Mormons Liability for polygamy 
amnestied 
 
Mar. 1896 Congress Rebels Lifted restrictions on 
former rebels to allow 
appointment to military 
commissions 
 
June 8, 1898 Congress Rebels Universal Amnesty Act 
removed all disabilities 
against all former rebels 
 
July 4, 1902 T. Roosevelt Philippine 
insurrectionists 
Full pardon and amnesty to 
all who took an oath 
recognizing “the supreme 
authority of the United 
States of America in the 
Philippine Islands” 
 
June 14, 1917 Wilson  5,000 persons under 
suspended sentence 
because of change in law 
(not war related) 
 
Aug. 21, 1917 Wilson  Clarification of June 14, 
1917, proclamation 
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Date Issued by Persons Affected Nature of Action 
Mar. 5, 1919 Wilson Espionage Commutation of “unduly 
harsh” sentences for 
individuals sentenced for 
espionage during World 
War I 
 
Mar. 5, 1924 Coolidge Deserters More than 100 deserters - 
as to loss of citizenship for 
those deserting since World 
War I armistice 
 
Dec. 23, 1933 F. Roosevelt Espionage and 
deserters 
1,500 convicted of having 
violated espionage or draft 
laws (World War I) who 
had completed their 
sentences 
 
Dec. 24, 1945 Truman  Several thousand ex-
convicts who had served in 
World War II for at least 1 
year 
 
Dec. 23, 1947 Truman Draft evaders 1,523 individual pardons 
for draft evasion in World 
War II, based on 
recommendations of 
President’s Amnesty Board 
 
Dec. 24, 1952 Truman  Ex-convicts who served in 
Armed Forces not less than 
1 year after June 25, 1950 
 
Dec. 24, 1952 Truman Deserters All persons convicted for 
having deserted between 
Aug. 15, 1945, and June 
25, 1950 
 
Sept. 16, 1974 Ford Deserters A limited clemency 
program in 1974 of partial 
relief for war resisters 
 
Sept. 8, 1974 Ford President Richard 
Nixon 
Pardon for former President 
Richard Nixon for 
“offences against the 
United States” 
 
Jan. 21, 1977 Carter Deserters Unconditional pardon for 
draft evasion 
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Date Issued by Persons Affected Nature of Action 
Dec. 24, 1992 Bush Sr. Six Reagan 
administration 
members 
 
Pardon for involvement in 
Iran-Contra Affair 
Aug. 11, 1999 Clinton Insurgents 16 members of Armed 
Forces of Puerto Rican 
National Liberation 
(FLAN) for violent 
insurgency within the 
United States 
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[T]hrough a curious transposition peculiar to our times—it is 
innocence that is called upon to justify itself. 
Albert Camus1 
INTRODUCTION 
The metaphor “intimate enemy” best captures the changing nature 
of international law vis-à-vis nations. “Intimate enemy” is a useful 
heuristic device that could be deployed to capture legal concepts of 
indeterminacy, dialectics, and reformulation within international law. 
The United Nations Charter of 1945 aims primarily at saving, 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war . . . reaffirm[ing] 
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations 
large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and 
respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of 
international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress 
and better standards of life in larger freedom.2 
Developing countries since then have mostly been backbenchers 
within the international legal system given their dismal compliance 
with human rights norms and high protectionism in international 
trade. Furthermore, since the formation of the United Nations, 
international organizations have taken form in a myriad of 
memberships such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States (ACP), Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración, 
and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. 
Empirically, the participation of developing and least developed 
 
1 ALBERT CAMUS, THE REBEL: AN ESSAY ON MAN IN REVOLT 4 (Anthony Bower 
trans., 11th ed. 1978) (1951). 
2 U.N. Charter preamble. 
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countries in international legal systems has increased multi-fold. With 
the rise in the participation of non-Western nations, international law 
began to change its overall relationship with nations. There is a 
gradual but unmistakable swap of positions. 
This Article calibrates the relationship of international law vis-à-
vis developed, developing, and least developed nations by deploying 
the metaphor of “intimate enemy.” Given the lack of sufficient non-
Western academics and institutions in the field of international law, 
there exists a less than robust view on the relationship of international 
law with developing and least developed countries. Thus, this Article 
deploys the metaphor of “intimate enemy” to: 
1. Unpack the non-compliance of international law by Western 
nations 
2. To show that there is a growing trend among non-Western 
nations towards compliance. 
International law—so far as it is a set of legal doctrines animated 
by the spirit of global solidarity, world peace, and Laissez-faire 
policy—has begun to threaten the old position of developed countries. 
In a new environment, BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries 
have taken away part of the influence from the developed countries. 
This fundamentally alters the relationship of countries with 
international law. This Article seeks to expose the politics of 
knowledge production and marketing that hides this dynamic in the 
service of a perception that non-Western countries are the worst 
violators of international law. The scale of intimate animosity works 
both ways; it maps the decline in international law’s compliance by 
Western nations as well as a growth in its compliance by non-Western 
nations. 
Indian Judge Radhabinod Pal’s dissent3 that famously absolved all 
the Japanese defendants in Tokyo Tribunal of all guilt, according to 
Kirsten Sellars, was an articulation of a “third-worldist sentiment.”4 
Indeed it was also the start of an international legal advocacy in 
postcolonial ink. The first wave of postcolonialism marked the birth 
of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). However, 
having transgressed the limits of conditions and riding the wave of 
globalization today, many see the Arab Spring and other 
 
3 See generally International Tribunal for the Far East: Dissenting Opinion of Justice 
Pal (1953). 
4 Kirsten Sellars, Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1085, 
1095 (2011). 
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advancements in developing countries as blowing away 
postcolonialism.5 Nonetheless, the first phase of the discovery of self-
worth among developing countries came within a postcolonial 
vocabulary. In fact, within the legal literature postcolonialism is still 
alive as a methodology of deconstruction.6 
Nobel laureate V.S. Naipaul pens about Salim—the hero of his 
novel, A Bend in the River—in postcolonial ink.7 Salim’s background 
is rather international and interesting. His forefathers came from 
Gujarat—the home province of Gandhi. “My family was Muslim,” 
declares Salim, and “in our customs and attitudes we were closer to 
the Hindus of northwestern India. . . . All that I know of our history 
and the history of the Indian Ocean I have got from books written by 
Europeans.”8 
If I say that our Arabs in their time were great adventurers and 
writers; that our sailors gave the Mediterranean the lateen sail that 
made the discovery of the Americas possible; that an Indian pilot 
led Vasco da Gama from East Africa to Calicut; that the very word 
cheque was first used by our Persian merchants—if I say these 
things it is because I have got them from European books. 
[However,] [t]hey formed no part of our knowledge or pride.9 
And Salim throws the salvo at the politics of knowledge creation 
rather innocuously: “Without Europeans, I feel, all our past would 
have been washed away, like the scuff marks of fishermen on the 
 
5 See HAMID DABASHI, THE ARAB SPRING: THE END OF POSTCOLONIALISM xvii 
(2012) (“We have now entered the phase of documenting in what particular terms that 
world is transcending itself, overcoming the mystified consciousness into which it was 
colonially cast and postcolonially fixated.”). Shashi Tharoor makes similar claims in his 
book, PAX INDICA: INDIA AND THE WORLD OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 15 (2012). 
Post-1991, Tharoor says, “the post-colonial chip has fallen off” India’s shoulder. Id. 
6 Antony Anghie, The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial 
Realities, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 739 (2006) (“The colonial and postcolonial realities of 
international law have been obscured and misunderstood as a consequence of a persistent 
and deep seated set of ideas that has structured traditional scholarship on the history and 
theory of international law. This article seeks to identify these structures, suggesting ways 
in which they have limited the understanding of the relationship between imperialism and 
international law.”). Tayyab Mahmud, Law of Geography and the Geography of Law: A 
Post-Colonial Mapping, 3 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 64 (2011). James Gathii talks about anti-
colonial reconstructions of international legal history. See James Thuo Gathii, 
International Law and Eurocentricity, 9 EURO. J. INT’L L. 184, 187 (1998) (“I Identify this 
form of anti-colonial International legal scholarship as strong because of the centrality its 
analysis places on the claims and role of economic, political, social and cultural 
superiority/inferiority in the historical relationship of colonized and colonizing countries in 
the past and the present.”). 
7 V.S. NAIPAUL, A BEND IN THE RIVER 11 (1979). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 11–12. 
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beach outside our town.”10 Naipaul is very sarcastic in speaking 
through Salim. At the same time he exposes the problem that 
international law faces, the problem of the absence of native voices, 
the enigma of an authentic Other’s worldview. International law today 
deepens the problem still further; it is about the ability that powerful 
actors have to co-opt resistance by the Others within international 
law.11  
Unfortunately, it is only through borrowed glasses that one begins 
to see oneself.12 The postcolonial international law is one such 
borrowed glass.13 But then this enemy has become intimate; at the 
base of this intimacy is a live-in relationship between the developing 
countries and international law after 1945 that—as Bhabha would 
say—is an offspring of the productivity of colonial power. 
In order to understand the productivity of colonial power it is 
crucial to construct its regime of ‘truth’, not to subject its 
representations to a normalising judgement. Only then does it 
become possible to understand the productive ambivalence of the 
object of colonial discourse; that ‘otherness’ which is at once an 
object of desire and derision, is an articulation of difference 
contained within the fantasy of origin and identity. What such a 
reading reveals are the boundaries of colonial discourse and it 
enables a transgression of these limits from the space of that 
otherness.14 
Decolonization was succeeded by the birth of a “predominant 
liberal notion of democracy” that “deals with those excluded, but in a 
radically different mode: it focuses on their inclusion, as minority 
voices.”15 Here all minorities “should be heard, all interests taken into 
account, the human rights of everyone guaranteed, all ways of life, 
cultures and practices respected, and so on.”16 In the process, what 
 
10 Id. at 12. 
11 See B.S. Chimni, Co-option and Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative 
Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 799, 826 (2006) (“Indeed, GAL [Global Administrative 
Law] can be co-opted by powerful states to their advantage. While this is no reason for 
neglecting the development of GAL, it is important to understand the limits of this 
expanding phenomenon. GAL can, in other words, only act as a very limited tool of 
resistance and change. Even for this to happen, certain conditions must be present.”). 
12 See Prabhakar Singh, The Scandal of Enlightenment and the Birth of Disciplines: Is 
International Law a Science?, 12 INT’L CMTY. L. REV. 5 (2010). 
13 See Frédéric Mégret, From ‘Savages’ to ‘Unlawful Combatants’: A Postcolonial 
Look at International Humanitarian Law’s ‘Other’, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS 
OTHERS 265 (Anne Orford ed., 2006). 
14 Homi K. Bhabha, The Other Question . . . Homi K. Bhabha Considers the Stereotype 
and Colonial Discourse, 24 SCREEN 18, 19 (1983). 
15 Slavoj Žižek, How to Begin from the Beginning, 57 NEW LEFT REV. 43, 55 (2009). 
16 Id. 
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gets lost is “the position of universality embodied in the excluded. . . . 
What unites us is that, in contrast to the classic image of proletarians 
who have ‘nothing to lose but their chains’, we are in danger of losing 
everything.”17 While a liberal notion of democracy welcomed 
decolonization, today neo-colonialism awaits the liberal democratic 
machine and the demise of postcolonialism. With the new age of the 
“war on terror” and the rise of nationalism in the Western world, 
international law is gradually being sidelined in the service of 
American foreign policy. This rigmarole, this Article emphasizes, 
could be captured within the epithet of “intimate enemy.” In order to 
prove this thesis, this Article discusses international humanitarian 
law, international economic law, and international criminal law. More 
precisely, this Article will take up “war on terror,” laws of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds (SWFs), and the law of regional unions such as the EU 
and the AU to explicate the claims made. Across the board, this 
Article claims that an intimate animosity is on display. 
In what follows, Section I discusses the blatant breach of 
international law in droning Pakistan. Since the droning is not 
supported by any UN resolution, it is the United States alone that 
should offer the legal basis for the exercise. Subsection B, therefore, 
discusses the role of U.S. courts and scholars vis-à-vis international 
law. With the background set in this way, Section II discusses the 
psychological pull of international law, a fact that further stamps the 
growing affinity of the Third World and international law. Section II 
focuses on the Third World’s view of international law. Section III 
discusses the nature of international law vis-à-vis the EU. Section IV 
discusses the fallacy of the international law of humanitarian 
intervention using Afghanistan as an example. Western nations are 
largely interested in the suspension of international law at a time 
when SWFs are on the rise in non-Western economies. The 
withdrawal from international law by the Western countries to 
sabotage SWFs has been brought out in Section V. Section VI 
discusses the relationship between the AU and international law. 
Section VII concludes.  This Article invites scholars and researchers 
of international law to use “intimate enemy” as a new hermeneutics to 
unpack the real relationship of countries and international law. 
 
17 Id. 
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I 
THE HEURISTIC OF “INTIMATE ENEMY” 
I borrow the phrase “intimate enemy” from Ashis Nandy.18 The 
lens of “intimate enemy” offers an account of the relationship 
between international law and the Third World as the outcome of 
what Pahuja and Eslava put as “TWAIL’s characteristic double 
engagement with the attitudes of both reform and resistance vis-à-vis 
international law and scholarship.”19 The aim behind deploying this 
phrase in this Article is to capture a moment from the international 
law’s live-in relationship with the Third World. The desire behind 
importing this new lens of intimate animosity, to borrow Martti 
Koskenniemi’s words, “is not to write [a] ‘global history’ in which 
everything is visible—an impossible undertaking—but to diminish 
the power of blindness,” thereby seeing the future more clearly.20 
The evaluation of the Third World’s relationship with international 
law through the lens of intimate animosity, however, is not a value 
judgement. It is simply an effort at mapping the shifting realities of 
our times at a given moment, for instance, in 2012. Essentially a love-
hate courtship, the bond between international law and the Third 
World is in a state of constant flux. This affair is akin to the 
Stockholm syndrome: after a prolonged exposure to the Western 
technology of culture, Western education, and Western conceptions of 
international law, the Third World has began to sympathize with the 
erstwhile colonizers. It is this Stockholm syndrome of the Third 
World that has procreated the enigma of intimate animosity. 
Arguably, international law was the Third World’s enemy because, to 
deploy TWAIL’s central argument, it was used to justify colonial 
violence, slavery, and to acquire native land in all of Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America.21 
“It is now time,” Nandy wrote some two decades ago, “to turn to 
the second form of colonization, the one that at least six generations 
of the Third World have learnt to view as a prerequisite for their 
liberation.”22 Here lies the pull for intimate animosity of international 
 
18 ASHIS NANDY, THE INTIMATE ENEMY: LOSS AND RECOVERY OF SELF UNDER 
COLONIALISM 72 (1983). 
19 Luis Eslava & Sundhya Pahuja, Between Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and the 
Universality of International Law, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 103, 103 (2011). 
20 Martti Koskenniemi, Histories of International Law: Dealing with Eurocentrism, 19 
RECHTSGESCHICHTE 152, 176 (2011). 
21 Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in 
Nineteenth–Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 5 (1999). 
22 NANDY, supra note 18, at xi. 
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law for the Third World. The lens of intimate animosity, when 
applied to international law, helps us re-imagine the modern West 
from a “geographical and temporal entity to a psychological category; 
in structures and minds.”23 
Europeans, Camus once remarked, “have preferred the power that 
apes greatness . . . whom [European] school history books, in an 
incomparable vulgarity of soul, teach us to admire.”24 Books are 
agents of knowledge, and the power that such books wield on the 
minds of people is all too well known.25 Colonization cemented the 
presumption that knowledge only flows eastwards. However, through 
corrupt science and psychopathic technology, the West has 
purposefully dissipated only information eastward. For instance, 
during the colonial rule in India, the British introduced a new system 
of education to create clerical support. It is doubtful that this system 
even aimed at arming Indians with the knowledge of science and 
technology to create scientists. By the time of decolonization, 
international law had successfully seduced the Third World with 
concepts like sovereignty. About sovereignty and the primacy of 
international law, Hans Kelsen says that the theoretical dissolution of 
the dogma of sovereignty is one of the most substantial achievements 
of his Pure Theory of Law.26 
By the 1970s, in the New International Economic Order, oil rich 
nations furthered their resource nationalism through sovereignty. 
Notably, however, with its intimate animosity, the Third World also 
runs the risk of copying the West with all its lacunas. Somehow, 
international law functions as a software that facilitates this imitation. 
TWAIL then becomes an exercise in separating knowledge from 
information and affirming that knowledge could also flow westward. 
In effect, TWAIL, apart from exposing some of the hypocrisies of 
international law, calls for a cross-fertilization of knowledge, ideas, 
and solutions for global problems. 
 
23 Id. 
24 Albert Camus, Helen’s Exile, in LYRICAL AND CRITICAL ESSAYS 148, 150 (Philip 
Thody ed., Ellen Conroy Kennedy trans., 1967). 
25 See Aaron A. Dhir, The Politics of Knowledge Dissemination: Corporate Reporting, 
Shareholder Voice, and Human Rights, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 47 (2009), for a 
perspective. 
26 HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 124 (Bonnie 
Litschewski Paulsen & Stanley L. Paulsen trans., Clarendon Press 2002) (1934). 
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A. Droning in International Law 
In September 2012, Stanford Law School and NYU School of Law 
came up with a joint report titled Living Under Drones.27 The report 
deals primarily with death, injury, and trauma to civilians from U.S. 
droning in Pakistan.28 It is the possibility of losing everything—for 
example, in the war on terror—that begs attention to the nature and 
effect of international law’s displacement of developing countries 
such as Pakistan. Droning is a question of jus ad bellum, the body of 
law concerning the recourse of force between two or more nations.29 
In any case, civilians must be protected within jus ad bellum.30 
The legality of droning depends on whether Pakistan has consented 
to the strikes or whether the United States is lawfully acting in self-
defense.31 Paradoxically, while the liberal texts and documents of 
international law, including the UN Charter, seek to work towards the 
inclusion and protection of minority voices,32 in droning civilians, the 
United States has been violating those minorities within a foreign 
state whose consent was not sought.33 Pakistan’s parliament has long 
 
27 INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC (STANFORD LAW 
SCHOOL) & GLOBAL JUSTICE CLINIC (NYU SCHOOL OF LAW), LIVING UNDER DRONES: 
DEATH, INJURY, AND TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS FROM U.S. DRONE PRACTICES IN 
PAKISTAN (2012) [hereinafter LIVING UNDER DRONES]. 
28 Id. 
29 See Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace After September 11: Axes of Evil and 
Wars Against Terror in Iraq and Beyond, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 281 (2005); Brian 
L. Job, Confronting Terrorism: Dilemmas of Principle and Practice Regarding 
Sovereignty, in RE-ENVISIONING SOVEREIGNTY: THE END OF WESTPHALIA? 119, 122 
(Trudy Jacobsen, Charles Sampford & Ramesh Thakur eds., 2008). 
30 “If the goal of the laws of war is to protect all individuals in armed conflict, can one 
ever be on the ‘wrong’ side of the laws of war? The answer to that question from many 
international humanitarian lawyers is an emphatic ‘no’.” Mégret, supra note 13, at 265. 
31 LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 27, at 103, 105, 106; 3A C.J.S. Aliens § 1133 
(2012) (“Designation of foreign terrorist organization—Judicial review”); 74 Am. Jur. 2d 
Terrorism § 8 (2012). 
32 A very seasoned scholar and lawyer, Michael Riesman clearly admits this: 
“[E]xpectations with respect to the lawfulness of current or projected actions in the 
contemporary international political system are not necessarily congruent with the stuff 
with which lawyers ordinarily work, the formal texts of international law.” W. Michael 
Reisman, International Legal Dynamics and the Design of Feasible Missions: The Case of 
Afghanistan, in THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 59, 59–60 (Michael N. 
Schmitt ed., 2009); see also Yousef T. Jabareen, Toward Participatory Equality: 
Protecting Minority Rights Under International Law, 41 ISR. L. REV. 635 (2008); see 
generally United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, United Nations, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/47/135 (Dec. 18, 1992), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r 
135.htm. 
33 Piotr Balcerowicz, Afghanistan at the Cross-Roads, 11/12 DIALOGUE & 
UNIVERSALISM 97, 98 (2001) (“The call to war against world terrorism should not mean  
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called far the end of droning.34 Clearly there is no state consent then.35 
However, droning could still be legal if the United States is found to 
have acted purely in self-defense as UN Charter 51 stipulates.36 
However, a neutral evaluation of pure self-defense is tough to have, 
given the pro-government bias of U.S. courts as seen in a streak of 
new cases.37 Also such claims of self-defense are not only arbitrary, 
but they also constitute an invitation to extraterritorial application of 
one sovereign’s laws over another. No doubt, the war on terror has 
not only stretched the very idea of self-defense—a justification that 
 
common responsibility of the whole Afghan nation. Would a Parisian during the World 
War II unhesitatingly approve of American carpet bombing of Paris and Rheims, 
undertaken in order to expel the Nazis or their Vichy collaborationists under Marshal 
Pétain? Any civilised European would have shivered with a twinge of resentment at such 
an action, because the means would have been in stark disproportion to the ends, because 
the individual lives of civil inhabitants would have been considered too costly, because 
alternative methods could have been envisaged that would lead to ultimate victory and, 
lastly, because the cities are considered world cultural heritage.”); see also Steven R. 
Ratner, Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After September 11, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 905 (2002). 
34 Declan Walsh, Pakistani Parliament Demands End to U.S. Drone Strikes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 21, 2012, at A8. 
35 The Living Under Drones report says: 
Some analysts, citing information released by Wikileaks maintain that Pakistan had, 
at some prior point, tacitly supported drone strikes. It is not known whether 
Pakistan continues to consent privately to the program today. Repeated public 
statements by Pakistani officials, which intensified in 2012—declaring that US 
strikes are illegal, counter-productive, and violate the country’s sovereignty—
clearly cast doubt on whether Pakistan consents to ongoing operations. 
LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 27, at 106. 
36 Id. at 103, 106. 
37 See, e.g., Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organization, 13A Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 
36:511 (Sept. 2012); Request for Comments on Effects of Foreign Policy-Based Export 
Controls, 52 Fed. Reg. 42663-01 (proposed Nov. 6 1987). Some of the cases under 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C.A, §§ 1602-11, are: Acree v. 
Republic of Iraq, 125 S. Ct. 1928 (2005); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 129 
S. Ct. 2859 (2009); Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S. 848 (2009); Samantar v. Yousuf, 
130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Republic of 
Sudan v. Rux, 549 U.S. 1208 (2007); Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012). 
The spate of cases after the 9/11 incident, such as Khalid v. Bush, have upheld the 
President’s authority to capture and detain persons outside of Afghanistan.” Khalid v. 
Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Invoking the separation of powers doctrine, 
the court said that it is impermissible to inquire into conditions of detention under 
international norms given the President’s authorization from Congress to detain 
combatants. Id. The U.S. Constitution was read as ossifying any cognizable constitutional 
rights of non-resident aliens captured and detained outside the United States in the war on 
terror. Id. U.S. v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2011) (holding that 
military commissions have subject matter jurisdiction); see also Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 
F. 3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Executive Power v. 
International Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73 (2006); John R. Kennel, Exceptions to 
Immunity, 48 C.J.S. International Law § 45. 
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exists by virtue of UN Article 51—beyond anyone’s imagination, it 
has also induced a breach of the principles of natural justice.38 The 
United States not only defines its reasons of self-defense, but also 
interprets all tacit talks to the military government of Musharraf after 
9/11 and current ductile Pakistani government as a form of legal 
consent within international law.39 The United States thus stands in 
the grave danger of not only undermining democracy as a concept in 
Pakistan, it also insults the will of the civilians in a foreign country, 
who often become victims of droning. Either from outside or from 
within, it is international law that is put to rest. 
Today, it is the innocence, alienation, and ignorance of women, 
men, and children at the Afghanistan-Pakistan boarder that is often 
called upon to justify itself in a situation where the international 
community, through NATO, has ensured a rainfall of bombs.40 Very 
ironically, while the war on terror in Afghanistan, which has 
subsequently leaped into Pakistan, has identified its most vulnerable 
victims—women and children—a senior advisor to Obama blogs 
about the President’s release of “the first ever U.S. National Action 
Plan on Women, Peace, and Security.”41 The White House has not 
only identified terrorists—a prerequisite of so-called “signature” 
droning of locations in Pakistan42—in the form of the U.S. National 
Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, it dons the garb of a 
savior of the women and children in these two countries.43 In his 
 
38 Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 41, 42 (2002); LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 28, 
at 103. 
39 LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 27, at 106. 
40 J. Ann Tickner, Feminist Perspectives on 9/11, 3 INT’L STUD. PERSP. 333, 333 
(2002). 
The author “demonstrate[s] how gendered discourses are used in this [Afghan war] 
and other conflict situations to reinforce mutual hostilities, [and] suggest[s] that 
men’s association with war-fighting and national security serves to reinforce their 
legitimacy in world politics while it acts to create barriers for women. Using the 
framework of a post-9/11 world, [the author] offer[s] some alternative models of 
masculinity and some cultural representations less dependent on the subordination 
of women. 
41 Valerie Jarrett, Progress Toward a World Without Violence Against Women and 
Girls, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Aug. 10, 2012, 5:06 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov 
/blog/2012/08/10/progress-toward-world-without-violence-against-women-and-girls. 
42 David Zucchino, Drone Strikes in Pakistan Have Killed Many Civilians, Study Says, 
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/24/world/la-fg-drone      
-study-20120925. 
43 Wazhma Frogh, Is Afghanistan the Worst Place for Women?, GUARDIAN (London), 
Jun. 16 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2011/jun/16/afghanistan-worst-for    
-women (“What the world forgets is that Afghanistan has been at war, civil war, conflict  
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Savages, Victims, and Saviors, Makau Mutua attacks precisely such 
attitudes and politics of the United States.44 Mutua’s “savages-
victims-saviors” construction enlightens the larger ongoing politics of 
human rights. For instance, it illuminates the role of the Nobel Peace 
Prize and what its committee thinks are the victims to not only 
identify, but also to manufacture and, eventually, award the saviors. 
In her Nobel Peace Lecture, Aung San Suu Kyi commented: 
“When the Nobel Committee awarded the Peace Prize to me they 
were recognizing that the oppressed and the isolated in Burma were 
also a part of the world . . . .”45 Actually, she identifies all three: the 
savages, the victims, and the savior. It is because of her popularity in 
the West after her Nobel Prize win that she is being critiqued for her 
silence on grave human rights violations of Rohingya Muslim 
minority in Burma.46 The Rohingya are a stateless and oppressed 
people, and the government of Burma thinks they have no place in 
Myanmar and must leave the country.47 As Suu Kyi’s National 
League for Democracy looks ahead to elections in 2015, analysts feel 
that expressing support for the Muslim minority would be politically 
 
for so many years, almost all my life, and that is what has created chaos for women and 
shrunk women’s rights.”). 
44 Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 201 (2001). Mutua evaluates the human rights project as a damning 
three-dimensional metaphor that exposes multiple complexes. The grand narrative of 
human rights, for him, contains a subtext which depicts an epochal contest pitting savages, 
on the one hand, against victims and saviors, on the other. Mutua’s savages-victims-
saviors construction lays bare some of the hypocrisies of the human rights project 
questioning the universality and cultural neutrality of the human rights project. 
45 Her speech was remarkable: 
So for me receiving the Nobel Peace Prize means personally extending my 
concerns for democracy and human rights beyond national borders. The Nobel 
Peace Prize opened up a door in my heart. . . . We are fortunate to be living in an 
age when social welfare and humanitarian assistance are recognized not only as 
desirable but necessary. . . . When the Nobel Committee chose to honour me, the 
road I had chosen of my own free will became a less lonely path to follow. 
Aung San Suu Kyi, Nobel Lecture in Oslo City Hall (June 16, 2012), available at 
www.nobelprize.org /nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1991/kyi-lecture_en.html. 
46 Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Rohingya (Arakanese) in Burma (2004), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/469f3872c.html; DPA, About 75,000 Rohingyas in 
Myanmar Camps: Refugee International, THE HINDU (Sept. 29, 2012), http://www 
.thehindu.com/news/international/about-75000-rohingyas-in-myanmar-camps-refugee       
-international/article3948606.ece. 
47 Thomas Fuller, Internet Unshackled, Burmese Aim Venom at Ethnic Minority, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 15, 2012, at A4. 
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calamitous.48 Ironically, the same Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to 
Obama soon after he became the U.S. President on the expectations 
that the Peace Prize would remind him of his duty as the savior.49 Just 
like Suu Kyi’s election in 2015, Obama’s second term in the White 
House depends upon feeding uncritical nationalism and Islamophobia 
during the war on terror.50 
B. American Scholarship and International Law Within U.S. Courts 
In the war on terror, the NATO-led assault has chosen the same 
social and political location to play the savior. It is in this connection 
that Salim—Naipaul’s mouthpiece in his postcolonial A Bend in the 
River—talks about the civil violence in Africa: “[I]t was 
extraordinary to me that some of the newspapers could have found 
good words for the butchery on the coast. . . . But people are like that 
about places in which they aren’t really interested and where they 
don’t have to live.”51 Clearly, Afghanistan is one such place where 
humanitarian-minded Westerners either don’t live or don’t have to 
live.52 Yet it is this not-so-liked place that has become the goldmine 
 
48 Alex Spillius, Aung San Suu Kyi Facing Backlash for Silence on Abuses, TELEGRAPH 
(Eng.) (July 26 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/burma myanmar 
/9430518/Aung-San-Suu-Kyi-facing-backlash-for-silence-on-abuses.html. 
49 Though in an apologetic manner, Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize Lecture nonetheless 
talks of war: 
Still, we are at war, and I’m responsible for the deployment of thousands of young 
Americans to battle in a distant land. Some will kill, and some will be killed. . . . 
Now these questions are not new. War, in one form or another, appeared with the 
first man. At the dawn of history, its morality was not questioned; it was simply a 
fact, like drought or disease—the manner in which tribes and then civilizations 
sought power and settled their differences. 
Barack H. Obama, Nobel Lecture in Oslo City Hall (Dec. 10, 2009), available at 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama   -lecture_en.html. 
50 Ron Faucheux, Obama’s Second-Term Blues, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/sep/20/obamas-second-term-blues/. 
51 Id. 
52 Wazhma Frogh, a gender and development specialist and human rights activist from 
Kabul, says that peace in Afghanistan is only possible through campaigning at the 
grassroots: “[P]eople have to own it.” But NATO’s policy is not to interfere in matters 
considered “cultural.” Its failure to acknowledge the rights of women is detrimental to 
building a stable society in Afghanistan. Pennie Quinton, Special Report: Why World 
Peace Needs Women, CEASEFIRE, Jan. 3, 2012, http://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/if-dreams   
-dont-scare-big-enough/. For a legal discussion, see John F. Murphy, Afghanistan: Hard 
Choices and the Future of International Law, in THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 79 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2009). 
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of victims to ensure the production of saviors.53 The reality, in the 
words of Tariq Ali, has been the same all the while: 
There is widespread fury among Afghans at the number of civilian 
casualties, many of them children. There have been numerous 
incidents of rape and rough treatment of women by ISAF 
[International Security Assistance Force] soldiers, as well as 
indiscriminate bombing of villages and house-to-house search-and-
arrest missions. The behaviour of the foreign mercenaries backing 
up the NATO forces is just as bad. Even sympathetic observers 
admit that ‘their alcohol consumption and patronage of a growing 
number of brothels in Kabul . . . is arousing public anger and 
resentment.’ To this could be added the deaths by torture at the US-
run Bagram prison and the resuscitation of a Soviet-era security law 
under which detainees are being sentenced to 20-year jail terms on 
the basis of summary allegations by US military authorities. All this 
creates a thirst for dignity that can only be assuaged by genuine 
independence.54 
As a consequence, United States courts have to deal with a flurry of 
cases within its Alien Torts Statute.55 Since the United States 
Congress “has yet to state clearly whether tort claims alleging torture 
in U.S. custody should be allowed to proceed,” in Ali v. Rumsfeld,56 
the D.C. Circuit could very well have “arrived at a contrary holding 
that would have been more likely to elicit congressional input.”57 But 
it did not. The court took a textualist approach. Notably, American 
constitutional scholarship has recently been wielding its pen to arrest 
international law.58 Reckoning from the cases cited by scholars who 
favor the United States President’s and Congress’s unchecked powers 
in trumping international law, and the scholars cited in the judgments 
of U.S. courts in cases of detainees—usually foreign nationals—
 
53 My “production of saviors” idea comes from reading Baxi. See UPENDRA BAXI, THE 
FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 96–114 (2002); see also Thomas Poole, Book Review, 2 HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 163 (2002) (reviewing Baxi). 
54 Tariq Ali, Afghanistan: Mirage of The Good War, 50 NEW LEFT REV. 5, 15 (2008) 
(footnote omitted). 
55 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
56 Recent Case, D.C. Circuit Holds that U.S. Officials are Immune from Alien Tort 
Statute Claims, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1080, 1080 (2012) (discussing Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 
F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). 
57 Id. 
58 See Prabhakar Singh, Why Wield Constitutions to Arrest International Law, 2010 
ASIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 16 (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1719363. 
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arrested in relation to the war on terror, there is a strong symbiotic 
cross feeding to sustain each other.59 
Not only do the U.S. Congress, the courts, and some academicians 
today stand together to silence the voice of human rights and trump 
international law in the war on terror, they have also eliminated the 
doubts that shrouded the theorization of the world within the “clash of 
civilizations” epithet.60 A better example of a growing uncritical unity 
between academia, politicians, and courts is tough to find in any other 
country today.61 In the United States, even sovereign immunity has a 
more defined statutory basis under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act against a blanket immunity that international law mandates.62 
Yousuf v. Samantar63 epitomizes a gradual but unmistakable 
unwillingness of the U.S. Supreme Court to engage with or even 
deliberately ignore international legal rules, materials, and cases, 
which it would ordinarily have. 
 
59 For example, most of the U.S. court judgments on the detention of detainees have 
cited Bradley, Goldsmith, Posner and the like. See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F. 3d 1 
(D.C. Cir. 2010); al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008). See also Curtis A. 
Bradley, Enforcing the Avena Decision in U.S. Courts, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119 
(2006). 
60 See the controversial thesis of Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 
FOREIGN AFF. 22 (1993). 
61 John Balzano, A Hidden Compromise: Qualified Immunity in Suits Against Foreign 
Governmental Officials, 13 OR. REV. INT’L L. 71, 117 (2011). “The Samantar decision [of 
the U.S. Court] ended the circuit split over the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s 
coverage of individual officials, and has left the determination of foreign official immunity 
under the common law in a state of doubt. . . . It does not discuss the extensive amounts of 
U.S. and international cases potentially related to foreign official immunity that the parties 
cited in their briefs; indeed, it does not mention a single international law decision.” Id. at 
97. 
62 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(7) (repealed 2008); see also Balzano, supra note 63, at 
77. In 1996, Congress amended 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a), in part by adding thereto a new 
subparagraph (7), which created such an exception with respect to certain suits in which 
money damages are sought by or on behalf of a U.S. national for certain acts of state–
sponsored terrorism. In Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 105–06 
(D.C. Cir. 2000), this amendment was applied. It dealt with a wrongful death action 
against Iran and its intelligence service brought by the brother of an Iranian-born U.S. 
national who was assassinated by the Iranian intelligence service. The court found that the 
murder of the decedent constituted an “extra-judicial killing” under the statute. See 
Michael A. Rosenhouse, State–Sponsored Terrorism Exception to Immunity of Foreign 
States and their Property Under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C.A. § 
1605(a)(7), 176 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (2002). 
63 Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010). 
“The government has determined that the defendant does not have foreign official 
immunity. Accordingly, defendant’s common law sovereign immunity defense is no 
longer before the [District] Court.” Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04CV1360, 2011 WL 
7445583, at *1, *1 (E.D.Va. Feb. 15, 2011). 
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C. Comparing American and Indian Positions on the War on Terror 
The Western collective, this Article argues, is withdrawing from 
different types of international law (e.g., the UN and the WTO law) 
gradually. For instance, the United States wants a diplomatic 
settlement of anti-dumping cases after a series of losses,64 and the EU 
is happy to derogate from Article 103 of the UN Charter if it 
jeopardizes EU constitutional principles.65 In what Ben Chigara calls 
the short-circuiting of international law, as far as laws of war are 
concerned, powerful states “breach the foremost rules of international 
law and then claim that they were merely inaugurating new practice 
in aid of a new nascent norm of customary international law.”66 
Chigara analyzes the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq against the UN’s 
prohibition on the use of force.67 In an attempt to create an exception 
to the prohibition on the use of force, the United States claimed that 
they were merely actualizing the new doctrine of pre-emption.68 Thus, 
a custom’s potential to short-circuit international law is actualized 
“when states breach norms jus cogens and then plead new State 
practice.”69 Furthermore, a significant majority of American 
constitutional scholarship not only declares the project of 
international law unconstitutional law, but it is also breaking new 
ground in how to withdraw from treaty and customary international 
law.70 
The courts in developing countries, on the contrary, are groping 
toward international law in piecemeal ways. For instance, in 2010, the 
Indian Supreme Court held that India does not have any 
comprehensive legislation to generally define natural resources and a 
framework for their protection. Basing its opinion on international 
 
64 Sungjoon Cho, The WTO Appellate Body Strikes Down the U.S. Zeroing 
Methodology Used in Antidumping Investigations, ASIL INSIGHTS (May 4, 2006), 
http://www.asil.org/insights060504.cfm. 
65 Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi v. Council of the Eur. Union, Judgment of 
The Court (Grand Chamber) Sept. 3, 2008. 
66 Ben Chigara, Short-Circuiting International Law, 8 OR. REV. INT’L L. 191, 191 
(2006) (italics omitted). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law and Withdrawal 
Rights in an Age of Treaties, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1 (2010), for a discussion on 
this issue. See also Anthea Roberts, Who Killed Article 38(1)(B)? A Reply to Bradley and 
Gulati, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 173 (2010) (“[T]he withdrawal proposal is premised 
on an analogy between treaties and custom given the apparent anomaly that withdrawal is 
sometimes permitted from the former but never from the latter.”). 
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law in the absence of a specific domestic law, the Indian Supreme 
Court said, “it rests upon the . . . principle of permanent sovereignty 
(of peoples and nations) over (their) natural resources.”71 In a loosely 
worded judgment, the Indian Court confessed the Indian intellectual 
property law to “be an exact copy of GATT and WTO.”72 Thus a 
genre of textual monism is already taking root in some of the fast-
growing developing countries. 
As compared to the existing robust debate in Europe and America 
about their less-than-robust respect for international law, one is then 
tempted to compare the American and European approach to how 
Indian police captured Kasab, the terrorist who conducted the 
infamous “26/11” attacks in Mumbai, and chose to try him before 
district trial court under Indian criminal law for “murder, conspiracy 
and of waging war against the nation.”73 From the time of his capture, 
there was an irrefutable case under the Indian Constitution for 
Kasab’s right to legal assistance and the Indian state’s duty to provide 
it. Kasab’s case is important to distinguish between the Indian state 
and the Indian judiciary. The Indian State (bureaucracy) is dualist.74 
However, since the 1980s, the Indian judiciary, which has the power 
of judicial review, is gradually moving to monism, as exhibited in 
over a dozen judgments. Overall, India is moving toward monism as 
far as terrorism and international human rights are concerned, though 
much more remains to be done. Thus, between Osama Bin Laden, 
Kadi, and Kasab, three jurisdictions’ real respect for the rule of 
international law is exposed. 
Now this might be counterintuitive to some. Nonetheless, this is 
the background for this Article; there is a kind of intimacy mixed with 
animosity that animates the lives of third worlders vis-à-vis the 
regime of international law. This Article invites scholars and 
researchers of international law to use “intimate enemy” as a new 
hermeneutics to unpack the real relationship of countries and 
international law. 
 
71 Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2012) 3 S.C.C. 1, at ¶ 64 
(India). 
72 Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2005) 1 S.C.C. 308, at ¶ 45 
(India). 
73 26/11 Mumbai Attack: Kasab’s Trial, NDTV (India) (May 3, 2010, 3:38 PM), 
http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/26-11-mumbai-attack-kasab-s-trial-22806. The New 
York Times reported: “Even by the standards of terrorism in India, which has suffered a 
rising number of attacks this year, the assaults were particularly brazen in scale and 
execution.” Somini Sengupta, At Least 100 Dead in India Terror Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 27, 2008, at A1. 
74 See Jolly George Verghese v. Bank of Cochin, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 470 (India). 
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II 
THE WORLD WITHIN AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL VOCABULARY 
Albeit a law of easy virtues, this Article contends that, today, 
international law has become an “intimate enemy” to the Third 
World. However, one cannot jump to this conclusion without telling 
the complete story. Within TWAIL, international law has been 
perceived as an enemy of the Third World because of, as Anghie 
observes, international law’s colonial origin.75 Therefore, this essay 
will first discuss the nature of the relationship between developing 
countries and international law after 1945, the year the UN was 
established.76 
A comparison between the attitudes of international law and its 
officials towards the EU and the AU brings out the inherent bias of 
international law. International law has indeed been promoted as a 
civilizing force.77 Because of the abundance of resources, funded 
projects, and first movers’ advantage, European lawyers have been 
able to defend the EU’s breaches of international law. The United 
States clearly admits its breaches of international law as an example 
of exceptionalism.78 The American exceptionalism to human rights is 
also not hidden.79 However, Bradford and Posner reject the idea of 
American exceptionalism: 
 
75 See Anghie, supra note 6, at 739. 
76 The name ‘United Nations,’ coined by United States President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt was first used in the Declaration by United Nations of 1 January 1942, 
during the Second World War, when representatives of 26 nations pledged their 
Governments to continue fighting together against the Axis Powers. . . . In 1945, 
representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco at the United Nations 
Conference on International Organization to draw up the United Nations Charter. 
Those delegates deliberated on the basis of proposals worked out by the 
representatives of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United 
States at Dumbarton Oaks, United States in August-October 1944. 
See History of United Nations, UN, http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/ (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2012). Representatives of the fifty countries signed the Charter on June 26, 1945. 
Poland, which was not represented at the Conference, signed it later and became 
one of the original 51 Member States. The United Nations officially came into 
existence on 24 October 1945, when the Charter had been ratified by China, 
France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and by a majority 
of other signatories. 
Id.; see also J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 119 (2011). 
77 See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND 
FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960, 130 (2001), for an excellent exposition. 
78 See Nadine Strossen, American Exceptionalism, The War on Terror, and the Rule of 
Law in the Islamic World, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 495 (2009). 
79 “The idea that the United States is uniquely virtuous may be comforting to 
Americans. Too bad it’s not true.” Stephen M. Walt, The Myth of American  
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A trope of international law scholarship is that the United States is 
an “exceptionalist” nation, one that takes a distinctive (frequently 
hostile, unilateralist, or hypocritical) stance toward international 
law. However, all major powers are similarly “exceptionalist,” in 
the sense that they take distinctive approaches to international law 
that reflect their values and interests. We illustrate these arguments 
with discussions of China, the European Union, and the United 
States. Charges of international-law exceptionalism betray an 
undefended assumption that one particular view of international law 
(for scholars, usually the European view) is universally valid.80 
Prior to expressing such a view, Goldsmith and Posner have said: 
“But international law as such has no special importance. . . . [A]s in 
other settings, Americans and Europeans have more in common than 
meets the eye.”81 One should not forget that post-1945, international 
law has always existed within the spirit of solidarity, and by flaunting 
the breaches of international law, first by the United States and the 
EU, and then by China, Goldsmith, Posner, and Bradford are only 
self-excusing breaches of international law by the United States. They 
seem to advocate that eventually all nations live in a self-contained 
regime and, depending upon the military might and diplomatic skills 
of the nations, international law is trimmed or allowed to flower. 
Basically, Posner and Goldsmith interpret international law in a 
positive fashion, as law between two or more nations, and not as a 
universal construct. 
In the war on terror, foreign detainees have received little 
sympathy from American constitutionalists (as well as the American 
courts), even though some claim that “the use of international law in 
constitutional interpretation [in American Courts], as one factor 
among others, is highly traditional and eminently proper.”82 Dennis 
Jacobs, an American judge, thinks: “International law is not all about 
 
Exceptionalism, FOREIGN POL’Y, Nov. 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011 
/10/11/the_myth_of_american_exceptionalism. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Paradox of 
U.S. Human Rights Policy, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 147 
(Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005). 
80 Anu Bradford & Eric A. Posner, Universal Exceptionalism in International Law, 52 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 3 (2011). 
81 Jack Goldsmith & Eric Posner, Does Europe Believe in International Law?, WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 25, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122757164701554711.html. 
82 Gerald L. Neuman, International Law as a Resource in Constitutional Interpretation, 
30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 177 (2006) (“Some international law is too important to 
the place of the United States in the world for our constitutional jurisprudence to ignore; 
some international law provides useful functional or normative insights on which 
constitutional adjudication can draw.”); see also William H. Pryor Jr., Foreign And 
International Law Sources in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 173 (2006). 
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human rights, conflict, and the overlaying of international consensus 
on domestic law.”83 
A set of nationalist American lawyers interprets the Presidential 
war powers as arresting international law unconditionally.84 Rabkin, 
for instance, opines that “American self-defense should not be too 
distracted by international law.”85 Also, the “[United States] Supreme 
Court has made it clear that both the President and Congress can 
break free of customary international law by simple decree.”86 Rabkin 
challenges the critics’ underlying premise that “international law has 
the same sort of claim on [the United States] government as domestic 
law and that war measures abroad can accordingly be judged in the 
same terms as police abuses at home.”87 A series of United States 
Supreme Court cases has also supported this position, more so during 
the war on terror.88 United States Presidents have stretched or violated 
international law at significant moments in American history, and 
international law has served as a political rallying point against the 
anti-terrorism policies of the Bush administration regarding the use of 
force, detention, interrogation, and military trial.89 
What is worrying in such a development is the dry realism that 
casts off the ideal kernel of international law, the celebrated value of 
the equality of mankind trumped by the calibrated approach of the 
supply and demand and the production and consumption of rules. 
A. International Law as a Psychological Pull 
The romance between international law and the Third World began 
with the colonizers’ cultural identification of the non-West as heathen 
 
83 Dennis Jacobs, What Is An International Rule of Law?, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
3, 3 (2006). 
84 See Michael S. Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law, 
118 YALE L.J. 1762 (2009); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Bush Administration and 
International Law: Too Much Lawyering and Too Little Diplomacy, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 57 (2009). 
85 Jeremy Rabkin, American Self Defense Shouldn’t be Too Distracted by International 
Law, HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y  31 (2006). 
86 Saikrishna Prakash, The Constitutional Status of Customary International Law, 30 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 (2006); see also Michael D. Ramsey, The Textual Basis 
of the President’s Foreign Affairs Power, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141 (2006). 
87 Rabkin, supra note 85, at 31. 
88 See United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (C.M.C.R. 2011) (holding that 
the commission properly exercised jurisdiction over defendant); see also 78 Am. Jur. 2d 
War § 32 (2012). 
89 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 37. 
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and barbaric.90 According to Nandy, “Colonialism replaced the 
normal ethnocentric stereotype of the inscrutable Oriental by the 
pathological stereotype of the strange, primal but predictable 
Oriental—religious but superstitious, clever but devious, chaotically 
violent but effeminately cowardly.”91 
Writing in 1951, R.D. Kollewijn provides evidence to Nandy’s 
insights. He writes that, among all French and German colonizers the 
trend was towards non-recognition of the non-Western legal 
systems.92 During the seventeenth century, in the case of Blankard v. 
Galdy, Justice Coke’s sentence was mitigated as follows: “Where it is 
said in Calvin’s Case, that the laws of a conquered (non-Christian) 
country, do immediately cease, that may be true of laws for religion, 
but it seems otherwise for laws touching the government.”93 In 
Campbell v. Hall,94 Lord Mansfield expressed his displeasure to the 
distinction made between “a christian and a heathen kingdom”95 that 
Lord Coke had made earlier in Calvin’s Case.96 “Don’t quote this 
distinction,” Lord Mansfield interrupts the plaintiff’s counsel in 
Campbell v Hall, “for the honour of my Lord Coke.”97 
In that sense, modern colonialism, the vehicle of international law, 
“won its great victories not so much through its military and 
technological prowess as through its ability to create secular 
hierarchies incompatible with the traditional order.”98 Thus, 
international law came to the colonized world, such as India, with a 
 
90 See Prabhakar Singh, From ‘Narcissistic’ Positive International Law to ‘Universal’ 
Natural International Law: The Dialectics of ‘Absentee Colonialism’, 16 AFR. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 56, 62 (2008). 
91 NANDY, supra note 18, at 72. 
92 See R.D. Kollewijn, Conflicts of Western and Non-Western Law, 4 INT’L L.Q. 307 
(1951), for an early essay on this issue. “Without scrutiny of any sort, the laws of a non-
Christian State are estimated to be contrary to Christian principles and subject, therefore, 
to wholesale condemnation.” Id. at 310. 
A modern example of the conception that non-Western law is no law, is given by 
German colonial theory. When the imperial German Government, in the wake of 
private merchants and the trading companies, cast covetous eyes upon African 
territory, extensive estates were already found there, some simply occupied by the 
German pioneers, others obtained from African chiefs in exchange for cheap 
circulating mediums. 
Id. 
93 Id. at 310. 
94 Campbell v. Hall, (1774) 98 ENG. REP. 848 (K.B.). 
95 Calvin’s Case, (1608) 77 ENG. REP. 377. 
96 Id. 
97 Campbell, 98 ENG. REP. 848. 
98 NANDY, supra note 18, at ix. 
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promise of emancipation from the local yolk of caste discriminations 
and other traditional forms of exploitations.99 To a very great extent, 
certain local social evils were uprooted as the British introduced their 
legal system in India. This promise of a new order ensnared the Third 
World though a “psychological pull.”100 
Since then, an internal bifurcation characterizes the lives of Third 
World states. International law, arguably, was the secular wedge that 
was put between the Third World and its traditions to allow 
developmentalism to enter.101 Here the insightful findings of M. 
Sornarajah are remarkably useful; in a purely legal critique of 
international law, Sornarajah establishes that international law is often 
kidnapped by powerful nations, among other things, through 
academic writings, which sometimes even trump the sovereign will of 
weaker nations.102 Talking about the state of international investment 
law, he says: 
A series of arbitral awards, followed by confirmatory writings of 
the so called “highly qualified publicists”, all of them coming from 
the so called “civilised legal systems”, held that . . . a contract was 
akin to a treaty in that responsibility of the state followed the event 
of the breach of the contract and failure to amend the breach. The 
use of awards of tribunals and the writings of “highly qualified 
publicists”, often mercenary participants in the litigation writing up 
their opinions or briefs as articles in “learned” journals, resulted in 
the creation of an international law in the area. The practice still 
continues. The members of the so called “arbitration fraternity” 
elevate each other in status, cite each other’s views and create law 
on the basis that they are “highly qualified publicists”.103 
 
99 INDIA CONST. art. 51, § 4 (“Promotion of international peace and security. The State 
shall endeavour to (a) promote international peace and security; (b) maintain just and 
honourable relations between nations; (c) foster respect for international law and treaty 
obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another; and (d) encourage 
settlement of international disputes by arbitration.”); see also V.G. Hegde, Indian Courts 
and International Law, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 53, 53 (2010) (“For the Indian courts the 
first substantive encounter with international law emerges in the context of several 
territorial-related issues. The socio-political context forms the next phase, for the Indian 
courts to have recourse to diverse international legal norms relating to the environment and 
human rights and applying them as a persuasive tool. Later, the development context 
brings a complex array of commercial, environmental, and other related international legal 
norms into the Indian legal system.”). 
100 NANDY, supra note 18, at ix. 
101 See Daniel D. Bradlow, The World Bank, the IMF, and Human Rights, 6 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1996). 
102 See M. Sornarajah, Power and Justice: Third World Resistance in International 
Law, 10 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 19, 31 (2006). 
103 Id. at 31 (footnotes omitted). 
2012] International Law as “Intimate Enemy” 399 
No doubt this psychological pull worked well, and even since de-
colonization, a belief in the West’s inherent secular developmentalism 
has catapulted many Third World countries into a prosperous state. 
However, during this time, the West has unexpectedly suffered from a 
bout of illness: decline in overall prosperity, economic crises, and the 
loss of international hegemony with the rise of China. In about a 
century’s time, between October 1911 (the year of the Chinese 
revolution) and October 2011 (the year of an ever-deteriorating 
Eurozone crisis), Europe and China have swapped their positions: 
from being a keen lender, Europe has become a desperate borrower of 
capital. Consequently, Sornarajah contemplates, developed states 
might “dismantle to a significant extent the international law they had 
created to protect foreign investment and retreat into principles of 
sovereignty earlier advocated by the developing states.”104 
Thus, today’s cracks seem to have appeared in the secular and 
developmental wedge itself.105 Perhaps, therefore, Anghie says, “[t]he 
role of the Third World or developing country states in relation to the 
well-being and dignity of their own people is thus a subject that 
requires ongoing analysis.”106 Since it is now proven that international 
law was created to promote European commercial interests, this 
change in situation warrants an evaluation of the relationship between 
international law and the Third World and First World. This Article 
studies this new relationship though the lens of “intimate enemy.”107 
 
104 M. Sornarajah, Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Existing Structure of the Regulation 
of Investments, 1 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 267, 267 (2011). 
105 Alastair Ager & Joey Ager, Faith and the Discourse of Secular Humanitarianism, 
24 J. REFUGEE STUD. 456, 456 (2011). The authors argue: 
that functional secularism frames the discourse of contemporary humanitarianism. 
While in principal ‘neutral’ to religion, in practice this framing serves to 
marginalize religious language, practice and experience in both the global and local 
conceptualization of humanitarian action. Illustrated with examples from a range of 
humanitarian contexts, it is argued that the resulting discourse fosters a 
humanitarian response that is ill-equipped to engage with dynamics of faith within 
displaced populations. Humanitarianism needs to acknowledge the advent of post-
secularism signalled by many social theorists, and engage with greater awareness of 
the role of faith—both liberal materialist and religious—in addressing a range of 
issues of core relevance to the field: the clarification of core humanitarian values, 
the retention of a human rights framework able to define and protect human 
dignity, and appropriate means of addressing religious experience and well-being in 
the course of humanitarian programming. 
Id. 
106 Antony Anghie, International Law in a Time of Change: Should International Law 
Lead or Follow?, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1315, 1365 (2011). 
107 Prabhakar Singh, Macbeth’s Three Witches: Capitalism, Common Good and 
International Law, 14 OR. REV. INT’L L. 47, 79 (2012). 
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B. Third World as a Legal System 
It is hypocritical that no text on international law adverts to th[e] 
practice of lawmaking for so many states and peoples by so few in 
an age in which there is much talk of democratic legitimacy. These 
trends were kept in check by the vigorous assertion of competing 
principles by the developing states in General Assembly 
resolutions. Yet, such alternative sources were dismissed by 
members of the “arbitration fraternity” as unable to create 
international law or as expressing ex ferenda. It is strange that the 
collective wishes of the states of the world solemnly expressed 
through resolutions of international institutions could not create 
international law but often uncontested arbitral awards and writings 
of a few “scholars” could create international law.108 
Sornarajah’s above views flag the reasons that led to the alternative 
view on international law from a non-Western perspective. What is a 
Third World? Baxi thinks, “Third World emerges through practices of 
resistance and struggle by the colonially constituted subject peoples, 
practices which offer the best possible readings of the critique of the 
European Enlightenment and of the universalising form of 
capitalism.”109 Offering an historical understanding, Chaliand notes: 
“The French demographer Alfred Sauvy coined the expression (‘tiers 
monde’ in French) in 1952 by analogy with the ‘third estate,’ the 
commoners of France before and during the French Revolution—as 
opposed to priests and nobles, comprising the first and second estates 
respectively.”110 It “therefore implies that the Third World is 
exploited, much as the third estate was exploited, and that, like the 
third estate its destiny is a revolutionary one.”111 
B.S. Chimni, one of the most prominent Third World voices on 
international law, notes: “It is very often argued that the category 
‘third world’ is anachronistic today and without purchase for 
addressing the concerns of its peoples.”112 However, “too much is 
often made of numbers, variations, and differences in the presence of 
structures and processes of global capitalism that continue to bind and 
unite. It is these structures and processes that produced colonialism 
 
108 Sornarajah, supra note 102, at 31 (footnotes omitted). 
109 Upendra Baxi, What May the ‘Third World’ Expect from International Law?, 27 
THIRD WORLD Q. 713, 714 (2006). 
110 Gerard Chaliand, Third World: Definitions and Descriptions, THIRD WORLD 
TRAVELER, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/General/ThirdWorld_def.html (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2012). 
111 Id. 
112 B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto, 8 INT’L 
CMTY. L. REV. 3, 4 (2006). 
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and have now spawned neo-colonialism.”113 Therefore, he proclaims, 
“once the common history of subjection to colonialism, and/or the 
continuing underdevelopment and marginalization of countries of 
Asia, Africa and Latin America is attached sufficient significance, the 
category ‘third world’ assumes life.”114 Thus, he unpacks the politics 
of vocabulary through which some actors deliberately try to dissolve 
the category of Third World. 
But there is a need to be alert to the politics of critique of the 
category “third world”. To misrepresent and undermine the unity of 
the Other is a crucial element in any strategy of dominance. From 
which flows the suggestion that the category “third world” is 
irrelevant to the era of globalization. It represents the old divide and 
rule strategy with which third world peoples are exceedingly 
familiar. Such a policy seeks to prevent a global coalition of 
subaltern States and peoples from emerging through positing 
divisions of all kinds. Thereby, the transnational elite seeks to 
subvert collective modes of reflection on common problems and 
solutions.115 
Sornarajah thinks: 
China, though not a state created through the processes of self-
determination, played a leading role through solidarity with the 
newly independent states of Africa and Asia in advancing the 
causes espoused by these states which, together with the developing 
states of Latin America, collectively came to be described as the 
Third World.116 
To me, the Third World is synonymous with destitution, poverty, 
and lawlessness in the backyard of civilizations, both Eastern and 
Western. Third World, to me, points to the state of living, material 
access to resources, political and social conditions of the subaltern 
groups, and the sluggish traffic of justice to the victims of faceless 
global capitalism and dictatorial communism. There are many 
examples of the Third World: the great continent of Africa and the 
country of Afghanistan are two.117 
 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 5. 
115 Id. at 6. 
116 Sornarajah, supra note 102, at 19. 
117 “Under current [U.S.] law, the legal analysis of targeted killings is straightforward: 
If we are at war, an American government may target enemy combatants and civilians 
directly participating in hostilities without running afoul of either domestic or international 
law.” John Fabian Witt, Op-Ed., The Legal Fog Between War and Peace, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/11/opinion/the-legal-fog-between-war     
-and-peace.html. 
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Writing in 1987, two years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
Korean lawyer No-hyoung Park said, “[n]o effort, however, has been 
made to recognize the Third World’s significant contributions to the 
development of international law.”118 He argues: “The Third World 
should be regarded as a single international legal system, separate 
from the individual laws of Africa, Asia and Latin America.”119 
Several reasons justify the consideration of the Third World as a 
single international legal system.120 The universality of international 
law, according to Park, “should be understood as developing 
inductively from diverse regional national laws. Thus, considering the 
international legal system as a three-system group does not undermine 
the universality of international law.”121 
Regarding the Third World as an international legal system would 
enhance the development of contemporary international law. 
Second, considering the global future, it is necessary to identify the 
Third World as a separate international legal system. The debate on 
the global future, whose central issue is to establish effective 
patterns of order, has been affected by the Superpowers’ fight for 
hegemony. The Third World should participate in this debate 
because without Third World input, the Superpowers may establish 
a world order that ignores the needs of many nations.122 
What is notable is that soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when 
scholars began to deny the existence of three worlds, Park’s advocacy 
fell by the side.123 Perhaps Park’s observations about “Jihad” were to 
 
Current international law purports to decide the question of war or peace by 
evaluating the intensity of the conflict. But in an age of mass destruction, when 
conflicts can go in an instant from zero intensity to unfathomable terror, the 
intensity measure seems ill suited to the work at hand. 
Id. 
118 No-hyoung Park, The Third World as an International Legal System, 7 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 37, 38 (1987). 
119 Id. at 37. 
120 Id. at 38. The author says: “First, both underdeveloped and developed nations have 
neglected the study of the Third World as an international legal system. In the study of 
international law, ‘Traditional international law,’ ‘Eurocentric international law’ and 
‘Soviet international law’ have been recognized.” Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 40 (footnotes omitted). Park observed: “For example, a ‘Jihad’ or holy war is 
explained, not only by the cultural interests of territorial expansions but by the Islamic 
philosophy: unity of God, unity of mankind, and, the unity of religion. Hence, it is 
incorrect to assume that culture is irrelevant in international law and politics.” Id. 
Unfortunately such an example of “Jihad” follows his superb invocation and analysis the 
ICJ statute. Despite these observations, cultural values are relevant to international law. 
First, Article 9 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice designates the Court as a 
“whole representation of the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of  
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be proved historically wrong, as today the war on terror is effectively 
the war against “Jihad.”124 However, one should note what Chimni 
has to say about the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent end of 
the cold war: “Unnecessary importance is often attached to the end of 
the cold war.”125 The growing north-south divide is sufficient 
evidence, if any were needed, of the continuing relevance of the 
category “Third World.”126 Its lasting expediency “lies in pointing to 
certain structural constraints that the world economy imposes on one 
set of countries as opposed to others.”127 
Notably, humanitarian intervention in Third World countries, 
according to Fassin, “is a biopolitics insofar as it sets up and manages 
refugee camps, establishes protected corridors in order to gain access 
to war casualties, develops statistical tools to measure malnutrition, 
and makes use of communication media to bear witness to injustice in 
the world.”128 And all of this happens at a time the United States has 
 
the world.”’ Id. Article 9 indicates that cultural values are indeed relevant to international 
law and the ICJ must consider the diverse cultures of nations. Second, the rules which the 
Court applies are not always, universal or culturally neutral. Often, “the Court . . . 
consider[s] whether there [is] a special custom in capital states giving states of the 
shareholders locus standi under the circumstances of the particular case.” Id. Furthermore, 
it has been suggested that an established custom among a well-defined group of states is 
binding on all states in that group, except those states who consistently opposed the 
custom from its inception. Finally, “the premise that state interests which characterize 
foreign policy are independent of values or culture disregards the fact that state interests 
are not necessarily value-free.” Id. (footnotes omitted). However, lawyers are not 
clairvoyant pundits and wrong examples might succeed right analysis. 
124 Notably, a provocative advertisement—“In any war between the civilized man and 
the savage, support the civilized man. Support Israel. Defeat Jihad.”—that debuted in San 
Francisco made its way to New York subways in September 2012. See Hamid Dabashi, 
The War between the Civilised Man and the Savage, ALJAZEERA (Sept. 24, 2012, 12:19 
PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/201292464012781613.html. 
There cannot be better proof of that fact that the war on terror is seen as the war on Jihad, 
as the timing of the advertisement points to; a High-level Meeting of the 67th Session of 
the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels took 
place at the United Nations Headquarters in New York on September 24, 2012. The 
advertisement also has support from a U.S. Federal Court. New York’s Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority initially rejected it, but the Authority’s decision was overturned 
when a federal judge ruled that the ad is protected speech under the First Amendment. See 
Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 11 Civ. 6774(PAE), 2012 WL 
3756270, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2012). 
125 Chimni, supra note 112, at 5. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Didier Fassin, Humanitarianism as a Politics of Life, 19 PUB. CULTURE 499, 501 
(2007). 
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been droning parts of Pakistan, which constitutes one of its many 
breaches of international law.129 
C. The TWAILing of International Law 
This leads us to the question: what is TWAIL? Chimni has written 
the manifesto of TWAIL that is worth ruminating over and again.130 
He makes six points that speak to “The Road Ahead,” that constitute 
“[f]urther thoughts on a TWAIL Research Agenda.”131 Makau Mutua 
has offered one of its most provocative and powerful definitions.132 
The long and the short of his opinion is that though the acronym 
TWAIL is new, the idea is not. Historically, international law is a 
“predatory system,” Mutuwa pens, “that legitimizes, reproduces and 
sustains the plunder and subordination of the Third World by the 
West.”133 Thus, TWAIL first resists international law and then 
converts it into a reformist agenda. Today, TWAIL is on intellectual 
ascendancy. Using, if you will, a “social conflict” theoretical 
approach to the study of international law, TWAIL gives fresh ideas 
and adds new footnotes to the legal scholarship.134 
In advancing what has been a surprisingly reformist agenda, 
[TWAIL has] also helped to consolidate and institutionalise [sic] a 
political avenue that argues for the improvement of international 
law. Bringing to the forefront of thinking and writing on 
international law—issues of political economy, the cultural 
practices of differentiation, the uses of violence or the excessive 
exploitation of natural resources that have accompanied the 
expansion of the international legal order—TWAIL has become a 
virtual site from which scholars and activists can work both to 
resist, and to transform—or reform—international law.135 
 
129 See Chris Woods, CIA Drone Strikes Violate Pakistan’s Sovereignty, Says Senior 
Diplomat, GUARDIAN (Eng.), Aug. 2, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug 
/03/cia-drone-strikes-violate-pakistan. 
130 Chimni, supra note 112. 
131 They are: Increasing Transparency and Accountability of International Institutions, 
Increasing Accountability of Transnational Corporations, Conceptualizing Permanent 
Sovereignty as Right of Peoples and Not States, Making Effective Use of Language of 
Rights, Injecting Peoples Interests in Non Territorialised Legal Orders, Protect Monetary 
Sovereignty Through International Law, Ensuring Sustainable Development With Equity, 
Promoting the Mobility of Human Bodies. Id. at 23–26. 
132 Makau Mutua, What is TWAIL?, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 31 (2000). 
133 Id. at 31. 
134 Moshe Hirsch, The Sociology of International Law: Invitation to Study International 
Rules in Their Social Context, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 891, 906–09 (2005). 
135 Eslava & Pahuja, supra note 19, at 105. 
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Charged with umpteen counts of such allegations, where does 
international law stand today vis-à-vis the Third World? 
The mainstream international law is about the “state.” A state is 
assumed to have a sovereign character, meaning it is theoretically free 
in making its decisions. What does TWAIL have to say about the 
character of a state? TWAIL begins by asserting quite the opposite: 
states are inherently promiscuous and not sovereign. Sovereignty, as a 
concept, was invented within a particular historical environment. For 
mainstream international law, maintaining the façade of a state’s 
sovereignty helps to continue the old power structure. 
Naturally, then, an alternative conception of state leads to an 
alternative understanding of international law. Historically speaking, 
sovereignty was an expression of a political and commercial 
liberalism of, for, and by the Europeans. But when awarded to the 
non-Western states, liberalism within sovereignty, as a rule, addresses 
the individual’s egotistic indifference to other people’s plight. What 
else does the inherent liberalism of the responsibility to protect mean 
to the tribal and the rural population that is forced to welcome 
American drone visits through international law’s mandate?136 
Unfortunately, it is their innocence and disengagement that is 
unashamedly invited to defend itself. Therefore, TWAIL has provided 
us with five powerful observations. 
(1) [T]hat colonial patterns of thinking persist and continue to 
structure our international law sources and foundational concepts; 
(2) that the “civilizing mission” continues . . . (3) that racism and 
misplaced notions of cultural superiority continue to obliterate the 
contributions of and concerns expressed by non-Europeans; (4) that 
. . . notions of “class,” remain central to understanding our legal 
regimes; but that (5) contemporary forms of globalization have 
rendered geographically based notions of “imperialism” or 
“hegemony” overly facile in understanding the Gramscian forms of 
collaboration that now characterize the “Third World” itself.137 
The “intimate enemy” lens could very neatly magnify these five 
insights further. In his last article, the late R.P. Anand wrote: 
 
136 See Judy Dempsey, Europe Stays Quiet Despite Unease About Drones, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/12/world/europe/12iht-letter12.html 
(“Analysts say this approach is short-sighted. The United States intends to arm Italian 
surveillance drones in Afghanistan beginning next year. France has plans for military 
drones for reconnaissance and attack missions. NATO is trying to get member states to 
finance surveillance drones that eventually may also be armed.”). 
137 See J.E. Alvarez, My Summer Vacation (Part III): Revisiting TWAIL in Paris, 
OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 28, 2010, 6:13 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/28/my-summer     
-vacation-part-iii-revisiting-twail-in-paris/. 
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“Although international law is presumed to be applicable among all 
states, east or west, north or south, big or small, it is only a recent 
phenomenon, not older than the United Nations itself.”138 Likewise, 
Martti Koskenniemi says: “While the legality of the bombing of 
Afghanistan was still an object of polite disagreement, the occupation 
of Iraq is almost unanimously seen as illegal—occasioning the 
response from across the Atlantic that if so, then so much the worse 
for law.”139 Not surprisingly, globalization has rendered 
geographically based notions of “imperialism” or “hegemony” overly 
facile in understanding the alliance that now typifies the Third World 
itself. It is because of this that this Article uses the “intimate enemy” 
lens to see international law. 
III 
THE EU AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
After the Court of Justice of the European Union provincialized 
international law in the Mox Plant case,140 it again expressed its 
preference for dualism in the Kadi case.141 Kadi 
 
138 See R.P. Anand, The Formation of International Organizations and India: A 
Historical Study, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 5, 5 (2010). 
139 Martti Koskenniemi, International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration, 17 
CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 197, 197 (2004). 
140 See The MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), Case No. 10, Order of Dec. 3, 2001, INT’L 
TRIB. L. OF THE SEA, http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_10 
/Order.03.12.01.E.pdf; Arbitral Tribunal, Dispute Concerning Access to Information 
Under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention (Ir. v. U.K. & N. Ir.), Final Award of July 2, 
2003; ECJ, Case C-459/03, Comm’n of the Eur. Cmty. v. Ir. [2006] ECR I-4635. The 
conflict between Ireland and the United Kingdom about the building and operation of the 
MOX Plant at Sellafield, on the Irish Sea, dates back to 1993. The plant is designed to 
recycle the plutonium produced during the reprocessing of nuclear fuel. Ireland contested 
this project since the beginning and requested access to information from the UK about the 
plant in order to protect the marine environment of the Irish Sea. Both states are parties to 
the two treaties addressing the issue of environmental information: the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Convention for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention). In 2001, Ireland 
commenced dispute settlement proceedings under these treaties. Furthermore, it also 
applied to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) for provisional 
measures that would restrain the UK from commissioning the plant. In this context, 
waiting for the final decision of the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the UNCLOS, the 
ITLOS prescribed a provisional measure in December 2001, ordering the parties to co-
operate and to engage in consultations, including the exchange of information, without 
further delay. Ireland formally notified the Arbitral Tribunal of the withdrawal of its claim 
against the United Kingdom on February 15, 2007. See M. Bruce Volbeda, The MOX 
Plant Case: The Question of “Supplemental Jurisdiction” for International Environmental 
Claims Under UNCLOS, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 211, 218 (2007). On June 6, 2008, the 
Tribunal issued Order No. 6 terminating proceedings. See Ireland v. United Kingdom 
(MOX Plant Case), THE HAGUE JUSTICE PORTAL (last visited Oct. 20, 2012),  
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presented a high-profile and path-determining opportunity for the 
[European Court of Justice (ECJ)] to make its views felt in the 
current international debate about the extent to which human rights 
principles should inform the Security Council’s sanctions regime, as 
well as to develop its jurisprudence on the relationship between the 
European Community (EC) and the international legal orders in the 
novel context of the UN.”142 
“On both counts,” de Búrca says, “the judgment was a significant 
disappointment. . . . The result undermines the EU’s aspirations to 
develop a powerful international role premised on its distinctive 
commitment to international law.”143 
EU scholars defended the ECJ’s dualism as pluralism, adding to 
the recognized American constitutional dualism.144 Thus, even though 
 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=6164. In Case C-459/03, Comm’n of Eur. 
Cmty. v. Ireland, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of May 30, 2006, 
2006 E.C.R. I-4635. Ireland was condemned for bringing the MOX Plant dispute before an 
arbitral tribunal. See Nikolaos Lavranos, MOX Plant Dispute—Court of Justice of the 
European Communities, 2 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 456 (2006). International Court of Justice 
Judge Bruno Simma sees the MOX Plant case as a problem of parallel proceedings. He 
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the EU Commission initiated proceedings against Ireland in the European Court of 
Justice for breach of EU law committed through bringing a case against the United 
Kingdom under the Law of the Sea Convention. Here, it was not only the parties 
which initiated parallel proceedings (before ITLOS, an arbitral tribunal under the 
OSPAR Convention as well as an arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS), but also the 
organ of a regional organization which tried effectively to prevent the states 
involved from having their dispute settled by an independent arbitral tribunal 
outside the EU legal system. 
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both the EU and the United States keep violating international law, 
there is an expectation of compliance from the African and the Asian 
states. This expectation is further forced into compliance through the 
responsibility to protect, seconded by the threat of force. As the war 
on terror evinces, to recall Albert Camus, “[i]t is . . . with cannon 
shots that Europe philosophizes.”145 In the times of shifting realities, 
there exists a love-hate relationship between the Third World 
countries and international law, animosity mixed with intimacy. 
Depending upon the nature of international concern, the intimate 
animosity grows or declines. This constitutes a gradual shift of 
positions between the Western and the non-Western countries in 
relation to international law. 
A. Reconciling International Law’s European Experience 
[T]he spread of the nation-state norm beyond its European 
homeland was . . . the result of coercive imposition by hegemonic 
western powers as an integral part of colonialism and imperialism .  
. . . The European state ideal and its key concept of sovereignty 
became a cornerstone of the global interstate system after the 
Second World War. . . . Furthermore, the Charter of the United 
Nations and its support for the principle of state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity confirmed the centrality of the European state 
ideal.146 
The postcolonial constitutions have thus been framed in terms of a 
monist-dualist doctrine. Fresh from the bout of Stockholm syndrome, 
immediately after decolonization, the Third World states held on to 
sovereignty. Understandably, it was typical behavior of the newly 
decolonized non-Western states; sovereignty befell like a new toy in 
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property protection. 
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the ECJ in Kadi carries risks for the EU and for the international legal order in the 
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their hands. A sense of nationalism that emerged from their protracted 
separation from their traditionalism during colonial intervention 
swept all of Asia and Africa leading to nationalization of foreign 
properties and investments. By the 1970s, the New International 
Economic Order led to a further assertion of sovereignty by non-
Western oil rich states. Europe also seemingly has come full circle. In 
the EU today, dualism has become the sole way to look at 
international law, though scholars are offering a pluralist defense for 
eschewing monism.147 
In 2006, Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White 
observed that “[t]he [f]uture of [i]nternational [l]aw is [d]omestic (or, 
the European [w]ay of [l]aw).”148 And if we believe Camus, who says 
that Europe philosophizes with cannon shots, how good is this new 
European way of law? In the last article that professor R.P. Anand 
wrote, he observed: “Before the Second World War, international law 
was supposed to be not only a product of the European states and 
based on their customs and treaties, but applicable only among 
them—that is, European states or states of European origin.”149 Are 
Slaughter and Burke-White asking us to go back to this old position? 
To be sure, Hersch Lauterpacht, who invested all his life injecting 
domestic-law-type legality into international law, did not have the 
European way of law in mind.150 
When, in Kadi,151 the ECJ claimed to have created a legal order 
where international law could only enter after the EU’s permission,152 
Karl Popper became all the more important for the Third World. 
Wrapped in parochial nationalism, Europe, like the United States’s 
constitutional version, is offering a pluralist vision of international 
law that self-excuses both these constituencies for any derogation 
from international law. International law has thus been reduced to an 
agent of the West, employed or fired as and when needed. 
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B. Monism, Dualism and Pluralism: The Kadi Episode 
In its 1988 advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) said, “[i]t would be sufficient to recall the fundamental principle 
of international law that international law prevails over domestic 
law.153” This principle, the World Court said, was endorsed by 
judicial decision as long ago as the arbitral award of September 14, 
1872, in the Alabama case between Great Britain and the United 
States, and has frequently been recalled since—for example, in the 
case concerning the Greco-Bulgarian Communities.154 
The ICJ strongly affirmed the sole role of states in the Barcelona 
Traction case of 1970.155 Human rights discourses since then have 
sought to change that view. In 2011, after the Israeli navy attacked a 
flotilla of humanitarian aid for Gaza and nine Turkish citizens were 
killed, Mansfield rightly argued, “[w]here states have failed to 
comply with international law, private citizens must have the right to 
instigate transgressors’ arrest.156” 
No doubt, the conservative statist view, as Kelsen identified in his 
Pure Theory of Law, is fraught with normative contradictions. 
Powerful states create more duties for individuals under international 
law as they offer fewer rights—it was clearly seen in the lack of due 
process in listing procedure that led to Kadi. If we want to empower 
people and cut down powerful states’ ability to justify violence in 
terms of inflicting punishment, like how it was done through the UN’s 
resolution freezing the funds of people without due process, then the 
ECJ’s Kadi decision is certainly welcome.157 
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In Kadi, on the one hand, Europe strives to protect the fundamental 
rights of a Muslim male alleged to have connections with Osama Bin 
Laden and Al Qaida. On the other hand, it signals to the United States 
its autonomist aspirations of establishing fair procedures in 
international law.158 Europe receives a lot of investment from the 
nationals of oil rich states, and perhaps in Kadi the ECJ sends positive 
signals to such investors—who have a guaranteed fair trial under the 
European constitutional scheme—that Security Council resolution 
1267 cannot take away. 
Under the everyday integrating world, Europe seeks an inversion 
of Kelsen; it’s the European law that shall guide international law and 
not the other way around. Kadi serves a powerful signal to all three 
constituencies: (1) to those Europeans who defeated a common 
Lisbon constitutional treaty, (2) to the Americans that run the show at 
the Security Council, and (3) to the rest of the world that looks up to 
Europe on the standards of protecting human and fundamental rights 
through the powers of a constitution. 
C. Provincializing International Law 
The ECJ has emerged as the sole generator of EU regional law, as 
seen in the Mox Plant case159 between Ireland and England.160 Mox 
Plant has been raised at three different institutions: 
1. at the Arbitral Tribunal set up under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
2. another Tribunal under the Convention on the Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR 
Convention), and 
3. within the ECJ under the European Community and Euratom 
Treaties.161 
The UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal held that “according to ‘dictates of 
mutual respect and comity’ it should defer the treatment of the matter 
until its implications under EC law had been clarified.”162 For the first 
time in the history of international law, a tribunal of higher UN order 
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waited on a regional European court to take orders.163 At the ECJ, the 
Advocate General Maduro found Ireland guilty of having gone to a 
UN body, and thereby bypassing the European Order. Mox Plant, in 
my view, was a preparation for Kadi.164 
Thus, the idea of international law’s interpretation is not a value 
neutral question, as many in West claim it to be. It is the value 
neutrality of international law that the United States and developing 
countries in general seek to question in plurality arguments made 
about the decisions of the ECJ. Kadi is therefore problematic, even 
though it does create some common good of protecting individual 
rights from the continuing war on terror. 
IV 
THE WAR ON TERROR AS THE TERROR OF WARS 
In a fragmented state of international law, Third and First World 
countries cling to different fragments of the law as the right law. As is 
well known, Article 1(1) of the UN Charter aims to “take effective 
collective measures” for the “suppression of acts of aggression or 
other breaches of the peace.”165 What is also known is that the 
Security Council has been busy blueprinting war plans in the “war on 
terror.” While, on the one hand, NATO, standing true to the United 
Nations’ spirit of taking “effective collective measures,” assumes the 
responsibility to protect, on the other hand, in Guantánamo and 
elsewhere, the United States is outsourcing torture and human rights 
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abuses to dodge legal volley and public protests that such an act 
would cause if done on the American soil.166 
The American courts have also moved from their position in 1980, 
expressed in Fernandez v. Wilkinson, that “even though the 
indeterminate detention of an excluded alien cannot be said to violate 
the United States Constitution or our statutory laws, it is judicially 
remedial as a violation of international law.”167 Perhaps the most anti-
international law judgment from a U.S. court came in the Citizens 
Living in Nicaragua case where, inter alia, the court said judgments 
of the ICJ “do not fall within the definition of jus cogens or 
peremptory norms of international law.”168 
The spate of cases after the 9/11 incidents, such as Khalid v. Bush, 
led the court to hold that the “[U.S.] President’s authority was not 
confined to capture and detention of persons on or near battlefields of 
Afghanistan.”169 Invoking the separation of powers doctrine, the court 
said that “it [is] impermissible to inquire into conditions of detention 
under international norms given President’s authorization from 
Congress to detain combatants.”170 The United States Constitution 
was read as ossifying any cognizable constitutional rights of “non-
resident aliens captured and detained outside” the United States in the 
war on terror.171 
It is this duality of international law that Kelsen attacked in his 
Pure Theory of Law. He penned: “International law is forced to 
undergo a complete denaturing in the notion that it is incorporated 
into the legal system of one’s own state.”172 Within the confines of a 
state legal system, “international law can no longer perform its 
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essential function.”173 This is precisely what we see in the “war on 
terror.” 
American constitutionalists invert Kelsen at this precise point to 
ensure the continuance of American hegemony and shirking 
responsibility for the civilian casualties in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan in the war on terror.174 It then becomes clear that the critique 
of international law’s hypocrisy in its useful deployment by the West 
cannot be done in a legal vocabulary. Only through the lens of 
political science, sociology, and other disciplines can this injustice be 
magnified for all to see. TWAIL is a step in that direction. 
A. The Afghanistan Example 
Post 1989, the world stood witness to the horrors of terrorism, 
which many argue was the aftermath of the United States’s Cold War 
policies. This is true to a great extent. In order to avenge the former 
USSR for the Vietnam defeat, the United States armed the Afghans 
and bankrolled Pakistan’s military to fight the invasion of the 
communist USSR. After Russia’s defeat in Afghanistan, a political 
lull attracted Islamist guerrilla fighters to the struggle for power. 
America’s modernist intervention in Afghanistan enthroned the 
medieval ideology of the Taliban in Kabul. Installed indirectly 
through American liberalism, the Taliban organized a large scale 
lynching of women, televised evangelization of the administering of 
death in public places like football fields, banning of media and 
entertainment, annihilation of secular culture, and other unimaginable 
illiberalisms.175 The Taliban later offered hospitality to Osama bin 
Laden and company, with Pakistan recognizing the Taliban rule. It 
later became bin Laden’s laboratory and the cause for 9/11. 
The problem with today’s United States is not that it is a new 
global empire, but that, while pretending to be an empire, it continues 
to act as a nation-state, ruthlessly pursuing its interests.176 Something 
analogous to the outsourcing of jobs to Third World countries is 
taking place with the interrogation of terror suspects. Torture is being 
“outsourced” to Third World allies (those same countries criticized in 
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the U.S. State Department’s annual Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices) who can coerce confessions without worrying about 
legal problems or public protests.177 
During this growth and nutrition of Talibani medievalism through 
modernist Western intervention, India received its own set of guests, 
trained on American money and weapons, Pakistan’s army 
establishment sent mujahids to fight for Kashmir.178 This led to the 
1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan.179 Soon after Pakistan’s 
defeat and its isolation within the international community due to the 
efforts of Indian diplomacy, Pakistan saw a military coup and the loss 
of a democratic government. In terrorism, therefore, it can 
conclusively be said that the United States is fighting the spectres of 
its cold-war diplomacy; it is a case of the U.S. history run amok.180 
After the September 11, 2001, attacks, the United States declared the 
war on terrorism without caring much about its legality.181  India had 
high hopes from the United States-led campaign against global 
terrorists that emerged in the wake of the September 11 attacks.182 
From the arming of the Afghans against the former USSR to the 
efforts at disarming the Afghans in the war on terror, international law 
stood as a helpless bystander. Iraq need not even be mentioned. Yet 
many states sought international law’s indulgence manifesting an 
intimate animosity. 
Rarely has there been such an enthusiastic display of international 
unity as that which greeted the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. 
Support for the war was universal in the chanceries of the West, 
even before its aims and parameters had been declared. NATO 
governments rushed to assert themselves ‘all for one’. Blair jetted 
round the world, proselytizing the ‘doctrine of the international 
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community’ and the opportunities for peace-keeping and nation-
building in the Hindu Kush. Putin welcomed the extension of 
American bases along Russia’s southern borders. Every mainstream 
Western party endorsed the war; every media network—with BBC 
World and CNN in the lead—became its megaphone. For the 
German Greens, as for Laura Bush and Cherie Blair, it was a war 
for the liberation of the women of Afghanistan. For the White 
House, a fight for civilization. For Iran, the impending defeat of the 
Wahhabi enemy.183 
The end of the twentieth century has not put wars between nations 
out of fashion.184 Wars are businesses of profit and post-war 
reconstruction attracts investors with profit motives. The United 
States’s rise after Europe’s destruction in World War II is a relevant 
example. A decade into the twenty-first century, with the increase in 
the number of new sovereign states, the number of wars has only 
increased. Wars exemplify the symptoms of power with an 
understanding that every power structure is necessarily split. This 
crack is constitutive of the power dynamics; wars, as bottle-openers 
of the power structure, allow the aggressor to consolidate sympathy 
and thus more power though international solidarity. 
Meanwhile, the number of Afghan civilians killed has exceeded 
many tens of times over the 2,746 who died in Manhattan. 
Unemployment is around 60 per cent and maternal, infant and child 
mortality levels are now among the highest in the world. Opium 
harvests have soared, and the ‘Neo-Taliban’ is growing stronger 
year by year. By common consent, Karzai’s government does not 
even control its own capital, let alone provide an example of ‘good 
governance’. Reconstruction funds vanish into cronies’ pockets or 
go to pay short-contract Western consultants. Police are predators 
rather than protectors. The social crisis is deepening. Increasingly, 
Western commentators have evoked the spectre of failure—usually 
in order to spur encore un effort.185 
Such wars are conducted on rules entailed as international 
humanitarian laws, and they expose nations’ intimate animosity with 
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international law. Unfortunately new graveyards continue to spring up 
around the world, filled with millions of men, women, and children of 
all nations. We, the people of the world, have not moved away from 
wars; wars have simply chosen to dig new graveyards to lay to rest 
people of different ethnicities, races, and nationalities. In their 
responsibility to protect—while humanitarian wars put an end to life 
with bullets, bombs, or air strikes—sepulchral trade wars, embargos, 
and the discontinuation of relief and aid administer gradual death to 
kids, women, and men.186 
B. Humanitarian Interventions as a Consoling Myth 
When Roscoe Pound came to deliver the Tagore lecture at the 
Calcutta University in 1948, perhaps it was with a sense of future that 
he remarked that international law “has conspicuously failed.”187 
Those were the last days of formal colonialism. Oduntan usefully 
reminds us that the bulk of African states’ interest in the International 
Court of Justice arose only as a result of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo crises—which accounted for six new cases between 1999 and 
2004 alone—involving five African states that have never appeared 
before the court.188 
All these new states had based their political and social order on 
constitutions embodying a variety of rights and duties for both states 
and citizens taken from the so-called international standards. The 
relationship of these new states with international law, as Paulsen 
vehemently advocates in respect to the United States, also became a 
constitutional matter.189 Decolonization was the historical moment 
where international law underwent a cosmetic surgery. All along the 
two Hague Conferences and in the formation of the League of 
Nations, the primacy of international law over state law was 
promoted. 
Soon after the non-Western states joined the bandwagon of 
international solidarity, constitutional law’s priority over international 
law became the new argument. However, we will do well to recall 
Karl Popper, who exposed Hegel’s double face on his idea of a 
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constitution quite unmercifully.190 Ironically, under his Prussian 
patronage, Hegel transformed the demand for a constitution into one 
for an absolute monarchy.191 Some American scholars, such as 
Paulsen, seek to repeat the same feat by trumping international law 
using a constitutional vocabulary. 
Today, while the Third World shows a growing affinity for 
international law, the First World has reduced international law to a 
consoling myth. While speaking about the responsibility to protect, 
the new avatar of international humanitarian law, Žižek confirms this. 
According to him, the public message of the responsibility to 
protect—to provide international security and to save the planet—is 
supplemented by the obscene message of the unconditional exercise 
of power: “Laws do not really bind me, I can do to you whatever I 
want, I can treat you as guilty if I decide to do so, I can destroy you 
on a whim.”192 “This obscene excess,” he thinks, “is a necessary 
constituent of the notion of sovereignty.”193 
There is also a latent structural asymmetry that the five permanent 
members of the Security Council seek to promote: “[T]he law can 
only sustain its authority if subjects hear in it the echo of the obscene, 
unconditional self-assertion of power.”194 Sustained by an eminently 
political choice, America’s less-than-robust affection for international 
law lies in its enigma of the very presentation of international crises 
“as ‘humanitarian,’ the very recasting of the political-military conflict 
into the humanitarian terms.”195 
Examples abound. As Žižek asks, although all the media were full 
of pictures and reports, why did the UN forces, NATO, or the United 
States not accomplish just a small act of breaking the siege of 
Sarajevo, of imposing a corridor through which people and provisions 
could circulate freely? “It would have cost nothing,” Žižek says, 
“with a little bit of serious pressure on the Serb forces, the prolonged 
spectacle of encircled Sarajevo exposed to ridiculous terror would 
have been over.”196 
 
190 See KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES: VOL. 2 THE HIGH TIDE 
OF PROPHECY 48 (Harper Torchbooks 1962) (1945). 
191 Id. at 47. 
192 Slavoj Žižek, Against Human Rights, 34 NEW LEFT REV. 115, 123 (2005). 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Slavoj Žižek, The Obscenity of Human Rights: Violence as Symptom, LACAN.COM 
(2005), http://www.lacan.com/zizviol.htm. 
196 Id. 
2012] International Law as “Intimate Enemy” 419 
The situation was deliberately allowed to perpetuate a condition of 
humanitarian intervention. There is nothing human about such 
humanitarian interventions, then. Arguably then, TWAIL must 
interrogate the possible inconsistencies and splitting under the body 
of international law that “allow[s] the edifice of Order to maintain 
itself” in the guise of humanitarianism.197 
V 
THIRD WORLD’S INTIMATE ANIMOSITY AND THE FIRST WORLD’S 
SUSPENDED ANIMATION 
Today many non-Western countries, many of them Arabian, have 
been trying to invest in Western countries. Given the call for free 
markets and foreign investments, it is only natural that such 
investments are allowed. That is how many SWFs have come up. But 
there is an increased opposition to non-Western investment in the 
Western world. Most recently, a decision by “the French government 
to allow Qatar to invest millions of euros in France’s depressed and 
neglected suburbs has prompted concerns across the political 
spectrum about the motives of the wealthy Arab emirate.”198 
The outcry from the anti-immigrant far right was predictably loud. 
Marine Le Pen, head of the National Front, in a communique 
headlined “Islamic Trojan horse,” said Qatar’s decision was clearly 
linked to the fact that the majority of the population of the banlieues 
was Muslim.199 
Islamophobia, for now, puts international law on the backburner.200 
Even the political left in France is not comfortable with this. 
Demorand, from the left-leaning Libération, suggested the Qatari 
investment was the latest exercise in “soft power” and far from 
philanthropic.201 A similar fever had gripped the United States when a 
Dubai port wanted to invest in an American port, but it bowed to 
pressure from the U.S. Congress to sell it another American 
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company.202 In India, on the contrary, the government has announced 
a bold move to welcome foreign direct investment (FDI)—the FDI in 
the broadcasting sector is as high as seventy-four percent.203 The 
Indian Prime Minister, Man Mohan Singh, has urged Indians not to 
fear FDI.204 Quite understandably, due to a protracted fear of 
terrorism emerging from the Arab world and the feeling in the West 
about a soft takeover of their economy by Arab countries goes against 
the very freedom of trade, commerce, and investment that the West 
has been promoting since 1945. 
A. The Curious Case of SWFs 
In light of these developments in two important jurisdictions—the 
EU and the United States —this Article contends that at the start of 
the twenty-first century’s second decade, international law, to borrow 
Nandy’s apt idiom, has become an “intimate enemy” to the Third 
World in particular.205 The Third World, somehow, appears more 
inclined in obeying international law. Both the West and the non-
West do not fully comply with international law. Even so, while the 
West is gradually moving away, the non-West is slowly holding on to 
international law. This counterintuitive psychological evaluation 
informs a complete role reversal between the West and the non-West 
vis-à-vis international law today. 
The rise of concerns against SWFs is a case in point, as it exhibits 
the intimate animosity of international investment law vis-à-vis non-
Western states.206 Yvonne Lee argues that the reversal of capital flow 
from non-Western countries like “China, Russia, Singapore and 
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United Arab Emirates” to Western economies such as America and 
France, “have raised the spectre of SWFs as smoking guns.”207 
International law, that has promoted free markets and an 
undeterred flow of capital as a harbinger of universal common good, 
has been shifting to statist policies to keep Arabian and other non-
Western capital out of their markets. No doubt, there are genuine 
fears of security and terrorism. What this proves, however, is that 
primacy of self-interest over such values as freedom of trade and 
commerce and free flow of capital have long animated international 
law’s universalism and liberalism. 
In this new reversal characterized as intimate animosity, while the 
capital-exporting, non-Western countries like China, Singapore, and 
United Arab Emirates are keener on keeping the freedom of 
international investment law alive, capital importing Western nations 
now seek to defeat their old arguments of protection of investments, 
universality of international law, and free trade as a universal value 
for the common good of mankind. 
Žižek urges us to drop the common cliché today about Western 
cultural imperialism suppressing the globe’s cultural differences.208 
Actually, it is quite the opposite; in the twenty-first century, Western 
cultural imperialism accentuates the difference since the West lives 
by promoting cultural relativity.209 Perhaps this explains why 
international law has now become intimate to the Third World. 
The “intimate enemy” lens also helps us evaluate Third World 
countries’ love-hate relationship with international law. For example, 
it explains India’s incoherent reaction to international law’s different 
regimes: the UN-led security regime, the law of the seas, the WTO-
led trade regime, the human rights regime, the climate change regime, 
etc. Today, not only does India see international law differently, but it 
is conscious of how it is “perceived by the world compared with 
1996, the last time it contested and lost to Japan” for the non-
permanent seat in the Security Council.210 
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B. The Suspension of International Law 
In this section, the essay contends that a club of global capitalists 
are interested in the suspension of international law.211 In the sections 
before, it was contended that the European and the American 
scholars’ demand that national law control the international law—a 
position Kelsen vehemently opposed. Be that as it may, within a state, 
irrespective of the ruling ideology, there is an inherent urge on the 
part of the Left, Right, or Center to suspend the law.212 Since the 
national policies control the international arguments, naturally the 
urge to suspend the internal law translates into an urge to suspend the 
international law. Such ideological spaces thrive on the way the 
governments of various states connect with the international law 
regime. Arguendo, an evaluation of the role of such ideologies in 
maintaining the rule of law is a worthy exercise. 
Subsequently, importing Žižek to international law becomes 
necessary. He opines that “the ‘Right’ finds it difficult to conceal its 
fascination with the myth of a ‘primordial’ act of violence supposed 
to ground the legal order; the ‘Centre’ counts on innate human 
egotism . . . ; the ‘Left’, as has long been discerned by perspicacious 
conservative critics from Nietzsche onwards, manipulates with 
ressentiment and the promise of revenge.”213 The global Left points to 
a third domain that belongs “neither to global market-society nor to 
the new forms of ethnic fundamentalism: the domain of the political, 
the public space of civil society, of active, responsible citizenship—
the fight for human rights, ecology and so forth.”214 However, as 
TWAIL has often identified the problem, “this very form of political 
space is more and more threatened by the onslaught of 
globalization.”215 
Against the liberal center, “which presents itself as neutral and 
post-ideological, relying on the rule of the Law, one should reassert 
the old leftist motif of the necessity to suspend the neutral space of 
Law.”216 This means that irrespective of the prevailing ideology—
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Left, Center or Right—a new group of Third World capitalists would 
join the club of the global capitalist class.217 No wonder Žižek finds 
“multiculturalism” as the new cultural logic of multinational 
capitalism.218 
In the legal vocabulary, “multiculturalism” could be replaced by 
“pluralism.” Thus, scholarly debate around Kadi can also be 
explained as the effort on the part of the EU to avoid its self-
destruction and invite capital to financially sustain the EU 
constitutional project.219 Even so, most of the transnational capitalists 
are interested in getting around laws, or even putting them under 
suspended animation. 
VI 
THE AFRICAN UNION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE 
CONTINUED PSYCHOLOGICAL PULL 
The forces of neocolonialism have constantly underdeveloped the 
African continent as a whole to ensure its continued Third World 
status. Ibrahim Gassama quips about the destruction of the post-
decolonized African continent in great detail.220 “It is time for African 
communities,” he writes, “to reject the perspectives and programs of 
the past . . . [and] transcend limitations of the past.”221 It is an 
apparent call to transcend post-colonialism. Since international law 
remains the sole way to organize the postcolonial lives of nation-
states, we need a lens that first calibrates the very nature of this 
relationship. The lens of intimate animosity helps us calibrate the 
precise state of the relationship at a particular moment. 
On July 8, 2011, South Sudan became the world’s newest nation, 
the climax of a process made possible by the 2005 peace deal that 
ended a long and bloody civil war. On August 27, 2010, North 
Sudan’s president, Omar Al-Bashir, visited Kenya to attend 
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celebrations to promulgate a new constitution.222 He is facing two 
arrest warrants by the International Criminal Court (ICC).223 His visit 
extenuated international condemnation. As an ICC signatory, Kenya 
had an obligation to arrest Al-Bashir. 
A. Al-Bashir’s ICC Arrest Warrant and the ICC 
Kenya’s failure to do so drew criticism from both the Court and 
European governments.224 However, the Commonwealth Secretariat 
supported Kenya. Kamlesh Sharma, the Secretary General, said that 
the ICC must “understand Kenya’s multiple international 
obligations.”225 The Kenyan government argued that arresting the 
Sudanese president could have an adverse effect on the Sudanese 
peace process.226 Officials also said Kenya had a duty to the African 
Union, which instructed its members to defy the ICC and not 
apprehend Sudan’s president.227 
Responding to Commonwealth Secretariat, Christian Wenaweser, 
the President of the ICC assembly of states’ parties to the Rome 
Statute of the ICC, wrote a letter reminding the Commonwealth 
secretary of the standing of (1) an ICC arrest warrant in international 
law, (2) backed by treaty and (3) a UN Security Council resolution. 
Apparently baffled, Wenaweser remarked: “What was alarming to me 
was that [Sharma’s] comments seemed to indicate he agreed with the 
view expressed by the Kenyan officials that the obligation to the 
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African Union overrides the obligation to fully co-operate with the 
ICC.”228 The Security Council, Alvarez says is not much of a 
deterrent for the Sudanese head of state because “[t]he Security 
Council has, to date, ducked all pleas by the ICC Prosecutor to assist 
the Court in enforcing its indictments, even though the Council could 
easily do so under UN Chapter VII authority, including its existing 
sanctions regime for Sudan under Security Council Resolution 1591 
(2005).”229 Here Alvarez is egging on the Council to intervene in the 
AU at the cost of undermining an international legal process as 
enshrined in article 16 of the ICC.230 This flies in the face of the 
understanding of some AU members states that the ICC’s Article 16 
be used “sparingly and only when a specific threat to international 
peace and security could be identified under chapter VII of the UN 
Charter and when action against such a specific threat would be 
exacerbated by proceedings pending before or contemplated by the 
ICC.”231 
B. ICC Article 16, Security Council and Sudan: The Politics of 
International Law 
Wenaweser nonetheless needs to consult some of the judgments 
from the ECJ and the U.S. Supreme Court; many of them discussed 
the derogation of international law by the EU and the United States 
before. The question is: what alarms him? Is it the disobedience of 
international law per se or disobedience by an African state? As such, 
the AU is frustrated over the Security Council’s failure to consider its 
deferral request.232 “Less than two weeks after the Rome Statute 
entered into force on 1 July 2002, . . . article 16 of the Rome Statute 
was controversially invoked at the behest of the United States”233 The 
United States threatened in early June 2002 to veto the renewal of the 
mandate of the UN mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as all 
other future peacekeeping operations, if rticle 16 of the ICC was not 
amended to its liking.234 
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Usually states party to the ICC self-refer the cases. In the case of 
Sudan—not a party to ICC, only to the UN—the Security Council, 
acting under its chapter VII authority, submitted the situation to the 
ICC prosecutor.235 As such, as Dapo Akande et al argue, “in a treaty-
based consensual international judicial institution like the ICC, the 
Sudanese referral constitutes a coercive and exceptional measure.”236 
Such a measure is justifiable only from the perspective of 
international treaty law if “it is a measure aimed at the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace and security under article 39 of the 
UN Charter.”237 The Security Council’s invocation at the behest of—
and under threat by—the United States points to the highly politicized 
“nature of article 16” of the ICC.238 Although article 16 of the ICC 
allows the Security Council “a limited power of intervention in the 
workings of the ICC, it was not intended as a means” which the 
Council might use to undermine the ICC.239 Such a situation, as 
Akande reports, has prodded the Assembly of the AU, and the 
African Commission, “to consider seeking an advisory opinion from 
the International Court of Justice regarding the immunities of state 
officials under international law.”240 
Larger questions emerge. If the EU, as well as the United States, 
could trump international law, as discussed above, why can’t the 
African Union rethink its relationship with international law? This is 
not to justify any kind of genocide by any state machinery, including 
the State head. The question is about the political nature of conviction 
within international law. 
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After all, whether or not the Kenyan ‘“obligation to the African 
Union overrides the obligation to fully co-operate with the ICC”’241 is 
a matter of debate, just as it is within the EU as seen in Mox Plant 
case. As it is, the Sudan-Kenya part of the AU is an extremely fragile 
zone. When the larger prospect of peace is in deferring the arrest of 
Al-Bashir, which would be temporary, the Security Council should 
give peace a chance rather than just call unequivocally for Al-Bashir’s 
arrest. The exercise in international norm creation, such as the one 
done through the creation of the ICC, has been the single most 
important political result of international law’s project, which 
continues to misread the Third World states’ local needs. If the AU 
Assembly reiterates its request that the Security Council defer the 
proceedings against Sudanese President in accordance with article 16 
of the Rome Statute, it should draw the attention of international 
lawyers to a political turmoil that the arrest might unleash in the 
region. In any case, the United States, which controls the Security 
Council for all practical purposes, must not act to jeopardize the legal 
process for political mileage. The AU is doing its best to honor 
international law; it is the political production of convicts by the 
Security Council that wrongly portrays the AU as not complying with 
international law. International law’s intimate animosity continues. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the United States has 
decided to go it alone. Others are welcome to join in if they wish, 
and there may be advantages, but very little law, down that road. 
The Guantanamo base was deliberately chosen to hold al-Qaida 
suspects in a legal vacuum and has become a symbol of the US 
opposition to everything that might check its liberty of action—
from human rights treaty bodies to the International Criminal Court, 
multilateral disarmament to the Kyoto Protocol.242 
International law was never a Third World child. It was thrust upon 
the Third World through the process of colonization. Sovereignty is 
central to the understanding of international law. But as Anghie 
thinks, “sovereignty is, perhaps somehow inherently imperial.”243 It 
always seeks to expand its reach and power, whether internally or 
externally.244 Thus the “work of TWAIL scholars is indispensable to 
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addressing and comprehending these evolving complexities and 
shifting realities.”245 The lens of intimate animosity seeks to capture 
this shifting reality within the schema of international law. 
Today, the Third World has begun to accept the idea of 
international law. This creates a rather unprecedented situation when 
the Third World looks more interested in saving the project of 
international law than the Western collective. Much to the displeasure 
of Kelsen, both the EU and the United States have something dearer 
to defend. For the EU it is their yet-to-be-born constitution, and for 
the United States, it is their Constitution. Putting all speculations 
about the role of power in international law’s operation to rest, 
Paulsen reminds us that for the United States, its “Constitution is 
always supreme over international law.”246 He maintains: “To the 
extent that the regime of international law yields determinate 
commands in conflict with the Constitution’s commands or 
assignments of power, international law is, precisely to that extent, 
unconstitutional.”247 
Unfortunately, international lawyers “exist in a tenuous twilight 
zone between academic homelessness and practical professional 
insecurity.”248 While practicing international law, due in part to the 
discursive nature of law, lawyers do not want to transcend legal 
thinking. Sovereignty as a concept is also undergoing an 
unprecedented and severe change. Alas! Under the Western assault, 
international law is bleeding out its ability to see welfare as a 
common good at a time when NATO is handing down the 
responsibility to protect as a new humanitarian aid. If not more, at 
least in the responsibility to protect, we see the West philosophizing 
through force. 
Referring to Europe fresh from World War II, Albert Camus once 
wrote: “But the Europe we know, eager for the conquest of totality, is 
the daughter of excess.”249 It is no longer with hammer blows, he 
cautioned “but with cannon shots that Europe philosophizes.”250 Thus 
it is important that the norm-creating hypothesis of the international 
legal system “be reformulated so that support of a nascent norm of 
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customary international law could never be adduced alone as 
sufficient justification for breach of the system’s foremost norm.”251 
In other words, international law is waiting to be seen though an 
“intimate enemy” lens to capture its actual dynamics vis-à-vis 
developing and developed worlds. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, the United States Supreme Court ruled that conditions in 
California’s prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment and 
violated the inmates’ rights under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.1 The Supreme Court perceived the situation as so grave 
that it upheld the district court’s order mandating that California 
further reduce its prison population by approximately 37,000 
prisoners.2 The Supreme Court’s ruling stemmed from a plethora of 
 
1 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1922 (2011) (“This case arises from serious 
constitutional violations in California’s prison system. The violations have persisted for 
years. They remain uncorrected.”). 
2 Id. at 1923 (“Although the State has reduced the population by at least 9,000 persons 
during the pendency of this appeal, this means a further reduction of 37,000 persons could 
be required.  As will be noted, the reduction need not be accomplished in an indiscriminate 
manner or in these substantial numbers if satisfactory, alternate remedies or means for 
compliance are devised.  The State may employ measures, including good-time credits and 
diversion of low-risk offenders and technical parole violators to community-based 
programs, that will mitigate the order’s impact. The population reduction potentially 
required is nevertheless of unprecedented sweep and extent.”). California passed 
legislation in 2011 that the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 
describes as “the cornerstone of California’s solution for reducing the number of inmates 
in the state’s 33 prison[s] to 137.5 percent of design capacity by June 27, 2013, as ordered 
by the Three-Judge Court and affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court.” The Cornerstone of 
California’s Solution to Reduce Overcrowding, Costs, and Recidivism, CAL. DEP’T OF  
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evidence documenting egregiously problematic conditions in the 
prisons. This evidence begins with the sheer number of inmates in 
relation to the space. The Court noted that the prison population was 
“nearly double the number that California’s prisons were designed to 
hold.”3 The district court had described the severe overcrowding as 
“forc[ing] prisons to house inmates in non-traditional settings, such as 
triple-bunks in gyms and dayrooms not designed for housing.”4 The 
Supreme Court noted that two to three correctional officers may 
supervise as many as 200 inmates in a gymnasium, a space not 
designed to house prisoners, and that “[a]s many as 54 prisoners may 
share a single toilet.”5 
The conditions in California’s prisons as delineated in Plata are 
abysmal.6 As disturbing as these conditions are, I wonder what the 
Court might have ordered had the conditions in California’s prisons 
been as they have in Haiti’s. In reporting on conditions in Haiti, the 
U.S. Department of State’s 2009, 2010, and most recent 2011 Human 
Rights Reports concluded in similar, and sometimes identical, 
language in each year’s report that: 
[p]risons and detention centers throughout the country remained 
overcrowded, poorly maintained, and unsanitary. Overcrowding 
was severe; in some prisons detainees slept in shifts due to lack of 
space. Some prisons had no beds for detainees, and some cells had 
no access to sunlight. Many prison facilities lacked basic services 
such as toilets, medical services, potable water, electricity, and 
medical isolation units for contagious patients . . . .  Many prisoners 
and detainees suffered from a lack of basic hygiene, malnutrition, 
poor quality health care, and illness caused by lack of access to 
 
CORR. & REHAB., http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2012). The 
legislation, known as Realignment legislation (found in AB 109 and 117), became 
effective on October 1, 2011. Id. Generally, the legislation focuses on counties keeping 
and supervising individuals who have committed less serious offenses at the local level, 
rather than sending them to state prison. Id. 
3 Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1923. 
4 Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67943, at 
142 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009). In Plata, the Supreme Court described in graphic detail the 
disturbing results of California’s failure to remedy overcrowding and consequent failure to 
provide necessary medical and mental health care to the inmates of its prisons. Among 
other consequences, the Court pointed out that a 2007 “analysis of deaths in California’s 
prisons found 68 preventable or possibly preventable deaths.” Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1925 
n.4. 
5 Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1924. 
6 I have had occasion to visit one of California’s prisons, San Quentin Prison in San 
Quentin, California, and did observe some of the effects of overcrowding there. 
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clean water. Some prisons did not allow prisoners out of their cells 
for exercise.7 
With respect specifically to overcrowding, the 2011 State 
Department Report explains that “[a]ccording to local standards, 
available prison facilities were at 300 percent of their capacity, but by 
international standards, the prisons were above 500 percent of 
capacity.”8 
In March of 2012, a law school group from the University of 
California, Hastings College of the Law, visited the prison in Jérémie, 
Haiti, and observed that there was no triple bunking in gymnasiums 
and dayrooms because there were no gymnasiums or dayrooms.9 In 
 
7 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2011: 
HAITI 5 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: HAITI]. The relevant passage 
from the 2009 Report reads: 
Prisons and detention centers throughout the country remained overcrowded, 
poorly maintained, and unsanitary. Overcrowding was severe; in some prisons 
detainees slept and stood in shifts due to lack of space. Some prisons had no beds 
for detainees; some cells had no[] access to sunlight. Many prison facilities lacked 
basic services such as medical services, electricity, and medical isolation units for 
contagious patients. Many prisons also periodically lacked water. Many prisoners 
and detainees suffered from a lack of basic hygiene, malnutrition, and poor quality 
health care and illness caused by the presence of rodents. Some prisons did not 
allow prisoners out of their cells for exercise. 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: HAITI, available at http://www.state 
.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/wha/136116.htm [hereinafter 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: 
HAITI]. The relevant passage from the 2010 Report reads: 
Prisons and detention centers throughout the country remained overcrowded, 
poorly maintained, and unsanitary. Overcrowding was severe; in some prisons 
detainees slept in shifts due to lack of space. The earthquake, which damaged 
several prisons, intensified the existing problems. The earthquake damage 
compromised the holding capacity at facilities in Carrefour, Delmas, Jacmel, and 
the National Penitentiary in Port-au-Prince. Over 5,000 detainees escaped in the 
wake of the earthquake, including all 4,215 persons held at the National 
Penitentiary. Some prisons had no beds for detainees; some cells had no access to 
sunlight. Many prison facilities lacked basic services such as medical services, 
water, electricity, and medical isolation units for contagious patients. Many 
prisoners and detainees suffered from a lack of basic hygiene, malnutrition, poor 
quality health care, and illness caused by the presence of rodents. Some prisons did 
not allow prisoners out of their cells for exercise. 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: HAITI, available at http://www.state 
.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/wha/154509.htm [hereinafter 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]. 
8 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: HAITI, supra note 7, at 5. 
9 Escorted by Georges-Gabrielle Paul, an ESCDROJ graduate, I visited the Jérémie 
Prison with four other members of the 2012 Hastings-to-Haiti Partnership (HHP) on 
March 6, 2012. Our visit was brief. The Seton Hall Law School delegation also visited the 
prison the same week and conducted interviews with personnel associated with the prison 
and then prepared a fact-finding memorandum on the conditions there. See Seton Hall Law 
School Fact-Finding Memorandum from Rachel Lopez, Concerning Prison Conditions in  
2012] Representation for the Accused: 435 
Haiti’s Thirst and a Role for Clinical Legal Education 
fact, there were no bunks or beds for adult male inmates at all.10 In 
general, these inmates slept in shifts on the concrete floor because 
there was not enough floor space for all the inmates to lie down at one 
time.11 Adult male inmates primarily stood, sat, or squatted side-by-
side with, in at least one cell, over fifty men packed into the cell with 
an official capacity of approximately ten men.12 We learned that the 
adult male population of the Jérémie Prison had only limited access to 
toilets, which were located in the yard. According to a 2012 fact-
finding memorandum on the Jérémie Prison from a Seton Hall School 
of Law delegation, “[t]ypically, prisoners have two to three breaks 
from their overcrowded cells per day, during which they have 
approximately 25 minutes to shower, use the toilet, and get whatever 
little exercise they can. When a prisoner needs to use the toilet and it 
is not break time, he must relieve himself into a communal bucket in 
the cell, which is collected and dumped each morning.”13 
 
Jérémie and Recommendations for Reform (Apr. 18, 2012) (on file with the Review and 
with the author). 
10 During the March 6, 2012, visit to the Jérémie Prison, I observed the intensely 
crowded conditions in adult male inmates’ cells, the absence of gymnasiums and 
dayrooms, and the lack of bunks and beds in cells with adult male inmates. 
11 The Seton Hall Memorandum notes, with respect to sleeping conditions in the prison, 
that the 
prison warden explained that he cannot furnish the men’s cells with beds or 
mattresses because the roofs are made of aluminum and the prisoners could easily 
escape by using the mattresses to push up the roof. As a result, the prisoners must 
sleep on the floor. Sometimes the prison guards will place cardboard on the ground 
so the inmates do not have to sleep directly on the cold concrete floor. 
Lopez, supra note 9, at 2. 
12 Lopez, supra note 9, at 1–2. When the HHP group visited the prison in March, we 
noticed the number fifty-seven chalked on a cell door, one that housed adult male inmates.  
This number was apparently intended to represent the count of inmates in the cell. We 
were, however, informed that the actual count of inmates in the cell was fifty-eight.  
Inmates in this cell stood, squatted, or sat almost on top of one another, occupying what 
appeared to be nearly every available square foot of floor space of the small dark room. 
13 Lopez, supra note 9, at 2 (“The facility only has seven toilets and seven showers, 
which are located outside of the cells . . . The prison allows the prisoners two visits from 
their family members each week, but on those days they lose their regular break time.”). 
The HHP group did learn that, in at least some ways, the conditions in the Jérémie Prison 
had improved in recent years. For example, inmates now had regular access to water, 
which was apparently treated with chlorine or other disinfecting agents. Id. at 2–3. This 
access to water apparently resulted from funding by Seton Hall Law School and 
coordination with Dr. Eustache to have a well dug for the prison. Id. The cholera epidemic 
in Haiti, which began in October of 2010, has produced outbreaks in Haitian prisons, see 
2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT HAITI, supra note 7, at 6, and rendered the issue of the 
adequacy of medical care facilities in Haitian prisons especially urgent. In a July 18, 2012, 
website posting, the Center for Economic and Policy Research notes that the outbreak of  
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The observations of the March 2012 UC Hastings College of the 
Law group who visited the prison and the description in the Seton 
Hall 2012 fact-finding memorandum mirror many of the concerns 
about overcrowding and prison conditions articulated in the most 
recent 2011 U.S. State Department’s Human Rights Report on Haiti.14 
Similarly, the Health and Human Rights in Prisons Project in Haiti 
(HHRPP) opined in 2009 that “Haiti’s prisons are among the worst 
detention facilities in the Americas.”15 
 
cholera in Haiti had caused 7,418 deaths and infected 579,014 people. 104 Members of 
Congress Call for the UN to Take Responsibility for Cholera, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY 
RESEARCH (July 18, 2012), http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/relief-and-reconstruction 
-watch/104-members-of-congress-call-for-the-un-to-take-responsibility-for-cholera; see 
Health Cluster Bulletin: Cholera & Post-Earthquake Response in Haiti, PAN AM. HEALTH 
ORG. (Dec. 21, 2011), available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources 
/Full_Report_3209.pdf (“As of 30 November 2011, the cumulative number of reported 
cholera cases was 515,699, of which 279,077 (54%) were hospitalized and 6.942 persons 
had died.”). When I visited the Jérémie Prison in 2012, there was a pool of what appeared 
to be bleach just outside the entrance to the prison into which we dipped the soles of our 
shoes to avoid spreading (cholera) germs. On March 6, 2012, at least one and perhaps two 
inmates seemed to be in the process of being treated for apparent cholera symptoms. One 
was walking about the yard in what appeared to be a disposable hospital gown and the 
other lay under a canopy on a cot in the otherwise open prison yard and appeared to be 
attached to a one-to-two gallon-sized jug of intravenous solution. The Seton Hall group, 
who visited the following day, reported that even though the well water was being treated 
in the Jérémie Prison, “four prisoners have had cholera and two have died since the 
outbreak of cholera in October 2010. Additionally, the week that the Seton Hall delegation 
visited, one of the prisoners was identified as possibly having cholera.” Lopez, supra note 
9, at 3. 
14 As indicated in note 13, supra, some of the conditions in the Jérémie Prison (for 
example, access to water) may have been better than those in the prisons generally in Haiti 
as described in the 2009, 2010, and 2011 U.S. State Department Reports. The U.S. State 
Department Reports do note improvements in some of the conditions in Haitian prisons. 
See, e.g., 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: HAITI, supra note 7, at 6 (“Authorities took some 
measures to improve prison conditions. In response to the prison killings in Les Cayes, 
Minister of Justice Paul Denis began a series of unannounced prison visits, beginning with 
the Women’s prison in Petionville followed by the National Penitentiary. In addition, the 
government started releasing defendants who had been held in preventive detention for 
unacceptably long periods, pending formal charges and trial. Officials implemented a pilot 
project at the Petionville Women’s Prison, establishing a special correctional tribunal to 
deal with the 257 detainees awaiting formal charges. Between June 8 and 14, the tribunal 
heard 15 cases, including three involving juveniles; 14 defendants were released, including 
an inmate who had served her sentence but remained incarcerated. The Ministry of Justice 
held hearings in August and September to reduce the pretrial detention backlog in the 
National Penitentiary, and the court committee released 30 inmates as a result. Still, since 
most of the 1,570 detainees awaiting trial in the Penitentiary were held for serious crimes 
that warranted a jury trial, they were effectively denied the right to a prompt trial. An 
estimated 15 percent of detainees in the National Penitentiary had been convicted by 
year’s end.”). 
15 HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRISONS PROJECT (HHRPP), INSTITUTE FOR 
JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY IN HAITI 3 (Dec. 2009), available at http://ijdh.org/archives/5007  
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Not only are the prison conditions deeply troubling, but they are 
accompanied by frequent failures to meet the Haitian legal 
requirement that suspects be brought before a judge within 48 hours 
following arrest.16 The 2009, 2010, and 2011 U.S. State Department 
Reports all explain, in similar language, that arrestees are often held 
in the jails and prisons for “extended periods—in some cases up to 
five years—without the opportunity to appear before a judge.”17 The 
 
[hereinafter HHRPP]. Additional sources that describe the prison conditions in Haiti 
include the decision of the Inter-American Court in the Yvon Neptune v. Haiti case, where 
the court explained: 
The Court also finds that it has been proved and not disputed that, during the time 
Yvon Neptune was detained in the National Penitentiary and subsequently in the 
Annex, there was a general context of serious shortcomings in prison conditions in 
Haiti, as well as a lack of security in almost all the country’s detention centers; this 
was pointed out by several international organizations and agencies. There was 
extreme overcrowding, lack of beds, badly ventilated and unhygienic cells, few 
sanitary installations, poor food, a scarcity of drinking water, lack of medical 
attention and serious problems of hygiene, illnesses and bacterial diseases. The 
State did not dispute the Commission’s allegations, according to which: “[t]he 
extreme overcrowding, unhygienic and unsanitary conditions and poor inmate diet 
at the National Penitentiary did not even approximate the standards set in the 
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners”; and 
“[d]espite repeated outbreaks of violence in the National Penitentiary, the State 
kept its inadequate structure intact.” 
See Yvon Neptune v. Haiti, Merits Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C), ¶ 137 (May 6, 2008) (footnotes and citations omitted), available at www.corteidh 
.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_180_ing.pdf, and a submission to the United Nations 
Human Rights Council entitled REPUBLIC OF HAITI CRIMINAL JUSTICE—SUBMISSION TO 
THE UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW, available at http://ijdh.org/word 
press/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/UPR-Prisons-SR-English-Final.pdf. Some sources 
report current or impending improvements in prison conditions in Haiti. See, e.g., Trenton 
Daniel, Haitian Prisons Get Overhaul as Rest of Reconstruction Lags, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(July 21, 2011), http://ijdh.org/archives/20289. 
16 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: HAITI, supra note 7, at 7–8, 10 (noting specifically 
that “[t]he law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the constitution stipulates that a 
person may be arrested only if apprehended during the commission of a crime or on the 
basis of a warrant by a legally competent official such as a justice of the peace or 
magistrate. Authorities must bring the detainee before a judge within 48 hours of arrest. 
Officials frequently did not comply with these provisions in practice . . . . The government 
frequently did not observe the constitutional requirement to present detainees before a 
judge within 48 hours, and prolonged pretrial detention remained a serious problem. 
Authorities held many detainees in pretrial detention for extended periods—in some cases 
up to five years—without the opportunity to appear before a judge.”). 
17 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: HAITI, supra note 7, at 7–8; 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS 
REPORT: HAITI, supra note 7, at 8 (“The government frequently did not observe the legal 
requirement to present detainees before a judge within 48 hours, and prolonged pretrial 
detention remained a serious problem. Many detainees were held in pretrial detention for 
extended periods—in some cases up to five years—without being informed of charges 
against them.”); see also HHRPP, supra note 15, at 6. The HHRPP report describes results  
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most recent 2011 Report indicates that “most of the 4,808 pretrial 
detainees had never been before a judge, seen a lawyer, or even had 
access to documentation regarding the charges against them.”18 
According to the Seton Hall memo, in Jérémie, there appear to be 
significant efforts underway to get pre-trial detainees before the 
court.19 Nonetheless, the memo indicates that, of the 243 adult male 
inmates in the prison on March 7, 2012, only seventy-five had been 
sentenced.20 The remaining 168 still awaited trial, meaning more than 
two-thirds of the adult male inmates in the prison were pre-trial 
detainees who had not been convicted of the crime for which they sat, 
squatted, or stood in prison.21 
These reports underscore the need for representation. Seeing a 
judge or being heard in the Haitian justice system may require the 
intervention of an attorney.22 For example, the 2012 Seton Hall fact-
finding memorandum opines that “[a]fter 48 hours has passed, 
someone who has been arrested and not been before a judge may file 
a petition for habeas corpus, but that person needs a lawyer to 
represent him.”23 An international human rights attorney familiar with 
prisons and legal services in Haiti explains, however, that: “[a]ccess 
to legal services is particularly problematic. Eighty percent of the 
population is desperately poor and cannot afford to pay [for] legal 
services. Despite the great need, Haiti lacks a tradition of organized 
public assistance lawyering.”24 Similarly, the 2011 State Department 
 
from its survey of prisoners on the length of detention as follows: “the average wait for 
trial for detainees in the HHRPP survey was 16 months, with one prisoner still waiting 
after nine years.” Id. 
18 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: HAITI, supra note 7, at 11. 
19 Lopez, supra note 9, at 1, 4. 
20 Id. at 3. 
21 Id. There were approximately five women inmates during the March 2012 visit. The 
women inmates did have bunks and mattresses in the women’s cell, and so they were able 
to lie down without having to sleep in shifts. Id. at 2. Moreover, women were not confined 
to their cell during the day in the same way that the male adult inmates were confined. Id. 
Instead, the women seemed to have substantial access to the prison yard during the day. 
22 Id. at 5. 
23 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
24 Blaine Bookey, Enforcing the Right to be Free from Sexual Violence and the Role of 
Lawyers in Post-Earthquake Haiti, 14 CUNY L. REV. 255, 274 (2011). Similarly, the 
2011 State Department Report explains that “[m]any detainees could not afford the 
services of an attorney, and the government routinely did not provide free counsel.” 2011 
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: HAITI, supra note 7, at 10. As described by a knowledgeable 
observer, most “Haitian law school graduates never become lawyers, because they fail to 
complete the required memoire (thesis) and stage (apprenticeship) required for admission 
to the bar. Students of modest means, those most likely to work on behalf of the poor, find  
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Report notes, “Many detainees could not afford the services of an 
attorney. The local bar association in some departments formed legal 
assistance groups to provide pro bono counsel to indigents who could 
 
it particularly difficult to overcome these hurdles.” Bookey, supra at 274. Similarly, Brian 
Concannon notes: 
After finishing law school, graduates must present a memoire, or thesis. Technical 
support, access to materials, and advice for this process are not integrated into the 
curriculum, so students must find a lawyer willing to help them with their proposed 
topic, for a price. After successfully defending their memoire, candidates must 
complete a two-year stage or internship. Although some internships may be done in 
the public sector (in a courthouse, for example), the vast majority of candidates 
must find a senior lawyer in private practice who is willing to supervise them. As a 
result, although many students are enrolled in Haiti’s six law schools, some 
motivated by the possibility of using the law for social change, [Mr. Concannon 
estimates that] fewer than twenty lawyers per year are admitted to practice . . . 
Haiti’s legal education system is changing, but haltingly. 
Brian Concannon, Jr., Beyond Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and 
National Prosecutions, A View from Haiti, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 201, 212 n.45 
(2000). In addition, the Seton Hall fact-finding memo also opines that 
[i]n Haiti, free legal assistance is nearly non-existent and . . . opportunities for pro 
se representation are extremely restricted.” Lopez, supra note 9, at 7. On the topic 
of the availability of legal representation, Dr. Eustache explains: “In Haiti . . . [t]he 
scarcity of free legal services for lower income groups contributes greatly to the 
lack of legal knowledge. While the right to counsel is afforded to all citizens, court 
appointed counsel is generally only provided after the pretrial investigation is 
completed. In short, defendants are denied the right to legal advice during the most 
critical period of the proceedings. 
Dr. Jomanas Eustache, The Importance of Teaching Law and the Reinforcement of the 
Judiciary System in Haiti, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 601, 609 (2009). 
 A significant development in providing free legal representation to prisoners has begun 
in a pilot project in prisons in Hinche, Mirebalais, and St. Marc, Haiti, under the auspices 
of the Health and Human Rights Project in Prisons. See HHRPP, supra note 15, at 7. A 
report on their work explains that “[t]he legal team represents prisoners at no charge to 
secure a dismissal of unjustified charges, and pre-trial release or a speedy trial where 
appropriate.” Id. at 3. The HHRPP report notes that “[t]here is no effective system of legal 
aid in Haiti.” Id. at 6. Moreover, the report contends, “Haiti’s prisons are at the center of a 
nationwide bribery racket within the justice system.” Id. at 6. Similar concerns about 
official corruption more generally also appear in the 2011 U.S. Department of State 
Human Rights Report, which maintains that “[t]he law provides criminal penalties for 
official corruption. However, the government did not implement the law effectively, and 
officials often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. Corruption remained 
widespread in all branches and at all levels of government.” 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS 
REPORT: HAITI, supra note 7, at 20. 
 Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. The World Factbook, Haiti: 
Economy, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/ha.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2012). The most basic human needs, for 
adequate food, potable water, and safe shelter, especially post-earthquake, are often not 
met. Many organizations and individuals are working to try to meet these and other 
threshold needs. 
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not afford an attorney, but there was no nationwide government 
provision of free legal representation.”25 This need for representation 
produces an imperative to train and encourage attorneys to represent 
detainees in Haitian prisons.26 
At least one law school in Haiti aims to meet this imperative. 
ESCDROJ (L’École Supérieure Catholique de Droit de Jérémie, the 
Catholic Law School of Jérémie) focuses on “help[ing] build a society 
where the rule of law can be enforced”27 and preparing law students 
“to become servants of law and justice.”28 Approximately 130 
students are enrolled in the four-year law school curriculum.29 A law 
school dedicated to supporting the rule of law and to justice furnishes 
an excellent forum for encouraging students to undertake 
representation of prison detainees. 
In U.S. legal education, especially in the decades since the 1992 
MacCrate Report,30 a law school would likely rely on a clinical 
 
25 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: HAITI, supra note 7, at 10; 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS 
REPORT: HAITI, supra note 7 (explaining that “[w]ith the support of the national 
government and the local legal community, international groups provided funds to 
indigent defendants for professional legal representation”). 
26 Training and encouragement of attorneys to represent detainees are crucial steps in 
providing legal counsel for inmates. While some attorneys may be able to donate their 
time to handle some of these cases pro bono, additional funding to support attorneys 
representing indigent detainees will almost certainly be required to provide sufficient 
access to representation. In the pilot project of the HHRPP, described briefly in supra note 
24, the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (Bureau des Avocats Internationaux) 
reports that it “hired on-site lawyers at two of the three prisons” involved in the project. 
HHRPP, supra note 15, at 3. Of course, representation is only one of a number of reforms 
that are likely to be necessary to address the issues surrounding detention of individuals in 
Haiti’s prisons. HHRPP, which involves a partnership among legal and health 
organizations, more generally aims to address “prolonged pretrial detention and horrific 
prison conditions by systematizing the delivery of health and legal services to individual 
prisoners and advocating for broader, systemic reforms.” Overview, Health and Human 
Rights in Prisons Project, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY IN HAITI, 
http://ijdh.org/projects/prisoners-rights#hhrpp-prisons (last visited Oct. 13, 2012). 
27 About ESCDROJ, L’ÉCOLE SUPÉRIEURE CATHOLIQUE DE DROIT DE JÉRÉMIE, 
http://escdroj.org/About.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2012) (“ESCDROJ was created to help 
build a society where the rule of law can be enforced, where justice may flourish, and 
where peace may be enjoyed. We envisioned our law school as a place for those who want 
to become servants of law and justice, regardless of religion, gender, social, economic or 
political backgrounds.”). 
28 Id. 
29 In addition to the successful completion of classes, to practice as an attorney in Haiti, 
generally students must complete both a “memoire,” which resembles a thesis, and a 
“stage” or apprenticeship in a court or law office. The “stage” appears to differ from a 
typical U.S. law school externship experience in that it occurs following law school and 
without academic supervision. See supra note 24. 
30 See generally AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE 
BAR, LEGAL EDUC. AND PROF’L DEV.: AN EDUC. CONTINUUM (July 1992); see also N.  
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program to provide the theoretical, doctrinal, and practical training to 
help students embark on criminal representation of the underserved 
jail population. The law school might employ a live-client clinic, in 
particular, to enable students to experience such representation.31 But, 
as succinctly explained by Dr. Jomanas Eustache, Dean of ESCDROJ, 
“these kinds of clinical training opportunities do not currently exist in 
Haiti.”32 
Pioneers at ESCDROJ aim to change that. To do so, Dr. Eustache 
and members of the ESCDROJ community have engaged in a variety 
of efforts to enhance the focus on practical experiential legal 
education in Haiti. Among these efforts, they have sought to import 
some of the information and experience from U.S. clinical programs.  
For example, they have reached out to encourage U.S. law schools 
that partner with ESCDROJ to share U.S. clinical teaching 
approaches with aspiring lawyers-to-be in Haiti. As part of these 
efforts, members of the Hastings-to-Haiti Partnership (HHP)—a long-
standing partnership between the University of California, Hastings 
College of the Law, and ESCDROJ—have participated in creating 
and teaching sample clinical criminal simulation modules.33 More 
directly, ESCDROJ is in the midst of attempting to create its own 
 
William Hines, Ten Major Changes in Legal Education Over the Past 25 Years, THE 
ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH., http://www.aals.org/services_newsletter_presNov05.php (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2012) (“The recent ABA report on curriculum changes between 1992 and 
2002 notes that one pronounced trend has been the growth in opportunities for students to 
gain practical experiences in representing clients within supervised clinical settings and the 
proliferation of courses emphasizing discrete professional skills, such as factual 
investigation, interviewing, counseling, negotiation, mediation, and litigation—the core 
agenda of the McCrate Report.”). 
31 An extensive body of scholarship exists on clinical andragogy/pedagogy in legal 
education. See, e.g., Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, Clinical Legal 
Education for this Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (2000); GARY 
BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL 
INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978). 
32 Eustache, supra note 24, at 607; see also Brian Concannon, Jr., The Bureau des 
Avocats Internationaux, a Victim-Centered Approach, in EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR 
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS 239 (Barnhizer ed., 2001) (“Law School in Haiti is 
theoretical, with no practice classes or clinics.”). 
33 As one of several partnerships between ESCDROJ and U.S. law schools, HHP’s 
work is just one of a number of U.S. law school collaborations with legal educators in 
Jérémie. At least three U.S. law schools, in addition to UC Hastings College of the Law, 
enjoy educational partnerships with ESCDROJ, including Catholic University of America, 
Columbus School of Law, Florida International University College of Law, and Seton Hall 
University School of Law. See Partners & Projects, L’ÉCOLE SUPÉRIEURE CATHOLIQUE 
DE DROIT DE JÉRÉMIE, http://escdroj.org/partners&projects.html (last visited Oct. 14, 
2012). 
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criminal justice clinic in Jérémie.34 The hope and expectation is that 
“[o]nce fully operational, the Clinic will help to reduce significantly 
the overcrowding of the jail in Jérémie.”35 
This Article explores and reflects on the experience of the 
Hastings-to-Haiti Partnership in designing and teaching two criminal 
justice simulation modules, one in 2009 and one in 2011, with the 
collaborative and invaluable engagement, advice, and support of our 
ESCDROJ colleagues. This simulation project aims to contribute to 
the larger endeavor of fueling practical legal training in Haiti’s law 
school curriculum, as well as furnishing more immediate education 
about practical legal skills for students who might represent detainees 
in the Haitian prison system in Jérémie through the hoped-for 
criminal justice clinic and in their future practices. 
It is important to note, before proceeding to a discussion and 
evaluation of this aspect of the UC Hastings and ESCDROJ 
exchange, that, although the members of the UC Hastings contingent 
were the primary presenters of material for these clinical modules, the 
exchange is a bi-directional one. The partnership engages students, 
 
34 Eustache, supra note 24, at 606–07 (“In the near future, ESCDROJ hopes to start a 
law clinic in order to provide both clinical training for our students and assistance to those 
in our community and who need representation. Currently, after passing a pre-memoir at 
the completion of their second year, students may represent individuals before the local 
court. However, by having a clinic, we could more effectively train our students in a 
manner that combines advocacy with a strong commitment to serve those who cannot 
afford justice. Students would then have the necessary tools to sharpen their legal 
advocacy skills. The need is great because these kinds of clinical training opportunities do 
not currently exist in Haiti.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Partners & Projects, supra note 
33 (“ESCDROJ is currently working to establish Groupe de Recherche, d’Analyse et 
d’Assistance Légale, the first law school affiliated Criminal Justice Clinic to serve the 
Grand’Anse region of Haiti. The clinic will increase access to quality legal representation 
for indigent defendants, provide for private mediation to resolve disputes before they ripen 
into criminal charges, inform the citizenry about their rights and responsibilities under the 
rule of law, and train and deploy a new class of lawyers dedicated to social justice. It will 
also serve as a model that can be replicated in other law schools of Haiti to increase high 
quality legal representation for those charged with crimes who currently are unrepresented, 
and often forgotten, in Haiti’s criminal justice system.”); Law and Social Justice 
Initiatives, THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA (June 20, 2012), http://lsji.law.edu 
/cuahaiti.cfm. As part of the effort to initiate a criminal justice clinic, clinicians in the 
United States at Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law hosted and 
worked with Roxane Dimanche, a pioneer in the efforts to found the Jérémie clinic, to 
provide information about U.S. clinical legal education. In January 2012, UC Hastings 
hosted Georges-Gabrielle Paul, a graduate of ESCDROJ, to support her efforts to help 
launch the Criminal Justice Clinic at ESCDROJ. Ms. Paul joined UC Hastings law 
students in attending an intensive accelerated class focused on preparing the U.S. law 
students for their externship experiences in local California prosecutors’ or public 
defenders’ offices. 
35 Law and Social Justice Initiatives, supra note 34. 
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alumni, and faculty from both institutions in presenting and sharing 
legal research, analysis, and information with each other. Moreover, 
the guidance, counsel, and practical support of our ESCDROJ 
colleagues were critical to the design and implementation of these two 
simulations. 
Part I provides an overview of the creation and implementation of 
the first module. Part II surfaces and reflects upon some of the lessons 
from this foray into clinical legal educational modules in Haiti. In 
identifying these implications, Part II articulates several potential 
guideposts for international academics and practitioners providing 
curricular support for clinical legal education in Haiti and, perhaps, in 
other international contexts. Part III briefly addresses the second 
module and how we tried to follow those guideposts and apply those 
lessons. 
Through this Article, I aim to provide a firsthand account and 
consequent analysis of one approach to developing and teaching 
criminal justice clinical legal educational modules in a Haitian law 
school. We hope that these simulation modules play at least a small 
part in helping to prepare and/or encouraging students to engage in 
criminal practice, and thus ultimately in addressing the urgent need 
for legal representation for detainees in Haitian prisons.36 Research in 
the scholarly legal literature suggests that this is the first Article to 
furnish such an account and analysis as applied to Haiti.37 
 
36 I use the term “we” often in this Article with the intent to credit my many wonderful 
colleagues involved in these simulations for the work and insights they contributed. But 
they may not share precisely my views, perspectives, or evaluative opinions. 
Consequently, please interpret the “we” as sharing credit, but not burdening my colleagues 
with my opinions. 
37 This research was conducted in a variety of scholarly legal literature sources 
available in English. This Article strives to supplement the existing collection of scholarly 
literature on global clinical legal education efforts. See, e.g., THE GLOBAL CLINICAL 
MOVEMENT: EDUCATING LAWYERS FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE (Frank S. Bloch ed., 2011) 
(describing and reflecting upon facets of clinical legal education endeavors in a variety of 
countries around the world); BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, STORMING THE COURT: HOW A BAND 
OF YALE LAW STUDENTS SUED THE PRESIDENT AND WON (2005) (describing the work of 
Yale Lowenstein Clinic Law School students, Michael Ratner and Professor Harold Koh, 
among others, in representing Haitian detainees at Guantanamo Bay); Stacy Caplow, 
“Deport All the Students”: Lessons Learned in an X-Treme Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 
633 (2006) (reviewing STORMING THE COURT); Scott L. Cummings & Louise G. Trubek, 
Globalizing Public Interest Law, 13 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 38–39 (2008) 
(“In an effort to formalize global information exchange among progressive academics, the 
Global Alliance for Justice Education was founded in the late 1990s to facilitate the 
network of clinical and practice-oriented law school professors from around the world 
interested in promoting social justice pedagogy.”); Lawrence M. Grosberg, Clinical 
Education in Russia: “Da and Nyet,” 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 469 (2001); Steven E. Hendrix,  
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I 
CREATING AND IMPLEMENTING OUR FIRST SIMULATION MODULE 
A. Developing the Module 
In the fall of 2008, Dean Eustache gave a symposium presentation 
at UC Hastings in which he conveyed his hope that ESCDROJ would 
create its own criminal justice clinic.38 Several months later, in the 
spring semester of 2009, as discussions got underway about what 
presentations might be of interest to our partners during the upcoming 
 
Restructuring Legal Education in Guatemala: A Model for Law School Reform in Latin 
America?, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 597 (2004) (discussing law school reform, including reform 
of law school clinics in Guatemala); Grady Jessup, Symbiotic Relations: Clinical 
Methodology—Fostering New Paradigms in African Legal Education, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 
377 (2002); Peter A. Joy et al., Building Clinical Legal Education Programs in a Country 
Without a Tradition of Graduate Professional Legal Education: Japan Educational 
Reform as a Case Study, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 417 (2006); Peggy Maisel, Expanding and 
Sustaining Clinical Legal Education in Developing Countries: What We Can Learn from 
South Africa, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 374 (2007) (reviewing obstacles faced by law school 
clinics and vehicles employed by clinicians for addressing them in South Africa); Peggy 
Maisel, The Role of U.S. Law Faculty in Developing Countries: Striving for Effective 
Cross-Cultural Collaboration, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 465, 466 (2008) (offering a critique to 
“provide ideas to U.S. law faculty who undertake future visits abroad to insure that their 
efforts amount to effective cross-cultural collaborations as opposed to one-sided attempts 
to transfer American expertise.”); Melissa Gibson Swain & JoNel Newman, Helping Haiti 
in the Wake of Disaster: Law Students as First Responders, 6 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 133 (2011) (discussing the efforts and aid provided by U.S. law school clinicians 
and their students in helping Haitians secure Temporary Protected Status in the wake of 
the January 2010 earthquake as part of the work of a law school clinic at the University of 
Miami School of Law); J.P. Ogilvy, Compilation of Clinical Law Teachers with 
International Teaching or Consulting Experience, 24–25 (Feb. 27, 2012), available at 
http://www.law.edu/res/docs/INTERNATIONAL_TEACHING_Survey_rev02-27-12(5) 
.pdf (including two references to faculty who have taught or consulted in Haiti—the 
compiler, Professor Ogilvy, and Professor Jean Larosiliere of Northern Illinois); Leah 
Wortham, Aiding Clinical Education Abroad: What Can Be Gained and the Learning 
Curve on How to Do So Effectively, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 615 (2006). Although Professor 
Larosiliere’s entry from a 1994–95 visit notes providing “training in investigative theory 
and technique, ethics, comparative law and criminal law,” neither entry reports teaching 
clinical simulations in a law school; Ala Hamoudi, Toward a Rule of Law Society in Iraq: 
Introducing Clinical Legal Education into Iraq Law Schools, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
112, 115 (2005) (recommending “introduction of clinical education methodologies” at 
Iraqi law schools but counseling against introduction of live client clinics at that time); see 
Rodney J. Uphoff, Clinical Essay: Why In-House Live Client Clinics Won’t Work in 
Romania: Confessions of a Clinician Educator, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 315 (1999) 
(contending that “[g]iven the existing structure of Romanian education, the nature of the 
Romanian system, and the limited resources available to Romanian law schools, 
pedagogically sound in-house live client clinics are not feasible”); Richard J. Wilson, 
Training for Justice: The Global Reach of Clinical Legal Education, 22 PENN ST. INT’L L. 
REV. 421, 422 (2004) (providing an “overview of the development of clinical legal 
education outside of the [United States]”). 
38 Eustache, supra note 24, at 606–07. 
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annual voyage to Jérémie, ESCDROJ’s interest in clinical legal 
education came to the fore.39 And so, we began designing an 
experiential module to provide a window into some of the practical 
training emphasized in clinical approaches in the United States. 
Clinical legal education may be defined in a variety of ways. But, 
in reviewing clinical education globally, one experienced clinician 
and scholar explains that “three elements stand out as constituting the 
most important commonly conceived notions of clinical legal 
education around the world: professional skills training, experiential 
learning, and instilling professional values of public responsibility 
and social justice.”40 This clinical educator describes “[c]linical legal 
education [as] bring[ing] a more realistic, from-the-ground-up 
perspective on law practice to students through the use of actual or 
simulated experiences as the primary teaching tool.”41 Fortunately, 
the 2009 contingent of the HHP included several clinicians as well as 
students willing and eager to participate in a simulation 
demonstration. As the group was largely self-selected, it was a 
serendipitous coincidence that ours had substantial clinical leanings. 
Two faculty members, including the author, and two of the students 
assumed primary responsibility for creating and translating the first 
module. 
1. On Which Skills Should the Module Focus? 
As we began imagining an experiential module for export, we tried 
to ascertain what types of legal training might be of use in Haiti. We 
aimed, within resource constraints, to develop a criminal law module 
from the ground up that correlated to the reality that law students 
might experience defending a client on a criminal charge in Haiti. We 
received information from an ESCDROJ colleague that attorneys in 
 
39 In the spring semester of 2009, as is commonly the procedure, UC Hastings faculty 
members who planned to participate in the spring voyage to ESCDROJ were asked about 
topics on which they would feel comfortable presenting in Haiti. From among the variety 
of topics proposed, Roxane Dimanche selected several, including one about clinical legal 
education and one about criminal law practice. With the encouragement of Karen Musalo 
and Richard Boswell, and the advice and practical support of Roxane Dimanche and 
Jomanas Eustache, these evolved into the clinical criminal practice simulation of that 
March. 
40 Frank S. Bloch, New Directions in Clinical Legal Education: Access to Justice and 
the Global Clinical Movement, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 111, 121 (2008) (“These three 
elements interact, with varying degrees of emphasis, to form the core of a global 
conception of clinical legal education.”). 
41 Id. at 122. 
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Haiti can interview their clients and that they can chose whether to 
interview witnesses. From among the range of possible legal skills to 
include in our simulation, client and witness interviewing could be 
germane to Haitian criminal defense practice. Moreover, 
representation for prison detainees was urgently needed. For effective 
criminal legal representation in the United States, we perceived client 
interviewing as a prerequisite, as well as being a skill crucial to the 
early phases of criminal defense.42 In addition, client interviewing 
also represents a common, if not the most common, experiential 
preparation that live-client clinics offer at U.S. law schools.43  
Still, although client interviewing is available as part of the 
criminal defense attorney’s role in Haiti, the Haitian legal system rests 
on a civil law, not a common law, approach.44 A clinical colleague 
involved in international clinical legal education, particularly in civil 
law systems in Europe, opines that “the attorney-client relationship 
appears to be less important in the civil law system than in the 
common law system.”45 He maintains therefore that “a sophisticated 
understanding of interviewing and counseling techniques may 
actually be much less important in such a system.”46 This colleague 
cautions that “if U.S. clinical teachers, in our international 
collaborations, are not mindful of the crucial differences between the 
legal cultures of civil and common law societies, we risk promoting 
clinical program models that will not work in civil law systems.”47 
This critique about recognizing differences between civil and 
common law systems generally is a significant one. 
 
42 Having an attorney at an early stage of criminal proceedings has not, as Dr. Eustache 
indicates, been the practice in Haiti. See Eustache, supra note 24, at 609. But, early 
intervention may be possible with the anticipated clinic. 
43 Client interviewing also apparently appears as a staple in clinical legal education 
globally. See Bloch, supra note 40, at 122–23 (“Increasingly around the world one sees a 
common set of clinical courses on interviewing, negotiation, counseling, trial and appellate 
advocacy, and so on.”). 
44 Eustache, supra note 24, at 602 (“Having not known another model of legal system 
and deprived of the necessary human resources to construct its own legal and judicial 
systems, Haiti's founding fathers inevitably adopted the French model of law commonly 
referred to as ‘The Napoleonic Code.’”). 
45 Professor Genty argues that, in civil law systems, “[t]he lawyer's duty to the court 
system trumps the duty to the client, and the lawyer is seen as presenting the client's case, 
without necessarily vouching for the client. Moreover, the client plays a limited role—if 
any—in the court proceedings, where written submissions predominate over live 
testimony.” Philip M. Genty, Overcoming Cultural Blindness in International Clinical 
Collaboration: The Divide Between Civil and Common Law Cultures and its Implications 
for Clinical Education, 15 CLINICAL L. REV. 131, 150 (2008). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 149. 
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In Haiti, however, perhaps especially in contexts where human 
rights are at issue (which is arguably the situation for many detainees 
in Haitian prisons), there appears to be significant interest directed 
toward training lawyers in case preparation techniques and in an 
investment in the attorney-client relationship.48 For example, the 
Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI) in Port-au-Prince, which “is 
a group of lawyers [initially] funded by the Haitian government that 
assists the judiciary with human rights cases,”49 emphasizes its “close 
collaboration”50 with its clients, the victims of alleged human rights 
violations, whose civil cases often companion the criminal 
prosecution of the alleged perpetrator.51 This attorney-client 
collaboration, within the Haitian civil law system, includes meeting 
with, interviewing, and working extensively with clients.52 Brian 
Concannon, Jr., one of the attorneys who came to BAI early in its 
history,53 explains that BAI “involves [their clients] as much as 
possible in strategic decisions, and work[s] with them to analyze the 
different obstacles to their case.”54 In addition to representing victims 
in civil cases that companion criminal prosecutions, among other 
human rights representation, BAI is now also significantly involved in 
efforts to represent detainees in Haitian prisons.55 
 
48 Mr. Concannon explains that the “BAI is helping train a new generation of human 
rights lawyers through its programs for Haitian law graduates and U.S. law students.” 
Concannon, supra note 32, at 239. He opines that “[i]n our experience, the lack of trained 
lawyers willing and able to do high quality human rights or public interest work is the 
largest single problem with the justice system.” Id. Mr. Concannon maintains that “the 
main cause of this human resources problem is a training system that: a) does not train 
lawyers to prepare a quality, fact-based case, and b) perpetuates a legal culture that 
reinforces existing injustices.” Id.; see also infra notes 50–56 and accompanying text. 
49 Concannon, supra note 32, at 233. According to BAI’s website, “since February 
2004, it has received most of its support from the Institute for Justice & Democracy in 
Haiti (IJDH), and no support from any government or political organization.” The Bureau 
des Avocats Internationaux, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY IN HAITI, http://ijdh 
.org/articles/article_bureau_internationaux.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
50 Concannon, supra note 32, at 237. 
51 As explained by Mr. Concannon, “[u]nder the French system used in Haiti, a claim 
for civil damages can piggy-back on a criminal prosecution. . . . The lawyer [for the 
victim] can introduce evidence and examine witnesses and parties at trial.” Id. at 235. 
52 Id. 
53 Mario Joseph is the attorney who currently manages BAI. See Bureau des Avocats 
Internationaux, supra note 49. 
54 Concannon, supra note 32, at 235. In the concluding lines of the chapter on BAI’s 
victim-centered approach, he writes “[i]f the office can add three to six well trained public 
interest lawyers to the bar every year, it will change legal training and the way lawyers 
relate to their clients forever.” Id. at 241. 
55 See supra notes 24 and 26, and accompanying text. 
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Relatedly, we have come to understand from an ESCDROJ 
colleague that sharing approaches that have not commonly been 
taught in the traditional law school curriculum (about, for example, 
fact investigation) is of interest in our presentations at ESCDROJ.56 
An interest in information about such approaches to legal training 
may stem at least in part from the widespread and substantial 
concerns that have been expressed about the judicial system in Haiti 
and the powerful desire for reform of that system.57 
Whether or how ESCDROJ faculty will encourage students to 
conduct client interviews or engage in fact investigation within their 
criminal justice clinic or more generally how students will perform 
such tasks when they practice within the Haitian civil law 
environment are decisions for the ESCDROJ faculty and students. 
What has become apparent is that our colleagues in Haiti are 
interested in having aspiring attorneys learn about approaches to 
engaging in a variety of lawyering skills, like the approaches 
commonly taught in U.S. clinical legal education. We thus could 
provide at least a window for comparison on what we believed were 
some options for best practices in U.S. representation, including 
attorney-client (and witness) interviewing. We began, then, to focus 
on client interviewing skills as the heart of our exportable module. 
2. Assumptions About Client Interviewing: But, Does It Work That 
Way in the Haitian Criminal Justice System? 
For this client-interviewing module, we concentrated initially on 
the need to establish rapport between the attorney and client. In our 
 
56 HHP notes of our planning discussion for the second simulation, for example, reflect 
our ESCDROJ colleague’s expressed preference that we present approaches to lawyering 
skills that were not commonly covered. For example, our colleague emphasized the value 
of attorneys learning to engage in fact investigation, rather than deferring to the court 
report. Similarly, the notes indicate that our colleague explained that client and witness 
interviewing were not generally taught. 
57 For examples of that expressed concern, see, e.g., Eustache, supra note 24, at 607 
(“[p]eople often witness cases where the justice system has failed to hold individuals 
accountable for their actions or where the protection of rights depended solely on an 
individual's ability to pay.”); Concannon supra note 32, at 234 (“Justice in Haiti is often 
described with the word ‘exclusion[]’ the exclusion of the poor from the formal justice 
system, and the use of the system to exclude the poor from the country’s economic, 
political and social spheres. . . . Lawyers were not adept at preparing cases for trial.”); 
2011 HUMAN RTS. REPORT: HAITI, supra note 7 (“Corruption and a lack of judicial 
oversight also severely hampered the functioning of the justice system. Many judicial 
officials charged varying `fees’ to initiate criminal prosecutions based on their perceptions 
of what a service should cost, and those who could not afford to pay often did not receive 
any services from prosecutorial or judicial authorities.”). With respect to reform efforts 
specifically, see, e.g., supra notes 34, 48, and 54.  
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minds, the confidential nature of the relationship was key to building 
rapport. We considered how to explain various aspects of client 
interviewing approaches used in the United States. We imagined what 
types of information a lawyer might find useful in criminal 
proceedings in Haiti, and how an attorney might effectively elicit and 
respond to a client’s needs and goals. 
The modules we had created over the years for our own clinics 
relied upon our understanding of U.S. federal and state practices. In 
developing the interviewing module for Haiti, we assumed that 
attorneys in Haiti enjoyed a privilege of confidentiality in 
conversations with their clients. We also assumed, or perhaps did not 
even consider whether, there would be a place in the local prison 
where such a confidential interview could take place. With some 
frequency, and sometimes not until we arrived in Haiti, we found 
ourselves confronting these and other assumptions we had unwittingly 
made in our framework—assumptions that threatened to undermine 
the usefulness of the module we were creating. 
Establishing rapport might, after all, look very different in a legal 
framework in which there is no attorney-client confidentiality. 
Without reassurances about confidentiality, why should a client 
confide personal, embarrassing, or potentially incriminating 
information in a complete stranger?58 Client confidentiality is so 
much a part of the fabric of our living and breathing as lawyers and 
legal educators in the United States that we posited its existence at the 
center of our module, though we did not actually know if attorney-
client confidentiality existed in Haiti. Fortunately, on this count, our 
assumption proved correct, as we learned from Roxane Dimanche and 
Dr. Eustache that Haitian clients do indeed enjoy confidentiality 
largely similar to the confidentiality that U.S. clients enjoy.59 We 
were relieved, first because we value confidentiality in the lawyer-
client relationship, and second, because the simulation we were about 
to deploy depended on it. 
With respect to interview space, as you can perhaps infer from the 
description given earlier of the space constraints in the prison, our 
 
58 There are, of course, rationales for providing information to one’s counsel even 
absent confidentiality, but confidentiality may be a prerequisite for some clients when the 
information is embarrassing, incriminating, or otherwise secret. 
59 See also Le Code de Déontologie des Avocats: Règle IV, LE JURISTE HAITIEN 2 
(although this code is apparently a draft code, Dr. Eustache has emphasized to us that 
attorney-client confidentiality is viewed in Haiti as a crucial ingredient of the attorney-
client relationship). 
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assumption proved incorrect. A private room allocated for client 
interviewing was not apparent in the prison plan. This practical reality 
left us to guess that attorneys and clients might confer in whispers in 
the open prison yard in an attempt to effectuate a confidential 
communication. 
3. Resources 
Creating experiential educational modules depends upon people 
and informational resources. When we create modules for our own 
clinics here in the United States, we have access to a wealth of 
resources written in English on virtually every aspect of criminal 
practice. Equivalent resources on the subject of day-to-day Haitian 
criminal practice, however, turned out to be somewhat scarce.60 When 
we arrived, we found, for example, that the one-room law school 
library itself possessed only two softbound copies of the Haitian Penal 
Code.61 Internet access there was also limited and often unreliable. 
We had, however, previously located a version of the Haitian Penal 
Code available online in French, a great asset in a code-based 
system.62 As French remains the language in Haiti in which formal 
court proceedings generally transpire and legal education proceeds, 
we were lucky that our UC Hastings group also included several 
strong French speakers.63 What our UC Hastings group often lacked 
was a clear understanding of the reality of practice, of cultural 
expectations and norms, of criminal procedure, and of evidentiary 
limitations as practiced in Haitian courts. 
Thus, in order to develop a workable module, we needed to rely 
upon our colleagues at ESCDROJ—academics and law school 
graduates who were professionally familiar with Haitian criminal 
 
60 There are, however, some very useful reports and descriptions in English by various 
organizations that do furnish insight into the criminal justice system. See, e.g., 2009, 2010 
& 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS: HAITI, supra note 7; HHRPP, supra note 15. 
61 The library contained other books as well, but I recall seeing only two copies of the 
Haitian Penal Code. 
62 See Código Penal de Haiti [Penal Code of Haiti], available at http://www.wipo.int 
/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=200018&tab=2 (last visited Oct. 13, 2012). 
63 While French is the language taught at school and used by many government 
officials, Haitian Kreyol (Creole) is the language spoken daily by the vast majority of the 
population. Estimates vary on the percentage of Haitians who speak French fluently, with 
five to twenty percent being the common range. See, e.g., Cordelia Hebblethwaite, Should 
Creole Replace French in Haiti’s Schools?, BBC NEWS (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.bbc 
.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-14534703 (estimating that five percent of Haitians speak 
fluent French). 
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legal practice.64 The UC Hastings contingent came in with lots of 
enthusiasm, substantial cumulative clinical legal teaching experience, 
and a firm grasp of various aspects of U.S. law; but also, no doubt, 
some naiveté about local practice and conditions. We were saved 
from countless errors by the partnership and counsel of our colleagues 
at ESCDROJ. But even with their help, a workable module depended 
upon our recognizing the topics about which we needed to make 
inquiry, such as our blind assumptions about confidentiality and a 
private space for a client interview. And, some of the process also 
depended on a bit of good luck. 
4. Trying to Respect Cultural Norms and Create a Simulation with 
Verisimilitude and Andragogical Integrity 
Having decided on client interviewing, at least U.S.-style 
interviewing, and a collection of related skills that we sought to 
present, we then needed to create a mock criminal case as the setting 
for the attorney-client interactions. Although our goal was to share 
approaches to U.S.-style interviewing, we sought to place those skills 
and ethical precepts in a context that approximated a criminal case 
that students might see in Haiti. What crimes were prosecuted in 
Haiti? After all, simply looking at the codebook itself does not tell 
one how often, or even whether, a particular crime is or will actually 
be prosecuted. It also does not effectively answer the question of 
which crime would provide a culturally appropriate base for our 
simulation. Input from our hosts would be crucial to enhance the 
verisimilitude of the simulation and hopefully prevent us from 
committing cultural faux pas, or generally embarrassing ourselves 
with our ignorance of the Haitian justice system. 
To help us prepare, Roxane Dimanche, a highly respected law 
school graduate who is playing a central role in the efforts to launch 
the new clinic,65 kindly located and e-mailed us a copy of the court 
papers for a criminal case of alleged arson in the Jérémie courts.66 
 
64 Julie A. Davies, Methods of Experiential Education: Context, Transferability and 
Resources, 22 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 21, 22–23 (2009) 
(“Experiences with exporting U.S. legal education methods to the rest of the world have 
shown, time and again, the importance of understanding the context in which those 
methods will be used.”). 
65 See 2010–2011 Course Catalogue, L’ÉCOLE SUPÉRIEURE CATHOLIQUE DE DROIT DE 
JÉRÉMIE, http://escdroj.org/faculty.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2012). Roxane Dimanche is 
listed as the Legal Clinic Director. 
66 Roxane Dimanche e-mailed us the court papers from two different cases, one of 
which served as the inspiration for the simulation. 
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They were in French and often hand-written in cursive script—a 
challenge to decipher through sometimes fuzzy scans and translation 
of unfamiliar terms.67 But the papers furnished highly useful insights 
into the reality of criminal charging and police fact-finding in Haiti in 
at least this one criminal arson case. We then researched the elements 
of arson in the Haitian Penal Code and accordingly framed our 
simulation based on an arson charge. 
With the offense in mind, we considered more carefully our 
pedagogical68 goals for the client interview. We contemplated what 
the fundamental skills associated with successful interviewing in the 
United States were, and what made some client interviews 
challenging. We brainstormed and consulted resource materials that 
opined on client interviewing.69 This led us to the view that it would 
be valuable to have our mock-case client lie, at least in the initial 
interview. Successfully interviewing a truthful trusting client who is 
accurate and forthcoming in his account is rarely a challenge to an 
interviewer. But a client who has something to hide, a client who is 
not forthcoming—that person is a client for whose interview we 
might provide some useful strategies. 
Thus, we began to construct the scenario. It would involve an arson 
and a client who lied during the initial interview. It would be an arson 
of a farmhouse inherited by the accused and his sister. We supplied a 
motive for the client to have caused the fire and consequent 
destruction of the farmhouse. The motive lay in a disagreement 
between the sister and the client about the appropriate use of the land. 
The sister wanted to farm the land. The client wanted to sell it and 
split the proceeds. The accused was allegedly heard to say: “I’d rather 
see the place burn to the ground than have you continue living there 
and waste the money it’s worth.” We invented an eyewitness and set 
the event for dusk. We gave the accused a lie—a false alibi. He was to 
say that he had spent the evening with his wife, when, in fact, he had 
not. 
Then we wanted to give him information that he could reluctantly 
reveal to his attorney in a second interview, if the attorney followed 
 
67 Roxane Dimanche also graciously sent us some word-processed materials on the case 
that she had prepared for the court. These materials were entirely legible. 
68 Although the technically correct term for teaching adults is andragogy, pedagogy 
also seems to be used with great frequency. I use the two terms interchangeably in this 
Article. 
69 See, e.g., ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, AM. LAW INST., TRIAL MANUAL 5 FOR THE 
DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES (1988); CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW PROCEDURE AND 
PRACTICE (Continuing Education of the Bar, 2008). 
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the principles that we believed were important in effective 
interviewing. We sought to invent something of a private nature, a 
relationship about which the accused might not feel comfortable 
telling a stranger. We proposed an affair with a woman who worked 
in the same town. When we consulted those familiar with cultural 
mores in Haiti, however, we were informed that the extramarital 
relations might not necessarily provoke hesitation in disclosure. We 
suggested instead the possibility of an extramarital gay liaison for the 
client, in lieu of a heterosexual extramarital affair. We thought 
perhaps our client, as a man married to a woman, might be more 
reticent about a same-sex extramarital affair. With this, we discovered 
we had crossed into the realm of the taboo. Views on homosexuality 
were so charged that we were strongly advised to steer clear of the 
issue entirely. 
This advice and some of the responses we were told to expect if we 
made reference to homosexuality were disconcerting. We considered 
whether we should defer to the advice. A number of us were inclined 
to incorporate the gay affair into the module and engage with the 
issues raised. But we ultimately concluded that, as invited guests, our 
just-over three evenings of class supplied too constrained a forum to 
take on this subject in an effective way with over 100 students, in 
French, and with translation required for a fair contingent of our 
delegation. It was also true that members of a delegation some years 
earlier had given a presentation on gay marriage, and their 
presentation had met with a number of highly negative responses. 
Thus, out of respect to our hosts and our other advisors, and because 
we believed that including a gay extramarital affair could become the 
focus of the exercise rather than an explanation of the accused’s 
initial falsehood, we returned to the existence of a heterosexual affair 
as the motivation for the lie and invented specific (and hopefully 
persuasive) reasons why the accused’s wife would be especially 
disturbed by this affair and, consequently, why the accused would fail 
to reveal its existence at the initial interview. 
B.  Logistics and Implementation: Would the Ceiling Fall? 
The scenario we created was born with the crime alleged in the 
court papers that Roxane Dimanche had sent us. But, as most 
clinicians recognize, when developing materials to meet specific 
pedagogical goals, substantial modification of real cases is often 
necessary. Thus, we relied on the crime alleged, but designed the 
simulation to enable students to acquire and practice skills that, at 
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least in the United States, we believed were crucial to effective client 
interviews. 
We built the module to incorporate a triad approach to learning.  
The three pivotal learning elements for this paradigm are: (1) an 
anchor or framing presentation; (2) experiential components, hands-
on participatory opportunities to apply the principles furnished in the 
anchor presentation; and (3) a demonstration of the principles applied 
as an example, perhaps a model, for students. In an ideal 
environment, each of the three elements also incorporates 
opportunities for students to inquire, respond, and reflect on the 
learning. Of these, often the most important reflective opportunity 
arrives at the conclusion, depending on the extent of earlier 
opportunities to reflect, with an end-of-exercise debriefing to elicit 
students’ understanding of the learning and their processing of the 
exercise. 
And so, one March evening, just before dusk and the time when the 
mosquitoes descended in force on our exposed skin, we began. It 
would be inaccurate to call the space at the law school in which we 
taught a room, in the sense of a space having four walls. We were 
conducting class in a hallway, entirely open to the outdoors at one 
end. We were there in the hallway because the ceiling of the school’s 
large outdoor classroom space was poised to collapse, even in pre-
earthquake 2009. None of the Haitian students seemed fazed by this. 
Attentive, engaged, but accustomed to lecture, these students were 
about to embark on a foray into a U.S.-style clinical client 
interviewing learning adventure. 
In our application of the triad approach, the frame or anchor 
presentation came first. We presented it in the form of a 
straightforward discussion on general principles about client 
interviewing in the United States. It focused on several primary 
tenets. Perhaps foremost among these was, of course, the importance 
of—and corresponding potential techniques for—establishing rapport. 
After all, rapport increases the likelihood of achieving other aims, like 
obtaining relevant facts, ascertaining the client’s goals, etcetera. 
Within the essential principle of rapport, we spoke, for example, of 
reassuring the client of confidentiality and inquiring what the attorney 
might do to help the client. We learned that what an inmate in Jérémie 
might need, in addition to some of the legal services that we might be 
accustomed to attorneys performing in the United States, involved 
much more basic needs. Apparently, for example, inmates sometimes 
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lacked access to adequate food.70 We could imagine an attorney 
working to arrange with a client’s family to provide such necessities. 
Among other principles, we also discussed the significance of 
ascertaining the client’s goals and helping the client understand the 
attorney’s role and the process, to the extent the process was 
predictable, and, of course, providing the attorney with information 
about the case. 
We tried to include at least a brief opportunity for questions and to 
respond and reflect at various phases of the learning exercise. We felt 
it was of particular importance to include responsive opportunities as 
we understood that our simulation stood in stark contrast to the 
traditional teaching formats used at the law school. In a world in 
which lecture and formal presentations were de rigueur, we were 
about to ask students to learn by doing, to brainstorm in small groups, 
and to conduct client interviews. 
I should perhaps add that we had been alerted by one of our very 
knowledgeable hosts that lawyers in Haiti sometimes entertain a 
certain determined skepticism about the likely truthfulness of their 
clients’ narratives in criminal cases. In our simulation, the client was 
supposed to lie in the initial interview, consistent with this skepticism, 
but was factually innocent of the crime charged. Thus, we hoped that 
our simulation would challenge the students to reach beyond the 
initial lie and their potential skepticism to attain a level of rapport to 
get to the truthful evidence supporting innocence. 
Following the anchor presentation, we bustled students off to 
brainstorm about how they might apply the general principles and to 
prepare to actually conduct the initial client interview. We had 
produced a preliminary narrative police report that supplied basic 
information about the case and translated it into French (an English 
copy of which appears in Appendix A). The ten-plus small groups 
buzzed with intense discussion and preparations for the interview.71 
 
70 HHRPP, supra note15, at 6 (“[T]he lack of adequate food in prisons forces families 
to spend precious time and money delivering their own food to the imprisoned.”); Lopez, 
supra note 9, at 2 (“Sometimes there are delays with government funding and the prison 
[in Jérémie] is unable to buy food. During those times, the warden says that he does 
whatever he can to make sure the prisoners have enough to eat. This has occurred three or 
four times in the last two years.”). 
71 We had confronted a choice in terms of pedagogical approaches. In the triad model, 
often the anchor and the demonstration precede the student’s hands-on component. But 
here, due to logistical constraints on timing and the specific dynamics of having the client 
lie about his wife as the alibi in the first interview, we chose to plan for the students to 
have their first of the hands-on experiences after we explained the general principles, but  
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For the hundred-plus students, the entire law school student 
population, to have a small-group experience conducting the 
interviews, almost every member of our UC Hastings contingent was 
needed to play the role of the client. We sent French speaking 
members in on their own and matched non-French speakers with 
translators. The ESCDROJ students and alumni were very generous in 
their willingness to translate. In sum, we were able to staff about 
twelve small groups. This resulted in approximately ten to fifteen 
ESCDROJ students per small group—larger than would be ideal—but 
far better than one group of a hundred-plus. After fifteen to twenty 
minute student-as-lawyer brainstorming sessions by the Haitian 
students without the client, the client arrived in each small group. 
This type of client interviewing role-playing exercise serves as the 
bread and butter of clinical and simulation modules in the United 
States. We looked forward to and anticipated hearing, as one might 
expect in the United States, a variety of outcomes from this initial 
effort to apply the principles we had outlined for effective U.S. client 
interviewing. 
Once the clients were ensconced in each space or room with their 
attorneys, I circulated to check the pulse of the interactions, aiming to 
help with logistical and/or translation issues. The exchanges were 
animated; voices were raised. The energy levels were running high on 
this sweltering evening in coastal Haiti. Students were engaged. I 
passed quickly from one group to the next with limited opportunity to 
garner a sense of whether rapport developed. I was pleased, though, to 
see genuine and energetic engagement in our clinical pedagogy. 
Some twenty or thirty minutes after they had initially joined their 
attorneys, the members of our delegation emerged. They looked 
discomforted.  When they shared their experiences as clients, we were 
crestfallen. Rapport had generally not developed. With perhaps one or 
two exceptions, our delegation members reported that, although 
varying by small group, collectively: (1) they had been accused by 
their attorneys of committing the arson, (2) they had been treated like 
hostile witnesses, (3) they had been encouraged to lie, and/or (4) they 
had been told that they were guilty and that therefore the students 
would not represent them. In addition, in some of the groups, students 
had made extravagant guarantees that they would get their clients 
released.72 Although the buckling concrete hadn’t moved from its 
 
before we offered any demonstration of the principles applied or of interviewing more 
generally. 
72 With allegations of judicial corruption common in Haiti, see supra note 57, perhaps  
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precarious perch above the outdoor classroom, in a figurative sense, 
the ceiling had fallen. 
Had I failed to effectively convey or persuade students of the 
importance or methods of establishing rapport in the anchor talk? Did 
our module design, in which no matter the excellence of the rapport, 
the client was going to lie and be evasive in the first interview, 
condemn the interviews to failure? Were we simply expecting too 
much after only a single anchor discussion of client interviewing with 
students who had never interviewed a client before?73 How could we 
repair, recover, and translate this unexpected result into a useful 
learning opportunity? Somehow we had arrived hoping to create 
teachable moments for our Haitian students. Instead, they had created 
a powerful teachable moment for us. 
We stepped back and reflected, albeit briefly, during a hurried 
“break,” on how and whether we might or should convey the failure 
to establish rapport, the risk of extravagant promises, and the 
importance and role of representing the guilty (even though, if they 
succeeded in their subsequent interviewing efforts, this client was 
factually and legally innocent). After some brief chaos and then some 
intense rapid-fire brainstorming on the delegation’s part, we 
determined to supply feedback directly from the clients to the 
reconvened student body, in hopes that this would be an effective 
platform for processing the initial interview and helping students 
revise their interview approaches. Thus, the clients stood in front of 
the now reassembled student body of over 100 students and each 
client shared his or her impressions as the client in a two-minute or so 
summary. Typically, each client began with positive comments, but 
then generally moved to how he or she had not perceived an 
empathetic environment in the interview, and to specifically 
enumerate the types of remarks and approaches that had resulted in 
the perception that perhaps the clients had just undergone an 
adversarial style cross-examination by the prosecutor, rather than 
having been engaged in an initial rapport-building interview with 
their own defense counsel. 
We realized that this approach held risks. Would students reject 
what we had to offer because our constructive criticism was so direct? 
 
some students anticipated that sufficient funds might indeed result in their client’s release. 
73 Perhaps, different roles of attorneys in civil and common law systems and the 
possible implications of those differences on client interviewing also contributed to the 
result we experienced. See Genty, supra note 45, at 150. 
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Would students find our approach just inapposite to interviewing 
clients in Haiti? Would students just stop being willing to play? After 
all, simulations rely on the good will of the participants. If 
participants feel that their time is being wasted, they are not learning, 
or they are not being appropriately valued, then the simulation is 
generally doomed. 
After furnishing this direct feedback, we asked what steps they, as 
the attorneys for the accused, would take next in the case. We had set 
the problem up so that the accused would present his wife as alibi (the 
lie) in that first interview. This was designed to provoke students into 
doing some additional fact gathering by seeking to interview the 
client’s wife. Fortunately, students did express the desire to interview 
the accused’s wife. 
In response, we then engaged in a demonstration witness interview, 
conducted by an experienced clinician as the interviewer, in front of 
the assembled student body. Following the demonstration, we 
processed with the students what they felt they had learned from this 
interview of the accused’s wife. Of course, an interview of a witness 
differs from an interview of a client. In particular, it lacks the 
protection of attorney-client privilege. But, many of the other vehicles 
for establishing rapport are analogous. Substantively, the students 
astutely discerned from the interview of the client’s wife that there 
were notable discrepancies between their client’s and their client’s 
wife’s account of the events on the night of the arson. Students then 
suspected (or, for some of them, undoubtedly concluded) that indeed 
their client had lied to them in the initial interview. 
This produced an interesting dynamic, especially in view of the 
largely antagonistic initial client interviews. Students who had 
perceived the client as evasive and a liar had their suspicions 
confirmed. Could they effectively establish rapport with a client they 
had alienated and/or who had alienated them, and whom they 
believed to be a liar? Despite the obstacles, students made clear their 
inclination to re-interview their client. Our class focus then became 
how to conduct this second interview with a client, who probably or 
certainly had lied to them and who probably or certainly felt 
alienated. What emerged was a discussion of the value of addressing 
the lie, but in the context of renewed attempts to establish rapport. We 
brainstormed ways to raise the issue while assuring the client we were 
on his side. We reaffirmed in particular the importance of discussing 
confidentiality. Then we once again hurried the students off to their 
small-group interviews. 
2012] Representation for the Accused: 459 
Haiti’s Thirst and a Role for Clinical Legal Education 
The interviews commenced, and I anxiously swept from group to 
group to ascertain how the second interviews were proceeding. Was 
there less hostility toward the client and were fewer confrontational 
voices raised? Once the interviews concluded and our delegation 
members had had a chance to reconvene and recount the second 
interview dynamics, we discovered that the Haitian law students had 
managed an almost absolute about face. From accusatory and hostile 
to conciliatory and reassuring (especially about confidentiality), 
student groups had succeeded, almost without exception, in creating 
an environment in which the clients apparently felt comfortable 
revealing the true alibi, the mistress Lisette. The students now 
vociferously requested an interview of Lisette. They were, at least 
most of them, apparently willing to move beyond the client’s initial 
lie to a place of enough trust to believe that the client had now 
revealed a truth that bore on his innocence and to insist upon an 
interview of this new alibi witness. 
As we were approaching the final moments of our class time with 
the students of ESCDROJ, we conducted a speedy demonstration 
interview of Lisette, who was played by a faculty colleague on the 
delegation. Much to the delight of—and punctuated by many 
outbursts of laughter by—the students, Lisette confirmed the 
accused’s true alibi. We engaged in a final and all-too-brief 
processing about take-aways from the exercise. And, to our delight 
(and, we hope, theirs), the students’ genuine understanding of the 
principles we had discussed earlier in the week emerged. We 
celebrated their success. 
Despite a very rocky start, and several bumps along the way, 
together as learners we had navigated our clinical legal education 
model and seen students acquire new, sometimes hard-won, 
understandings about lawyering skills of potential importance in both 
(as we learned) the United States and Haiti. A bright orange full moon 
had risen just beyond the edge of the chalkboard in our makeshift 
outdoor hallway of a classroom, a moon that we might be hard 
pressed to see as clearly from inside through the panes of glass in the 
classrooms at home. 
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II 
WHAT WE LEARNED THAT MIGHT TRANSLATE TO OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CLINICAL ENDEAVORS: ROUGHLY HEWN 
GUIDEPOSTS 
This section strives to provide some reflections on our first 
criminal practice simulation experience at ESCDROJ. Those of you 
who have exported or imported clinical educational modules 
internationally may find, as suggested in the literature on global 
clinical legal education,74 that some of the lessons we take away 
resonate with your own experiences. For those who have yet to 
undertake a similar endeavor, we aim to suggest some guideposts 
drawn from our experience that might be useful. 
A. Relying on Legal Academics/Practitioners On-Site and in 
Advance 
For us, there was no substitute for the legal, cultural, and practical 
acumen brought to bear by Dr. Jomanas Eustache and Roxane 
Dimanche, the ESCDROJ Dean and the well-respected graduate who 
is helping to launch the criminal justice clinic, among others. In fact, 
the more the project grows from the ground up, from its sources in the 
goals, knowledge, and values of the host institution and legal culture, 
the more successful the experience is likely to be.75 And, on the most 
 
74 The expanding scholarly literature on supporting clinical legal education abroad 
includes a number of discussions of “take-aways” or lessons learned. See, e.g., Davies, 
supra note 64 (describing the importance of resources, context, and transferability in 
supporting and/or developing clinical legal education opportunities abroad); Wortham, 
supra note 37 (offering insights on the development of clinical programs abroad); infra 
notes 75 and 76. 
75 See Maisel, The Role of U.S. Law Faculty, supra note 37, at 490 (“The experiences 
described above [in her article] and the opinions expressed all indicate that the chances of 
successful international cross-cultural collaboration increase if U.S. scholars consulting 
overseas follow the lead of their hosts in establishing or modifying the goals and agenda 
for the project.”). Similarly, Professor Maisel argues that, among other considerations, 
“preparation” and a willingness and ability to adapt course materials to the local context, 
as well as a willingness to disclose a lack of knowledge about local practice, are important 
in successful clinical teaching abroad. Id. at 492–503; see also Jessup, supra note 37, at 
380 (“Although the American experience is informative and may provide guidance to an 
African law school contemplating a clinical program, it is imperative that any attempt to 
incorporate a clinical experience into a current African law school curriculum take into 
account a cognizance of the political structure of governmental organizations and 
customary norms.” (footnotes omitted)); Pamela Phan, Clinical Legal Education in China: 
In Pursuit of a Culture of Law and a Mission of Social Justice, 8 YALE H.R. & DEV. L.J. 
117, 140 (“In adapting the American clinical model to China’s needs, it is crucial to 
recognize that China is a civil law society in which judges regard themselves as civil 
servants.” (footnote omitted)). 
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basic level, HHP’s collaborative efforts to develop and share U.S. 
clinical educational approaches with ESCDROJ emerged as a 
response to ESCDROJ’s interest in information on such approaches.76 
Learning that there was attorney-client confidentiality proved 
fundamental to the simulation module we created. Being advised of 
the risks of making a homosexual liaison the reason for a client’s lie 
enabled us to make informed choices. 
If your existing clinical team does not include a local expert, 
communicating with and relying on local experts who can provide 
guidance on the myriad of issues crucial to a successful clinical 
simulation exercise stands as guidepost number one for us in 
exporting clinical legal education from the United States to Haiti and, 
I imagine, to many other locations around the world. Relying on a 
local expert supplements, of course, the basic research and 
preparation that one pursues through other avenues. Pursuing these 
other avenues may be especially important in order to limit the 
imposition on your local experts, especially in a locale where 
electricity and internet access are unreliable. 
B. Unearthing Assumptions 
What I would like to propose as the second guidepost is, of course, 
to recognize the assumptions underlying the materials created and the 
approaches planned. But, of course, the challenge is the difficulty in 
perceiving these assumptions. Nonetheless, questioning everything 
and having many eyes and ears focused on searching for bias and 
assumptions can be helpful. The ability to pool and contrast 
observations commonly increases the likelihood of revealing hidden 
and unwarranted assumptions and bias and getting a better grasp of 
both the details and how they fit into the bigger picture. 
C. Acknowledging the Context-Specific Nature of Our Advice 
We tried hard to do our pre-simulation research and gather 
intelligence about the Haitian system to create a simulation that law 
 
76 See Maisel, The Role of U.S. Law Faculty, supra note 37, at 471 (“A comparison of 
these efforts provides considerable guidance about how to initiate and plan a successful 
project, mainly the need to do so collaboratively with academics in the host country.”); 
Genty, supra note 45, at 136 (“[T]he history of the Law and Development and subsequent 
movements, and the analysis of the ways in which legal systems are transplanted, indicate 
that successful international collaboration in legal education involves at least two 
elements: a subjective attention to issues of cultural sensitivity in transmitting ideas, and a 
practical attention to the utility of these ideas to the receiving ‘host’ country.”). 
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students in Haiti would find relevant and coherent. But, we recognize 
that our efforts were far from perfect. For this reason and others, we 
presented our project to the Haitian students as being limited to 
portraying common approaches to U.S. interviewing.77 Although we 
tried to contrast and address similarities and differences in U.S. and 
Haitian approaches when we felt reasonably confident that we 
understood them, we expressly attempted to confine our suggestions 
and educational pronouncements to practices in the United States. 
I don’t know that we entirely succeeded. It may be unrealistic to 
expect that a multi-hour investment by students in this simulation 
module as their first exposure to client interviewing, especially hands-
on interviewing, was likely to remain confined to an interesting “oh, 
that’s how attorneys do this in the U.S.” If you have created a 
meaningful learning experience, students are likely to internalize, 
transpose, and apply what you bring to their future lawyering. 
Consequently, despite our disclaimers about the simulation’s scope on 
site, it is helpful to work towards making as much of the simulation as 
possible consistent with the lived or anticipated experience of local 
lawyers. 
Both in the immediate context of the module’s U.S.-based 
approach to client interviewing and in the larger context of bringing a 
U.S. approach to clinical legal education to Haiti, we were cognizant 
of the risks of being or being perceived as imperialistic or 
 
77 Genty, supra note 45, at 148–49 (discussing the importance of recognizing 
differences between civil and common law systems in bringing clinical legal education 
models from common law to civil law systems). For a discussion of client interviewing in 
the context of differences between civil law and common law systems, see supra note 45 
and accompanying text. Distinctions between civil and common law systems represent one 
of the important considerations in international clinical endeavors. Another, perhaps 
related, consideration stems from a possible preference for familiar clinical vehicles and 
approaches. For a discussion of potential risks associated with such a preference, see 
Michael William Dowdle, Preserving Indigenous Paradigms in an Age of Globalization: 
Pragmatic Strategies for the Development of Clinical Legal Aid in China, 24 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 56, 56–57 (2000) (“But globalization can also inhibit access to justice and can 
do so in unexpected ways. This Essay uses the experiences of international efforts to 
promote clinical legal aid in China to explore one such unexpected consequence of 
globalization: international assistance’s understandable focus on more familiar kinds of 
legal aid institutions and activities can unintentionally impede the development of 
indigenous legal aid practices and institutions that might ultimately be better suited for the 
particular domestic environment. In order to avoid this dynamic, international 
development projects need to shift their focus from one of simply replicating successful 
foreign models (what we will call a reductive strategy) to one of promoting discovery of 
the indigenous developmental implications and possibilities inherent in the domestic 
environment (what we will call a pragmatic strategy).”). 
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ethnocentric.78 We worked to avoid succumbing to these risks. To 
begin, our efforts to share the clinical legal educational world that we 
knew responded to our partner law school’s, ESCDROJ’s, interest in 
learning about clinical legal education. As part of the endeavor to 
support their previously announced goal of creating and staffing their 
own criminal justice clinic, our ESCDROJ colleagues have been 
seeking to learn about U.S. clinical educational approaches. Second, 
guidance from our hosts about local legal culture and practice played 
a significant role in the design of various facets of the simulation 
module. Third, although we did try to bring some of what we viewed 
as best practices in the United States, we hope that these approaches 
serve not as an end, but as a starting point for inquiry, critique, and 
exploration in the Haitian students’ development of their own 
approaches to client interviewing and criminal practice, and that the 
experience encourages Haitian legal educators to design clinical 
curricula and teach the skills and related ethical precepts that they 
perceive as relevant to aspiring attorneys in the legal culture of Haiti. 
D. Anticipating Pitfalls 
Figure out the things on which you can certainly depend. Then, as 
in many adventures, assume that something will interfere with your 
calculations, and make back-up plans. I recall that, on at least one 
evening during the 2011 teaching adventure, the power failed. We 
waited in this huge open space in the dark. Luckily, either the general 
power returned or perhaps a generator kicked in and we continued. 
Fortunately, the back-up required here turned out to be just a bit of 
patience. 
On a related front of planning to prevent pitfalls, making multiple 
copies was not pragmatic in a place with the extremely limited 
resources of ESCDROJ. If we wanted each student to have the 
opportunity and time to process the mock police report, we needed to 
 
78 For perspectives on legal imperialism in the context of exporting U.S. approaches to 
law and legal education, see, e.g., Francis G. Snyder, The Failure of ‘Law and 
Development,’ 1982 WIS. L. REV. 373 (1982) (reviewing James A. Gardner’s book LEGAL 
IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA); Peggy 
Maisel, The Role of U.S. Law Faculty, supra note 37, at 473 (2008); Genty, supra note 45, 
at 135–36 (“[M]any of the efforts [of the Law and Development Movement] themselves, 
according to the critics, grew out of a form of legal ethnocentrism, i.e. a belief that desired 
social change would result from making the legal institutions in developing countries 
resemble those in the United States. This ethnocentrism was based on assumptions made 
without learning about the local context and without meaningful consultation with legal 
scholars in the host country.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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arrange to have it translated into French and copied for each student 
before we left the United States. 
Even more than simply having the copies, we learned to carry them 
in the small bags we took as carry-on luggage. The flight from Port-
au-Prince to Jérémie involves a very small plane with room for 
between perhaps sixteen and nineteen passengers. In 2009, with every 
seat occupied, those who make such decisions decided that most of 
our luggage would add too much weight for the plane to fly safely. 
So, they left much of our luggage behind at the domestic airport in 
Port-au-Prince. On our outbound flight from Port-au-Prince to 
Jérémie, we were there, flying above the Caribbean, clasping a few 
items like a change of clothes, our mosquito netting, and medications 
close to our persons, along with the requisite number of copies of the 
simulation.79 
E. Allowing a Bit of Chaos to Unfold, and, if Translation Is 
Necessary, Leaving Plenty of Time for That 
It can prove propitious to allow a bit of chaos to unfold. Careful 
planning is essential. But sometimes creativity and genuine learning 
occur most effectively in spontaneous and unplanned ways as 
students experiment with role. It can help if you are willing to 
improvise and modify on the fly. This may be especially true if your 
teaching environment involves live on-the-spot translation as 
translation appeared to approximately double the time it took to 
engage with everything. 
We had not adequately anticipated the students’ struggle with the 
issue of rapport in the first interview. We are under the impression 
that our improvised response with direct feedback before the large 
group from each client was pivotal in turning around what boded to 
be a frustrating and potentially unsuccessful learning experience. But 
it required a quick rethinking of our carefully structured plan. And, it 
required taking a risk that students would not reject what we had to 
offer if we supplied a direct critique. 
Upon reflection, we should not have been surprised or disappointed 
with the outcome of the initial client interviews. After all, it is 
supposed to be the experiential grappling with applying theory to 
practice that is at the heart of clinical education and student learning. 
This grappling is what we had observed in our students’ learning back 
 
79 Fortunately, the remainder of our luggage did arrive in Jérémie about twenty-four 
hours later. 
2012] Representation for the Accused: 465 
Haiti’s Thirst and a Role for Clinical Legal Education 
home. The process of trial and error, failure and mastery, is what 
clinicians invest countless hours helping our students in the United 
States access in a variety of clinical skills contexts. Somehow, here, 
with our condensed time frame and efforts at cross-cultural exchange, 
we had overlooked this wisdom underlying clinical legal education. In 
Haiti, as often elsewhere, the chance to fail and modify and retry was 
critical to genuine student learning. That was what happened here, 
and we are grateful that the Haitian students reminded us about how 
clinical legal education is supposed to work. 
F. Trying to Decipher Cultural Taboos 
As our experience with the possibility of including a gay affair 
demonstrated, it can be helpful to ask or otherwise try to decipher the 
local cultural boundaries. Then you can decide consciously if you 
want to challenge them and if so, how. Deciphering taboos is not 
always possible, of course, but it is certainly worth trying. 
G. Garnering Good Will; Believing In, Supporting, and Celebrating 
the Students’ Successes 
Experiential learning exercises commonly depend, heavily, on the 
good will of the participants. Garnering that good will was a high 
priority in the implementation of our simulation. How to garner it—
that was the question. The answer, of course, is as varied as the 
people making the attempt. We found that humor, clarity, and a belief 
that students can and will succeed in the exercise—along with an 
explicit request for, and explanation of, the importance of good will—
worked well. 
Humor across language and culture can sometimes be a bit risky. 
But, like in other contexts, often a modicum of self-deprecating 
humor can leap past cultural and language fences. For example, 
knowing how I struggle with my somewhat rusty French, it is safe for 
me to mention my anticipated grammatical errors, as it is 
extraordinary likely that any sustained effort by me to teach in French 
will produce some errors. It helps too, sometimes, to acknowledge the 
challenge of the undertaking for the students. We asked them to do 
something new, to engage in law school learning in a way that they 
may not have been expected to before. That they know that we know 
this is challenging can help, too.80 
 
80 I am not sure that we did enough acknowledging of the challenge. 
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We also articulated and celebrated the students’ successes. If they 
were mastering or progressing on some facets of interviewing, we 
praised them for the learning progress we perceived. As you know, 
when, in our view, they had failed to successfully implement aspects 
of effective interviewing practice, we had also been direct and 
(hopefully, gently) candid in our critique. Through this, we believe 
the students could discern that our praise was genuine. 
H. Flexibility, the Silver Lining; Faith in the Value of the Clinical 
Education Process 
Almost everything about the simulation took more time than we 
had expected. Being flexible helped keep us functional. It was 
disappointing to have to chop processing time by something like half. 
It is disappointing if, for instance, students who have to work in the 
outside-of-law-school world arrive late and miss part of the 
instructions or the anchor presentation. It is disappointing when you 
realize that even your careful and best-laid plans have indeed gone 
awry. But time and again, I see how lucky we were to be there in 
Haiti, introducing clinical legal education modules to students 
interested in public service—students who could make meaningful 
use of this knowledge, not by adopting it wholesale or even 
piecemeal, but by evaluating it and developing their own approaches 
to supporting the rule of law. Even if we could not orchestrate a 
flawless simulation, these students culled valuable information about 
their role as lawyers from our imperfect attempts to teach. 
In the end, the simulation strengthened my faith in the clinical legal 
education model. Our application was rushed, our execution 
somewhat flawed and, at moments, a bit chaotic, but the triad model 
provided structure and nudged students toward an understanding of 
fundamentals of the attorney-client relationship in both cultures. It 
nudged us, too, toward a meaningful exchange about the role of the 
lawyer in Haiti and in the United States, about skills fundamental to 
interviewing an often frightened individual accused of crime, about 
the shared, international enterprise of upholding the rule of law in 
different cultures. 
III 
RETURNING AND TRYING TO APPLY THE GUIDEPOSTS: THE 2011 
MODULE 
This Article seems incomplete without at least an 
acknowledgement of the experience of our 2011 visit and our second 
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module. For this module, when we consulted Roxane Dimanche early 
in the planning process, she expressed a preference for a simulation 
based on fact investigation skills.81 We focused then on these and 
related client interviewing skills for the just-over two class sessions 
available during our visit.82 
 We tried to implement the lessons we had learned in developing 
the first module. With respect to the first guidepost, we relied more 
extensively than before on our colleagues at ESCDROJ. In fact, Dr. 
Eustache visited Hastings in the month before we ventured to Haiti. 
We worked with him at length, reviewing much of the proposed 
second simulation line by line and revising our draft. We conferred 
and inquired and checked on legal limits and issues that attorneys in 
Haiti might raise. Similarly, we focused on deciphering taboos. We 
changed the alleged crime, but kept the reasons for a lie essentially 
unchanged. The accused still had a heterosexual love affair to hide. 
We still failed to ask important things. Our simulation rested in 
part on an incorrect eyewitness identification. Apparently, it turns out 
that in Haiti, if the police report in the case is wrong, officials stop the 
trial of the accused and have a new trial on the validity of the police 
report. We learned this on the second of the three nights of 
conducting the simulation exercise in Jérémie. Because our 
simulation remained in the investigatory rather than trial phase, we 
managed to skirt this issue. If we had been pressed, we might have 
extemporized that it was the eyewitness, not the police, who had been 
mistaken. So, the report was not wrong, just the eyewitness’s 
perception. We are not sure if that would have been adequate to solve 
the problem. 
We had to be flexible and allow a bit of chaos to prevail. In this 
second module, we decided to engage in on-the-spot fact gathering. 
We waited until we were at the law school to select the location from 
which the eyewitness would claim to have seen the accused exit the 
crime scene. This means we could not finalize the eyewitness’s 
 
81 Criminal defense attorney fact finding in the civil law system in Haiti may depend 
upon many factors, including available resources, perspectives on and expectations of role, 
and at what point in the process counsel becomes involved in the case. Consider Dr. 
Eustache’s concern about delayed representation. See Eustache, supra note 24, at 609 
(“While the right to counsel is afforded to all citizens, court appointed counsel is generally 
only provided after the pretrial investigation is completed. In short, defendants are denied 
the right to legal advice during the most critical period of the proceedings.”). 
82 For a discussion of important considerations involved in designing clinical 
opportunities for civil law systems and the need to understand the differences between 
common law and civil law legal cultures, see Genty, supra note 45, at 134. 
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account until we were at the law school on the afternoon of the first 
day of the simulation, just a few hours before class. This was cutting 
it a bit close for my taste. But waiting to locate the eyewitness’s 
vantage point meant we could actually invite students to walk the fifty 
or so feet to the law school gate and view the scene from pretty close 
to the eyewitness’s alleged vantage point. The eyewitness had been 
adamant that the person hurrying from the scene of the crime ducked 
behind a tree. But, because we were able to select the location while 
standing at the proposed location in Jérémie, we could select a place 
that was visible from the law school and a place, as it turns out, where 
there are no trees in the area where the eyewitness claimed that the 
accused disappeared. For our simulation, this meant that the dozen or 
so student representatives who walked to the gate during the 
simulation exercise that evening could report that the eyewitness had 
to have been wrong. With the eyewitness wrong on this issue, the 
likelihood of the client’s innocence increased. 
We explicitly acknowledged the U.S. context-specific nature of our 
advice, but sought to make the case otherwise relatively realistic. As 
indicated above regarding incorrect information in the police report 
itself, we were not entirely successful. 
Interestingly, in terms of the skills of client interviewing (and 
perhaps unrelated to our teaching), the students by and large 
conducted very well executed initial U.S.-style client interviews in the 
2011 module. Somehow, unlike following the 2009 anchor 
presentation, following this anchor presentation (also given by me and 
largely dependent on the same basic set of notes as the original 
anchor), students connected to the principles we lauded for client 
interviewing. I wonder if the fact gathering about the eyewitness’s 
error, which preceded the initial interview, gave students more 
confidence in the potential innocence of their client in this year’s 
scenario. (Although, in 2011, the case involved the theft of a cell 
phone, and the phone is found by the police in the defendant’s home 
under his bed.) In most of the small groups, students applied the 
principles beautifully. They used effective techniques and established 
rapport; they reassured the client of confidentiality; and they inquired 
astutely about alibi and factual assertions in the police report.83 
Apart from the speculation that the initial on-the-spot fact 
gathering about the eyewitness’s story may have enhanced the client’s 
 
83 With less trial and error on the part of the students, and much more initial success, as 
a clinician, I cannot help but wonder if this clinical experience was somehow less effective 
than the one in 2009. 
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credibility, I do not know why this group of students acclimated so 
quickly to the interview norms we articulated for client interviewing 
simulation exercises in the United States. I would like to speculate 
that the students who had participated in our simulation of two years 
earlier had recalled these norms and they surfaced in this similar 
exercise and guided the seven to nine student small group interviews. 
All right, so maybe that’s just wishful thinking. 
In evaluating our experience from the 2011 trip, I might add 
another guidepost, the ninth for the list: develop meaningful ways for 
your host students to provide a critique of the approach you bring. I 
imagine it might have felt impolite to our hosts to furnish on-the-spot 
criticism of the methods we presented. But, apart from feedback there 
and later from Dr. Eustache and Roxane Dimanche, and very gracious 
on-the-spot feedback from our host students, we did not create a 
vehicle designed to provide significant critical feedback on the 
usefulness and pitfalls of our teaching from the intended recipients of 
our efforts. 
Overall, the principles of the guideposts proved useful in our 
second simulation experience in Jérémie. As the partnership evolves, 
it will be valuable to find ways of soliciting meaningful critique from 
our host students about this new clinical facet of our shared 
international partnership. And I welcome your feedback so that we 
can improve our approach and identify additional guideposts for 
clinicians exporting and importing legal education with educational 
partners around the world. 
CONCLUSION 
This analysis of our efforts aims to add to the database of 
evaluations of clinical simulations shared internationally, as well as to 
encourage others to share and continue to share their clinical learning 
and teaching in legal environments around the globe.84 I hope 
especially that legal educators at educational institutions for whom 
clinical legal education is novel will (continue to) engage in the 
conversation, both by providing critical feedback about the 
 
84 In her 2006 article on supporting clinical legal education abroad, Professor Wortham 
concludes with a “hope[] to inspire those who work in clinics . . . to find the time to report 
their experience.” Wortham, supra note 37, at 681. This Article concludes by reaffirming 
and extending her call for the continued and additional sharing of reflections about global 
clinical legal education efforts, encouraging reflections on the development of clinics 
globally, as well as more generally on shared efforts in the development of clinical legal 
education curricula globally. 
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experiments of imported modules in their law schools and about their 
own endeavors in creating homegrown clinical educational 
curricula.85 I also hope that the very modest efforts of the HHP in the 
context of clinical legal education described and evaluated here will 
encourage students in Haiti to undertake representation of individuals 
in Haitian jails to vindicate detainees’ human rights, whether through 
the anticipated criminal justice clinic, or more generally when they 
graduate and become lawyers. I am grateful to have had the chance to 
learn so much from our Haitian partners about life, law, and legal 
education in Haiti and, often unwittingly, about myself. 
 
85 For a discussion of the growth and impact of clinical legal education in China and 
relationships with U.S. law schools and colleagues in those developments from the 
viewpoint of a Chinese legal educator, see Yanmin Cai, Global Clinical Legal Education 
and International Partnerships: A Chinese Legal Educator’s Perspective, 26 MD. J. INT’L 
L. 159 (2011). 
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APPENDIX A 
MOCK POLICE REPORT 
Hastings to Haiti 
Criminal Law Simulation File 
March 2, 2009 
 
Preliminary Report 
 
One year ago, Jean and his sister Marie inherited a farmhouse and 
some land located on the outskirts of Jabricot. The land and home had 
belonged to their grandparents, who had passed away. Neighbors 
understood there was some argument about the property. Marie 
wanted to live in the home and farm on the land, keeping the 
traditional uses of the property. On the other hand, Jean, whose wife 
was desperately unhappy in Jabricot, wanted to sell the entire 
inheritance and split the proceeds with Marie. Neighbors think Jean 
wants to immigrate to Miami, Florida with his wife so they can start a 
new life. He needs money to do all the paperwork. 
One week ago, when Jean, Marie, and Jean’s wife (Claudine) were 
eating in Chez Matou restaurant, a heated argument ensued between 
Jean and Marie about their inheritance. Jean was heard to say, “I’d 
rather see the place burn to the ground than have you continue living 
there and waste the money it’s worth.” 
Two days ago, just after dark, the farmhouse burned to the ground 
and some of the crops were also destroyed. Marie was not injured. 
Coincidentally, the fire was set during the time that Marie was at the 
regular church service she attends. 
In their investigation, the police found burned wood and rags 
soaked in kerosene around the perimeter of the farmhouse. 
One person (Guillaume Dupres), who had been walking by the 
farmhouse claimed to have seen someone on the property just before 
it had been torched. Although the sun was setting, Mr. Dupres 
described the person he saw as about 170 cm tall, of slight build, and 
wearing work boots. Mr. Dupres did not get a good look at the 
person’s face. 
Yesterday, the police arrested Jean Mars and charged him with the 
crime of arson of the farmhouse. 
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Student Instructions for Class 
 
 
Accused:  Jean Mars 
Offense Charged:  Arson 
Defense Counsel:  Jérémie Law Students 
 
This morning, you were given the above preliminary report and 
assigned to represent Jean Mars through the Criminal Justice Clinic at 
the Law School. You will have an opportunity to interview your client 
sometime in the next week. 
To prepare, you should research the elements of the crime of arson. 
Please write down the elements and bring these to our first case 
meeting (in class). 
Please also think about what you’d like to ask Jean Mars when you 
have the chance to meet him. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) issued 
its first judgment on a gay rights case from the Russian Federation. 
Alekseyev v. Russia resulted in a finding that the Russian government 
had violated Articles 11, 13, and 14 of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European 
Convention) when the city of Moscow banned the plaintiff, Nikolai 
Alekseyev, and other gay rights activists from holding a public 
demonstration in support of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(LGBT) rights in 2006, 2007, and 2008, specifically gay pride 
marches, rallies, and pickets. This ruling follows a recent trend in 
both the European Union and the United Nations of bold statements 
in favor of gay rights, and makes a strong case for LGBT rights of 
assembly.1 
I 
UNSANCTIONED PRIDE, SANCTIONED HATE 
In 2006, gay activists in Russia organized what they hoped would 
be the first gay pride parade in the Russian Federation. Organizers, 
including Nikolai Alekseyev (the plaintiff in this case) and his LGBT 
rights group, Gay Russia, chose May 27, 2006, as the date for a march 
and rally to support and promote the rights of Russia’s LGBT 
community.2 Beginning in February of that year, the local government 
 
1 The U.N. released its first ever report on LGBT human rights in December 2011. The 
report detailed the global battles facing sexual minorities, noting that “LGBT people are 
often targets of organized abuse from religious extremists, paramilitary groups, neo-Nazis, 
extreme nationalists and others, as well as family and community violence, with lesbians 
and transgender women at particular risk.” UN Issues First Report on Human Rights of 
Gay and Lesbian People, UN NEWS CENTRE (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps 
/news/story.asp?NewsID=40743. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon followed this up 
in March 2012 with a call to world leaders to protect gay rights during the U.N.’s first 
hearing on LGBT discrimination and violence. Michelle Garcia, U.N. Secretary-Gen. 
Urges Global Gay Rights, ADVOCATE.COM (Mar. 7, 2012, 5:17 PM), http://www.advocate 
.com/News/Daily_News/2012/03/07/UN_Secretary_Gen_Urges_Global_Gay_Rights/. 
2 May 27 was chosen specifically because it is the anniversary of the decriminalization 
of homosexuality in Russia. See Alekseyev v. Russia, Nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 and 
14599/09, ¶ 6 (2010). Boris Yeltsin signed a bill repealing Article 121.1 of the Russian 
Criminal Code, which criminalized consensual sex acts between men, on April 29, 1993.  
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of Moscow began an informal campaign to prevent the parade and 
spread the idea that gay activists were provoking societal 
confrontations by promoting homosexuality. On February 16, the 
mayor’s press secretary published a statement that the Moscow 
government would “not even consider allowing the gay parade to be 
held.”3 Less than a week later, on February 22, the mayor himself, 
Yuri Luzhkov, was quoted by the news agency Interfax as saying he 
personally considered homosexuality to be “unnatural,” and that he 
would impose a ban on gay pride parades and rallies to avoid 
“stir[ring] up society.”4 
On March 17, deputy mayor Liudmila Shvetsova, wrote to Mayor 
Luzhkov about the plans to hold the gay pride parade in Moscow.5 
She informed him that the parade was, in her opinion, a threat to the 
health and morals of the people of Moscow, and cited a number of 
petitioners who protested open expressions of support of 
homosexuality.6 However, Shvetsova acknowledged that under 
Russian law—specifically the Federal Law on Assemblies, Meetings, 
Demonstrations, Marches and Picketing (the Assemblies Act)—it was 
not possible to ban the event.7 She suggested that authorities ask to 
change the time or venue of the planned event, or use the possibility 
of the event becoming a public threat to stop it, and requested that the 
 
LAURIE ESSIG, QUEER IN RUSSIA 13 (2009). Lesbian sex was not criminalized in the old 
criminal code; the new code only mentions homosexuality in relation to gay/lesbian rape, 
and the penalties are the same for “gay” rape as for “straight” rape. Immigration and 
Refugee Board of Canada, Russia: Update to RUS13194 of 16 Feb. 1993 on the Treatment 
of Homosexuals (Feb. 29, 2000), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae 
6ad788c.html. 
3 Alekseyev ¶ 7. The press secretary went on to say that Moscow’s government “will not 
allow a gay parade to be held in any form, whether openly or disguised [as a human rights 
demonstration], and any attempt to hold any unauthorised action will be severely 
repressed.” Id. 
4 Id. ¶ 8. 
5 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRIDE AND VIOLENCE: A CHRONICLE OF THE EVENTS OF 
MAY 27, 2006 IN MOSCOW 3 (2006) [hereinafter PRIDE AND VIOLENCE]. 
6 Alekseyev ¶ 9. Shvetsova stated in the memorandum that the planned event was 
“direct propaganda for immorality, insulting the honor and dignity of the overwhelming 
majority of Muscovites and inhabitants of Russia . . . [and] undermining the moral 
principles of the society.” PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 3. 
7 Alekseyev ¶ 9. In spite of her acknowledgement that the Assemblies Act could not 
prevent the rally as planned, and that homosexuality was in fact no longer a crime in the 
Russian Federation, Shvetsova stated that “propaganda in favor of [homosexuality and 
lesbianism], in particular by means of holding gay festivals and gay parades, can be 
considered propaganda for immorality, which may be forbidden by legislation in [the] 
future.” PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 3. 
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mayor agree to develop an action plan to prevent any public or private 
actions towards organizing, promoting, or holding a gay pride event.8 
Following this letter, the mayor issued instructions to local officials 
and prefects to “take concrete measures to prevent holding public and 
mass gay events in the capital,” including organizing a media 
campaign that would draw on objections from local citizens, religious 
leaders, and public organizations.9 In spite of the Moscow 
government’s machinations, Alekseyev and Gay Russia pushed 
forward with their plans to hold the rally. On May 15, the organizers 
submitted notice of the march, including the proposed date, time, and 
route, to the mayor.10 Despite the work of the organizers to ensure 
that local laws were followed when planning the march, the mayor 
refused permission to hold the rally on May 18, citing public safety 
grounds, specifically the “prevention of riots and protection of health, 
morals and the rights and freedoms of others.”11 In the mayor’s 
opinion, the negative reaction of the community to homosexuality in 
general meant that the march “was therefore likely to cause a negative 
reaction and protests against the participants, which could turn into 
civil disorder and mass riots.”12 
In response to the mayor’s refusal to allow them to demonstrate, 
the organizers submitted notice of a second protest, a picket of the 
decision to be held at Lubyanskaya Square, at the same date and time 
as the original march they planned. The next day, May 19, the 
organizers formally challenged the mayor’s decision in the Tverskoi 
District Court.13 Four days later, on May 23, the deputy prefect of the 
Moscow Central Administrative Circuit issued a refusal for the 
 
8 Alekseyev ¶ 9. 
9 PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 2. 
10 In order to ensure compliance with local laws, organizers “undertook to cooperate 
with the law-enforcement authorities in ensuring safety and respect for public order by the 
participants and to comply with regulations on restriction of noise levels.” Alekseyev ¶ 11. 
11 Id. ¶ 12. Ironically, on the same day that the mayor issued his decision, Russia 
assumed the six-month chairmanship of the Council of Europe, “the continent’s principle 
body concerned with human rights.” PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 2. Despite a 
pledge by Russia’s foreign minister, Serey Lavrov, that Russia’s tenure as chair would be 
“devoted to openness,” the NGO Human Rights Watch found a “centralized campaign in 
the [Moscow] mayor’s office against any attempts to publicly show support” for Russia’s 
LGBT community. Id. As with Shvetsova’s March 17 letter, the objections to the rally by 
Russian citizens and religious groups were cited as a reason for the rejection. 
12 Alekseyev ¶ 12. In defense of his decision, Mayor Luzhkov cited “numerous petitions 
. . . by representatives of legislative and executive State bodies, religious denominations, 
Cossack elders and other individuals.” Id. 
13 Id. ¶ 14; PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 4. 
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organizers’ second requested rally, the Lubyanskaya picket.14 The 
rationale behind the second decision was the same as the first—a 
gathering of gay activists to promote LGBT rights was a threat to the 
public order of Moscow. 
On May 25, the mayor again voiced his disapproval of both 
homosexuality and the efforts of gay activists to publicly promote gay 
rights, saying that people with sexual “deviations” should not publicly 
demonstrate and that Muscovites agreed with him: “I thank the 
citizens of Moscow as 99.9% of them in recent days also believe it is 
unacceptable to hold such parades.”15 The Moscow Pride Festival 
opened that same day, hosting both domestic and foreign participants 
in a two-day event of lectures and discussions leading up to the 
planned May 27 march. Activists and political figures came from 
around the world to participate, including the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Austria, France, the United States, Poland, Latvia, 
Moldova, and Belarus.16 The first event of the festival was a lecture 
by Merlin Holland, Oscar Wilde’s grandson. During Holland’s 
lecture, over a dozen people stood and began shouting “Russia free of 
faggots!” before spraying the audience with mace.17 
The following day, May 26, saw a couple of significant events. 
First, the mayor’s opposition to both homosexuality and public 
expressions of gay rights was again quoted by Interfax, reiterating his 
firm opposition to allowing a gay pride parade to happen, and 
highlighting the objections of religious groups.18 More importantly, 
the Tverskoi District Court dismissed the complaint filed by 
Alekseyev and Gay Russia. In its rejection of the complaint, the court 
relied upon provisions in the Assemblies Act that addressed the 
responsibility of authorities to ensure the safety of planned events.19 
 
14 Alekseyev ¶ 15. 
15 PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 3. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 4. 
18 The mayor was quoted as saying that no gay pride parade would happen as long as he 
was mayor. He went on to say that all three “major” faiths—Christianity (specifically the 
Russian Orthodox Church), Judaism, and Islam—opposed the events, which were 
unacceptable in Russia (unlike some “progressive” Western countries). Alekseyev ¶ 16. 
Interfax also quoted the mayor as saying: “That’s the way morals work. If somebody 
deviates from the normal principles [in accordance with which] sexual and gender life is 
organised, this should not be demonstrated in public and anyone potentially unstable 
should not be invited.” Id. 
19 The court did acknowledge that the Assemblies Act permitted holding the planned 
rally, provided that administrative notice requirements were met, and prohibited the 
interference of organizers, authorities, or other individuals, with the free expression of  
478 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 14, 473 
The court concluded that, under the Assemblies Act, Moscow 
officials’ refusal to allow the event had legitimate grounds; that the 
onus was on the organizers to propose time, date, and venue changes; 
and that the organizers’ right to hold public events had not been 
violated.20 Alekseyev appealed the Tverskoi court’s decision on the 
grounds that Article 12 of the Assemblies Act actually required 
officials, not organizers, to propose time, date, and venue changes for 
events. He also challenged the court’s conclusion that the ban was 
justified on public safety grounds, arguing that any safety concerns 
could have been alleviated by providing police protection for 
participants in the event.21 
In addition to the appeal, Alekseyev and other organizers decided 
to hold two events on May 27. The first was a march to place flowers 
at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Aleksandrovskiy Garden at 
the Kremlin, in a bid to “express[] . . . opposition to nationalism and 
extremism.”22 The second planned event was a vigil in front of a 
statue of Yuri Dolgoruky outside of City Hall to protest the mayor’s 
ban.23 At 2:30 p.m. on the 27th, Alekseyev and other organizers and 
attendants of the festival, totaling approximately fifteen people,24 
approached the gate to the Tomb and were met by approximately two 
to three hundred protestors, including “younger and older Orthodox 
and nationalist counter-protestors, and contingents of elderly women 
carrying crosses and icons.”25 There was a police presence at the 
Tomb, an estimated one hundred and fifty members of the special riot 
squad OMON (Otriad Militsii Osobogo Naznacheniy), but they only 
intervened to arrest Alekseyev for breaching the conditions for 
holding a public demonstration.26 The protestors beat some of the 
 
participants unless they contravened the parameters of the planned event or breached 
public order. Id. ¶ 17. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. ¶ 18. 
22 PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 4. 
23 Id.; see also Alekseyev ¶ 19. 
24 Alekseyev ¶ 20. 
25 PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 4–5. 
26 Id. at 5; see also Alekseyev ¶ 21. Alekseyev recounted the events to Human Rights 
Watch: 
I saw a huge group of people gathered there, shouting “death to sodomites,” “out of 
Russia,” “we will not allow you to put things here, our grandfathers died fighting 
against people like you.” I said, “My grandfather died fighting against your kind.” I 
said to myself, I will not stop—I will go on. But the gate was closed. Then the 
police suddenly appeared out of nowhere. They began pushing all of us back from 
the gate. Then . . . several officers[] seized me from behind and started to shove me  
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participants while OMON detained the others; a number of protestors 
threw objects at the activists, including eggs, bottles, and rocks.27 
After the small group of LGBT activists withdrew from the Tomb 
to move towards the site of the second planned event, anti-gay 
protestors continued to battle both bystanders and police. Police 
arrested between twenty-five and fifty demonstrators, but the “vast 
majority . . . who had been engaged in violence remained at large.”28 
These protestors made their way towards the site of the planned 
picket, continuing to assault people they perceived to be gay rights 
supporters on the streets along the way. When the remaining gay 
activists arrived at City Hall, a large contingent of anti-gay 
demonstrators was already waiting for them, in addition to the violent 
group of protestors who were still chasing after them from the 
Tomb.29 Amongst the protestors waiting at City Hall was Nikolai 
Kurianovich, a member of the Duma from the right-wing Liberal 
Democratic Party. Kurianovich stood upon the steps of the statue the 
gay rights activists planned their vigil around and warned the crowd 
that “Russia would become like ‘putrid America and dying Europe’ if 
it permitted the ‘gay mafia’ to triumph, and led the crowd in chanting 
‘Gays and lesbians to Kolyma’—the Stalin-era prison camp.”30 Local 
police were again present, but only to arrest gay rights activists, rather 
than the rabidly anti-gay crowd that surrounded them.31 
 
from the square and through the crowd. They pushed me very violently through the 
square and put me in the [police] bus. 
PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 5. British activist Peter Tatchell, who had been a 
participant in the Pride Festival and march to the Tomb, said of the violence they 
encountered: “We were immediately set upon by about 100 fascist thugs and religious 
fanatics who began pushing, punching and kicking us.” Rex Wockner, Pride Moscow, 
INT’L LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANS AND INTERSEX ASS’N (ILGA) (May 29, 2006), 
http://ilga.org/ilga/en/article/812. 
27 PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 5. 
28 Id.; see also Wockner, supra note 26. 
29 PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 6; Alekseyev ¶ 22. 
30 PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 6. 
31 Id. One of the remaining organizers, Dimitri Makarov, approached a colonel with the 
police to ask for protection against the extremists, only to be arrested: 
I showed him our application [to hold the demonstration], said this was a 
manifestation within the law. I asked him to defend the picketers against the 
extremists who controlled the square. He pointed to us and said to the officers, 
“Arrest them. Take them to the bus.” He said we had organized an unsanctioned 
demonstration! . . . I pointed out the demonstration of the nationalists that was 
already going on: I said, that is illegal, shouldn’t you stop that? The officers said, 
“We can’t, there is a deputy leading it.” I said, “What about the people standing 
there listening to him?” They said, “Well, they are listening to a deputy.” 
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During the fracas, several LGBT activists arrived and unfurled 
large rainbow flags in front of the statue, including an openly gay 
member of the German Bundestag, Volker Beck.32 The crowd 
immediately reacted with violence: skinheads surrounded the activists 
and ripped the flags away from them. A representative of Human 
Rights Watch was shoved to the ground. Beck and his partner were 
struck in the face with rocks and fists. Police intervened, but “instead 
of trying to separate the two groups they encircled all of them, 
crushing them tightly together and forming a close cordon within 
which the violence continued.”33 A number of arrests were made, 
including both the violent counter-protestors and the non-violent 
LGBT demonstrators. A leader of Russia’s lesbian movement, 
Yevgenia Debrianskaia, was arrested while speaking to journalists 
about the violence. As she told Human Rights Watch: 
I was appalled. I saw an unsanctioned demonstration, headed by a 
Duma parliamentarian, who was calling for gay people to be killed, 
and no one was disturbing him or interfering. . . . The journalists . . . 
turned their cameras to me. . . . I said, I came to exercise my civic 
responsibility, about the unfair ban on gay people. . . . The 
extremists started to throw things at me, rocks and bottles and soda. 
A policeman with three big stars on his shoulder broke through the 
journalists and told me my actions were illegal and I was under 
arrest.34 
Beck was also arrested, along with his partner; he later told the news 
agency Deutsche Presse Agentur that the security forces had not 
protected them, but prevented them from escaping the violence: “We 
were left without any protection.”35 
Reflecting on the event, activist Peter Tatchell placed a large part 
of the blame on Mayor Luzhkov, saying his “homophobia created the 
atmosphere which gave a green light to the fascists to attack the 
Moscow pride participants.”36 Throughout the day a number of people 
 
Id. 
32 PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 6–7. 
33 Id. at 7. 
34 Id. 
35 Wockner, supra note 26. When the police realized who Beck was, they immediately 
released him and his partner, telling the men “they had only detained us for our own 
security!” PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 7. 
36 Wockner, supra note 26. In the aftermath of the violence, the director of Human 
Rights Watch’s LGBT Rights Program, Scott Long, also pinpointed Moscow officials as 
the catalyst of the violence: “The authorities in Moscow have endorsed discrimination and 
fostered an environment that allowed hatred to rise . . . . Instead of leading Muscovites to 
embrace equality, Mayor Luzhkov supported and promoted homophobia. Given this 
failure of leadership, the violent ending should surprise no one.” Russia: Investigate  
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were beaten, detained, arrested, and harassed by anti-gay 
demonstrators and police. Skinheads roamed the streets, tracking 
down any remaining gay activists (or people they thought to be 
supporters) to continue the violence and harassment, largely 
unchecked by police.37 While it is unknown exactly how many arrests 
were made in connection with the events of May 27, Human Rights 
Watch was able to identify at least six LGBT supporters who were 
arrested, including organizers Alekseyev, Dmitri Makarov, and 
Alexei Kozlov, who were charged with organizing unsanctioned 
demonstrations.38 Makarov has stated that he was also harassed by 
police at the station: “They threatened me too, saying . . . ‘[w]e’ll beat 
you with the legal code till you realize what an unsanctioned 
demonstration is.’”39 
Following the violence of May 27, Alekseyev and Gay Russia 
attempted to get the Russian court system to recognize their right to 
have their public assemblies sanctioned by local governments. 
Multiple court challenges were filed, and activists waited as their 
cases slowly worked through the Russian judicial system, hitting 
roadblock after roadblock, only to have the courts sustain the bans.40 
 
Attacks on Gay Pride March, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 2, 2006), http://www.hrw.org 
/news/2006/06/01/russia-investigate-attacks-gay-pride-march. 
37 PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 9. One French participant who was seriously 
injured, Pierre Serne, told Human Rights Watch about the difficulty in finding safe haven 
or help that day: 
I was asking people on the streets to help me, asking where the police were. People 
avoided me. And when some skinheads saw that no one was doing anything, they 
started to follow me again. I saw two Russian photographers who were covering the 
event. I asked them to call the police. But the skinheads started chasing all three of 
us, mainly, though, after me. They began hitting me again. Then the police arrived, 
at last. . . . They arrested five of [the skinheads]. Then they took me to the bus. I 
was put in with the skinheads. . . . Those guys were just laughing in the bus, like the 
others on the street, as if they knew they had no fear of anything. 
Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 10. 
40 On June 16, Alekseyev and Gay Russia decided to file another court challenge to the 
city’s prohibition of the City Hall picket. Five weeks later, on August 22, the Taganskiy 
District Court of Moscow dismissed the challenge on the grounds that public safety 
concerns justified the ban; Alekseyev immediately appealed. Alekseyev v. Russia, Nos. 
4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09, ¶ 25 (2010). The Moscow City Court finally reviewed 
the pending appeal of the Tverskoi District Court’s May 26 decision upholding the ban on 
September 19; it found no fault with the lower court’s decision and upheld it as “justified 
in the circumstances.” Id. ¶ 26. Over two months passed before it reviewed the appeal of 
the Taganskiy District Court’s August 22 ruling, and it found no fault in that decision 
either. Id. ¶ 27. 
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The years since 2006 have seen similar attempts to organize pride 
rallies, and similar obstacles set up by the city to prevent them. In 
both 2007 and 2008, organizers submitted multiple requests and plans 
for a variety of gay pride events; every single request was rejected, 
ostensibly on the grounds of public safety.41 After three years of being 
prevented from obtaining relief by domestic courts, Alekseyev filed 
an application with the European Court of Human Rights, claiming 
violations of his rights under the European Convention. Every ruling 
the domestic courts had given subverted the constitutional rights of 
Alekseyev and other LGBT Russians, and, as the European Court of 
Human Rights would eventually rule, their human right to freely 
assemble without being subjected to discriminatory restrictions. 
II 
RELEVANT LAW 
A. Domestic Laws 
There are dual levels of domestic law at play in Alekseyev. The first 
is the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which guarantees 
Russians freedom of association and the right to peaceful assembly. 
Article 30 contains the right to association.42 Article 31 guarantees the 
right to peaceful assembly.43 Article 55(3) provides for those 
freedoms to be restricted by federal laws under certain circumstances, 
such as the protection of public morals and the rights of others.44 
 
41 In 2007, Alekseyev and others attempted to organize a march similar to the one they 
had attempted in the previous year. The march and a picket (similar to the 2006 picket) 
were banned on the grounds of “public order, prevention of riots and protection of health, 
morals and the rights and freedoms of others.” Alekseyev ¶ 32. On May 27, after 
attempting to march to the mayor’s office to file petitions protesting the bans, a small 
number of activists, including Alekseyev, were detained for twenty-four hours for 
disobeying a lawful order. Both the District and City Courts upheld the city’s decisions, 
finding public safety concerns justified the bans. Id. ¶¶ 37–38. In 2008, organizers were 
particularly careful about complying with the city’s laws but still received denials of every 
one of their twenty-five requests. Id. ¶¶ 40–44. As in previous years, court challenges were 
filed in District and City Courts, but the government won each challenge. Id. ¶ 46. 
42 See CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, art. 30(1) (“Everyone shall have 
the right to association, including the right to create trade unions for the protection of his 
or her interests. The freedom of activity of public association shall be guaranteed.”). 
43 Id. at art. 31 (“Citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to assemble 
peacefully, without weapons, hold rallies, meetings and demonstrations, marches and 
pickets.”). 
44 Alekseyev ¶ 49. See also CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, art. 55(3) 
(“The rights and freedoms of man and citizen may be limited by the federal law only to 
such an extent to which it is necessary for the protection of the fundamental principles of  
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The other level of domestic law is the Assemblies Act, which local 
officials used to justify the bans. The Assemblies Act was created 
with the aim of “ensuring realization of the constitutionally mandated 
right of citizens of the Russian Federation to peaceful assembly 
without weapons, to hold rallies, meetings, demonstrations, marches 
and picketing.”45 The Act gives the organizer of a public event the 
right to hold public demonstrations—including marches—provided 
the organizer meets certain requirements.46 Article 12 of the 
Assemblies Act governs the responsibilities of the executive 
authority. There is no provision in this section granting the 
government authority to outright ban a public event as long as the 
aforementioned requirements have been met. Officials are limited to 
proposing alternate venues, appointing a representative to assist 
organizers of the event, and taking on various tasks that help promote 
and maintain public order.47 Article 18 actually prohibits executive 
interference in the rights of the participants except in certain 
circumstances: “The promoter of a public event, officials and other 
citizens shall have no right to prevent participants in the public event 
from expressing their opinion in a manner not violating the public 
order and rules of procedure for holding the public event.”48 
B. International Laws 
Two aspects of international human rights law are necessary to 
understanding this case. The first is the widely recognized right to 
free assembly, the primary claim of Alekseyev before the European 
Court.49 The right to assemble is guaranteed by multiple international 
 
the constitutional system, morality, health, the rights and lawful interests of other people, 
for ensuring defence of the country and security of the State.”). 
45 Federal Law No. 54-FZ on Rallies, Meetings, Demonstrations, Marches and 
Picketing, June 19, 2004, available at http://legislationline.org/documents/action/popup 
/id/4367 [hereinafter Assemblies Act]. 
46 Assemblies Act at art. 5(3)(1). These requirements include notifying the executive 
authority of the planned event; notifying the authority of changes to the event within a 
specified period of time; ensuring compliance with any conditions for holding the event; 
ensuring that participants in the event maintain public order; and ensuring, to the extent 
possible, public order and the safety of citizens during the event. Id. at art. 5(4)(i)–(v). 
47 Id. at art. 12(1)(i)–(vii). 
48 Id. at art. 18(1). 
49 Three articles of the European Convention were at question in Alekseyev: (1) 
freedom of assembly and association, Article 11; (2) the right to an effective remedy, 
Article 13; and (3) the prohibition of discrimination, Article 14. Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005 
[hereinafter European Convention]. The primary violation that Alekseyev sought relief for  
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instruments, most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), the European Convention, and the International Covenant 
for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).50 The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (EU Charter) also guarantees the 
freedom of peaceful assembly and association. The second aspect is 
the stance of the international legal community on discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. A number of international instruments 
address both the importance of the right to free assembly and the 
pernicious effects of sexual orientation discrimination. State 
discrimination against sexual minorities has been studied, discussed, 
and generally condemned by the Committee of Ministers, the Council 
of Europe, and the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights; it has also 
been recognized by both the European Court of Human Rights and 
the European Court of Justice as a generally impermissible form of 
discrimination. 
1. Freedom of Assembly 
Aside from the UDHR and the European Convention, the ICCPR, 
to which Russia is a party, also contains the right of peaceful 
assembly: 
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions 
may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed 
in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security or public safety, public 
order . . . the protection of public health or morals or the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.51 
The EU Charter, which is the “first formal EU document to combine 
and declare all the values and fundamental rights . . . to which EU 
citizens should be entitled,” also contains a guarantee of the freedom 
 
was the Article 11 right. The Article 13 claim was a result of the ineffectiveness of the 
Russian judicial system in respect to adjudicating the applicant’s claim in a timely manner. 
Article 14 is considered a “parasitic” right—finding an Article 14 violation is contingent 
upon finding violations of another article. See generally Rory O’Connell, Cinderella 
Comes to the Ball: Article 14 and the Right to Non-Discrimination in the ECHR, 29 
LEGAL STUD. 211, 212 (2009). 
50 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 20(i), U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (“Everyone has the right to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and association.”); European Convention, supra note 49, at 
art. 11; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 21, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
51 ICCPR, supra note 50, at art. 21. Russia signed the treaty on March 18, 1968, and 
ratified it on October 16, 1973. See Status of the ICCPR, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter 
=4&lang=en (last updated Jan. 28, 2012). 
2012] We’re Here, We’re Queer, Get Used to It: 485 
Freedom of Assembly and Gay Pride in Alekseyev v. Russia 
of assembly and association.52 Article 12 of the Charter states: 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to 
freedom of association at all levels, in particular in political, trade 
union and civic matters.”53 
Regardless of a wide recognition of the freedom of assembly, this 
right is not without limitations. Legitimate aims for restricting 
freedom of assembly can include national security; public safety; 
prevention of disorder or crime; protection of health or morals; and 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.54 However, under the 
European Convention, “restrictions should be (1) prescribed by law, 
(2) have a legitimate aim, and (3) be necessary in a democratic 
society to achieve those aims.”55 The Court applies this three-part test 
after confirming that public authorities did in fact interfere with the 
rights in question. 
In addition to the three-part test employed to determine if a 
restriction on assembly is legitimate, the Court has set some limits on 
what constitutes a legitimate aim.56 Governments have an obligation 
to not only allow assemblies whose viewpoints they disagree with, 
but also an obligation to protect the people participating in those 
assemblies from violence.57 The Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) produced guidelines for 
states on how to guarantee and execute effective rights of free 
assembly, recognizing that “[t]he freedom of peaceful assembly can 
be an important strand in the maintenance and development of 
 
52 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, EU CHARTER, www.eucharter.org (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2012). The EU Charter became a binding part of EU Law when the Treaty of 
Lisbon came into force in December of 2009. 
53 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 12(1), 2000 O.J. (C 364) 
1 (Dec. 18, 2000) [hereinafter EU Charter]. Article 12(1) corresponds to Article 11 in the 
European Convention. See European Convention, supra note 49, at art. 11. 
54 COUNCIL OF EUROPE COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, DISCRIMINATION ON 
GROUNDS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY IN EUROPE 72 (2d ed. 2011), 
available at http://www.coe.int/t/Commissioner/Source/LGBT/LGBTStudy2011_en.pdf 
[hereinafter SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN EUROPE]. 
55 Id. 
56 For example, the “morality” exception does not give a state free hand to quell any 
public assembly it deems immoral. Authorities are still obligated to respect the right of 
assembly for people whose opinions or lifestyles they may find controversial or 
unwelcome. 
57 SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN EUROPE, supra note 54, at 72–73. 
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culture, and in the preservation of minority identities.”58 It extends the 
definition of “peaceful” assemblies to include those that “may annoy 
or give offence to persons opposed to the ideas or claims that a 
particular assembly is promoting,” a defense particular to states 
attempting to justify restrictions on LGBT rights to assembly.59 
2. Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
Sexual orientation discrimination has recently become a cause of 
concern amongst many international bodies, especially within the 
European community. The Council of Europe—which consists of the 
Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly, the 
Commissioner for Human Rights, and the European Court of Human 
Rights—has been “extensively involved” in advocating for and 
protecting the right of assembly for LGBT persons.60 In one notable 
example, Thomas Hammarberg, the Commissioner for Human Rights 
for the Council of Europe, issued a statement in response to the 
Moscow ban on May 26, 2006, the day before the riots. He classified 
the right to peaceful assembly as a “fundamental right[] in a 
democratic society [that] belong[s] to all people, not just the majority. 
A demonstration may annoy or give offence to persons opposed to the 
ideas or claims expressed, but this cannot be a reason to ban a 
peaceful gathering.”61 
In 2010, the Committee of Ministers issued Recommendation 
CM/Rec(2010)5 on measures to combat discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity (Recommendation on 
Discrimination). Section III explicitly addresses freedom of 
expression and peaceful assembly in the context of sexual orientation 
discrimination: “Member states should take appropriate measures at 
national, regional and local levels to ensure that the right to freedom 
of peaceful assembly, as enshrined in Article 11 of the Convention, 
can be effectively enjoyed, without discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation or gender identity.”62 Article 15 calls upon member 
 
58 OSCE/ODIHR PANEL OF EXPERTS ON THE FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY, GUIDELINES 
ON FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY 13 (2007) [hereinafter ODIHR GUIDELINES]. 
59 Id. 
60 Ronald Holzhacker, State-Sponsored Homophobia and the Denial of the Right of 
Assembly in Europe 19 (unpublished panel paper for the American Political Science 
Association, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=1643314. 
61 Statement, Thomas Hammarberg, Freedom of Assembly Belongs to All People (May 
26, 2006), available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1010053&Site=COE. 
62 Council of Europe Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 on 
Measures to Combat Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity  
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states to ensure that law enforcement protects peaceful gay rights 
demonstrators from any attempts to interrupt the free exercise of their 
right to assembly, and Article 16 asks member states to ensure that 
administrative and legal procedures are not used to ban peaceful 
LGBT assemblies.63 The recommendation even goes so far as to ask 
public officials to use media to publicly condemn attempts to interfere 
with the lawful expression of the right to assemble by gay rights 
supporters.64 
In addition to the Recommendation on Discrimination, the 
Parliamentary Assembly has also passed a resolution on sexual 
orientation and gender identity discrimination. Resolution 1728 
reaffirms that “[s]exual orientation and gender identity are recognised 
as prohibited grounds for discrimination.”65 The Resolution, in 
addition to clarifying both the Council of Europe’s and the Court’s 
positions on sexual orientation discrimination, specifically addresses 
freedom of assembly and LGBT rights. Section six states that “[t]he 
Assembly is particularly concerned by the violation of the rights to 
freedom of assembly and freedom of expression for LGBT persons in 
a number of Council of Europe member states since these rights are 
pillars of democracy.”66 Bans and attempted bans on gay rights 
demonstrations are illustrative of why the Parliamentary Assembly is 
concerned, and this is reiterated in Section 16.1.67 The Resolution is 
also critical of the “overt or tacit support some politicians have given 
 
§ III(14), 1081st Mtg. of the Ministers’ Deputies (Mar. 31, 2010), available at https://wcd 
.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1606669 [hereinafter Recommendation on Discrimination]. 
63 Id. § III, arts. 15–16. Article 15 reads as follows: 
Member states should ensure that law enforcement authorities take appropriate 
measures to protect participants in peaceful demonstrations in favour of the human 
rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons from any attempts to 
unlawfully disrupt or inhibit the effective enjoyment of their right to freedom of 
expression and peaceful assembly. 
Article 16 seems almost tailored as a response to Moscow’s approach to banning pride 
parades: “Member states should take appropriate measures to prevent restrictions on the 
effective enjoyment of the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly resulting 
from the abuse of legal or administrative provisions, for example on grounds of public 
health, public morality and public order.” Id. § III, art. 16 (emphasis added). 
64 Id. at art. 17. 
65 Parliamentary Assembly, Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity, Resolution 1728 § 2, 17th Sitting (Apr. 29, 2010) [hereinafter Resolution 
1728]. 
66 Id. § 6. 
67 Id. § 16.1 (calling on member states to “ensure that the fundamental rights of LGBT 
people, including freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association, are 
respected, in line with international human rights standards”). 
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to violent counter-demonstrations,” the potency of which was 
demonstrated in Moscow by the actions of Mayor Luzhkov and the 
Duma member Kurianovich.68 
There are some notable non-legal instruments that are taken into 
consideration by the Court and other international human rights 
bodies when deciding cases on sexual orientation discrimination. One 
is advice provided by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) 
in a recently published report on sexual orientation discrimination in 
EU member states. In that report, the FRA specifically noted the 
importance of pride events to LGBT persons, finding that “pride 
marches or similar gatherings and events constitute an important 
means through which LGBT persons exercise their right to freedom 
of assembly and freedom of expression.”69 The FRA report highlights 
actions taken by the European Parliament to promote the recognition 
of LGBT rights of assembly,70 and also makes recommendations on 
how local governments can facilitate that recognition. One 
recommendation that is particularly germane to the current case calls 
for eliminating the use of “public order” concerns as an excuse for 
officials to violate those rights.71 
Another non-legal instrument is the Yogyakarta Principles on the 
Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity (Yogyakarta Principles). Drafted in 
2006 by human rights law experts, the Yogyakarta Principles contain 
twenty-nine principles that discuss what rights are protected under 
international law with respect to sexual orientation and gender 
 
68 Id. § 6. 
69 EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, HOMOPHOBIA, 
TRANSPHOBIA AND DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND 
GENDER IDENTITY IN THE EU MEMBER STATES 17 (2010), available at http://fra.europa 
.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/FRA-homophobia-synthesis-report-2011_EN.pdf. 
70 Id. at 19. The policies highlighted by the FRA are “[v]arious European Parliament 
resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2007” that found bans on Pride marches to 
“contravene the principles protected by the ECHR,” and a 2009 resolution on a Lithuanian 
law called the Protection of Minors Against the Detrimental Effects of Public Information. 
Id. The Lithuanian law contained language that effectively banned information on same-
sex relationships, and the Parliament’s resolution “reaffirm[ed] the importance of the EU 
fighting against all forms of discrimination, including discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.” Id. at 18–19. 
71 Id. (“Arguments regarding the preservation of ‘public order’ should not be used to 
impose undue restrictions on LGBT-related events and other manifestations of LGBT 
identities or relationships. Public authorities should ensure that homophobic counter-
demonstrations do not hinder lawful LGBT events.”). 
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identity.72 Principle 20 contains the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and association, and is defined as follows: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association, including for the purposes of peaceful demonstrations, 
regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity. Persons may 
form and have recognised, without discrimination, associations 
based on sexual orientation or gender identity, and associations that 
distribute information to or about, facilitate communication among, 
or advocate for the rights of, persons of diverse sexual orientations 
and gender identities.73 
In addition to defining the freedom of assembly and association in the 
context of sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination, the 
Yogyakarta Principles detail positive obligations on states to ensure 
that these rights are realized and protected. These duties include 
ensuring that legislative and administrative measures protect LGBT 
rights of assembly, that adequate police protection is provided to 
demonstrators against potentially violent counter-demonstrators, and 
that these rights are not restricted on the grounds of public order, 
public morality, public health, and public security.74 In Alekseyev, the 
Russian government is alleged to have violated every single one of 
these duties. 
III 
LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
A. The Allegations 
The Court considered allegations that three rights of the European 
Convention were violated. Article 11(1), or the right to freedom of 
assembly, states that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the 
 
72 David Brown, Making Room for Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in 
International Human Rights Law: An Introduction to the Yogyakarta Principles, 31 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 821, 822, 833 (2010). Signatories to the Principles include notable human 
rights jurists, human rights treaty body members, UN Special Rapporteurs, law professors, 
and human rights activists. Two NGOs also participated: the International Commission of 
Jurists (ICJUR) and the International Service for Human Rights (ISHR). Id. at 840. 
73 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES ON THE APPLICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN RELATION TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND 
GENDER IDENTITY, Principle 20 (Nov. 2006) [hereinafter YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES]. 
74 Id. at Principle 20, §§ (A)–(E). 
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right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests.”75 Article 11(2) provides for exceptions to this right: 
No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other 
than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful 
restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed 
forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.76 
The Court’s primary question was centered on section two, asking 
whether the ban imposed by Mayor Luzhkov was in accordance with 
the law and “necessary in a democratic society” to protect the 
interests of any of the enumerated reasons. 
In addition to Article 11, the Muscovite government was alleged to 
have violated Article 13, or the right to an effective remedy.77 The 
alleged violation of this article stems from the Russian judicial 
system’s repeated refusal to recognize the claims of the applicant or 
ameliorate the harm of the bans, and from the statutory guidelines that 
made it impossible to receive a final decision on the ban before the 
event’s scheduled date. The Court was then asked to determine if the 
violations of Articles 11 and 13 were motivated by discrimination, 
which would be a violation of Article 14: “The enjoyment of rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”78 
B. Russia’s Arguments 
The Russian government’s argument revolved around three points: 
(1) the bans on the applicant’s public events are lawful; (2) the bans 
pursue legitimate aims; and (3) the bans are necessary in a democratic 
society. To bolster its first claim, the government pointed to the 
domestic legal instruments in question, the Constitution and the 
 
75 European Convention, supra note 49, at art. 11(1). 
76 Id. at art. 11(2). 
77 Id. at art. 13 (“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention 
are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that 
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”). 
78 Id. at art. 14. The phrase “other status” has been interpreted to include a variety of 
grounds for protection, including marital status and sexual orientation. See O’Connoll, 
supra note 49, at 13. 
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Assemblies Act. It argued that the inevitably violent confrontation 
between the activists and counter-demonstrators was a risk to public 
safety, and that these grounds were sufficient to justify banning the 
public event under Article 55 § 3 of the Constitution and Article 8(1) 
of the Assemblies Act.79 The government also claimed to be operating 
within its margin of appreciation under Article 11(2), arguing for 
leeway when it comes to protecting the public during potentially 
volatile public events.80 It claimed that the ban was the only way to 
maintain public order “because no other measure could have 
adequately addressed the security risks.”81 
With respect to its second argument, the government claimed that it 
had three legitimate aims in banning gay pride demonstrations: (1) 
protecting public safety, (2) protecting morals, and (3) protecting the 
rights and freedoms of others.82 Its public safety concerns are well 
documented, though the violence came from the counter-
demonstrators instead of the organizers and their supporters. To 
support its argument that it was acting in protection of morals, the 
 
79 Alekseyev v. Russia, Nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09, ¶ 57 (2010). Article 55 
§ 3 of the Constitution, supra note 49, reads: 
The rights and freedoms of man and citizen may be limited by the federal law only 
to such an extent to which it is necessary for the protection of the fundamental 
principles of the constitutional system, morality, health, the rights and lawful 
interests of other people, for ensuring defence of the country and security of the 
State. 
Article 8(1) of the Assemblies Act reads: “A Public event may be carried out at any place 
suitable for the purposes of the given event provided the holding of such event creates no 
threat of collapse of buildings and structures or any other threat to the security of 
participants in the public event.” 
80 The “margin of appreciation” doctrine is analogous to judicial discretion; it is “based 
on the notion that each society is entitled to certain latitude in balancing individual rights 
and national interests, as well as in resolving conflicts that emerge as a result of diverse 
moral convictions.” Onder Bakircioglu, The Application of the Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine in Freedom of Expression and Public Morality Cases, 8 GERMAN L.J. 711, 711 
(2007). 
81 Alekseyev ¶ 58. The government also claimed that a ruling contrary to its domestic 
courts’ rulings would make the Court a “court of fourth instance.” The Fourth Instance 
Doctrine is meant to maintain a high level of deference to national court systems, and the 
Court will generally only question the rulings of a domestic court “where the interpretation 
by the national court is ‘arbitrary,’ or where it is a part of a Convention requirement that 
national law be complied with . . . . Even so, it is very exceptional for the Court to disagree 
with any decision by a national court on its interpretation and application of its own 
national law.” D.J. HARRIS, M. O’BOYLE, E.P. BATES & C.M. BUCKLEY, LAW OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 15 (2d ed. 2009). 
82 See Paul Johnson, Homosexuality, Freedom of Assembly and the Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights: Alekseyev v. Russia, 11 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 578, 580 (2011). 
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government relied on the religiosity of the Russian people. It argued 
that promotion of homosexuality was “incompatible with the 
‘religious doctrines for the majority of the population.’”83 It supported 
this claim with the statements by local religious leaders and 
organizations condemning pride parades specifically, and 
homosexuality generally.84 Allowing the gay pride parade to go 
forward would be an insult to religious Russians who object to 
homosexuality, the government argued; it would be a “terrible 
debasement of their human dignity.”85 To buttress its religious 
protection claim, the government fell back on the guarantees of 
respect and protection of individual religious and moral beliefs found 
in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) and the ICCPR.86 
The government concluded its argument by disputing the idea that 
there was a consensus within the Council of Europe on the extent to 
which homosexuality was accepted in each country, a claim meant to 
 
83 Alekseyev ¶ 59. 
84 These statements came from the Orthodox Church, the Supreme Mufti for Russia, 
and the head of the Muslim authority of Nizhniy Novgorod, and ranged from threatening 
mass protests to calling for the stoning of homosexuals. See Johnson, supra note 82, at 
581. The Orthodox Church protested the parade on the belief that it was sin-promoting 
propaganda. The Supreme Mufti promised that Muslims and other “normal” people would 
protest en masse. And the Muslim authority in Nizhniy Novgorod claimed that, “as a 
matter of necessity, homosexuals must be stoned to death.” Id. 
85 Alekseyev ¶ 59. 
86 See ICCPR, supra note 50, at art. 18(1) (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a 
religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, 
practice and teaching.”). The ICESCR only references religious protection in the context 
of preventing religious discrimination in state fulfillment of its provisions: “The States 
Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the 
present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to . . . religion.” 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), art. 2(2), 
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. Reliance on this treaty to prove the point of religious 
discrimination is inapt, as none of the rights enumerated in the ICESCR are alleged to 
have been violated by the presence of a gay pride parade, let alone on religious grounds. 
The Russian government claimed that allowing gay pride parades would “breach the rights 
of those people whose religious and moral beliefs included a negative attitude towards 
homosexuality.” Alekseyev ¶ 60. It argued that “the democratic State must protect society 
from destructive influence on its moral fundamentals, and protect the human dignity of all 
citizens, including believers.” Id. In other words, allowing realization of LGBT Russians’ 
right to freely assemble would trample on the rights of religious Russians to have 
religiously rooted negative views on homosexuality; the Russian government saw itself as 
protecting the bulk of its population from having their religious rights encroached upon by 
a small portion of the population. 
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invoke the margin of appreciation doctrine.87 It first argued for 
keeping expressions of homosexuality or LGBT support purely in the 
private sphere, such as clubs, bars, and entertainment facilities; the 
idea was that homosexuality was something that “involuntary 
spectators” should not be exposed to, especially children.88 The 
government then claimed that because, in its opinion, Muscovites 
were not ready to accept gay pride parades or other public 
demonstrations of LGBT support, it was the duty of the Moscow 
government to “demonstrate sensitivity to the existing public 
resentment of any overt manifestation of homosexuality.”89 
C. Alekseyev’s Arguments 
Every argument made by the Russian government was strongly 
contested by Alekseyev. There are three basic points that rebut every 
claim made by the government: (1) domestic law does not provide for 
an outright ban on public events, merely for proposed changes in date, 
time, or venue; (2) the government’s so-called “legitimate aims” for 
the bans are inapplicable; and (3) the bans are not necessary in a 
democratic society. The first point is supported by Article 8(1) of the 
Assemblies Act, which governs public events where there are safety 
concerns. There is no language in that section allowing officials to 
ban an event for public safety concerns; rather, they are required to 
suggest another venue.90 Even if the Court had found that the 
 
87 The government wanted to demonstrate that there was a lack of agreement on the 
extent of LGBT rights throughout Europe that justified a wide margin of appreciation from 
the Court. Typically, when dealing with public morals issues, the Court “generally submits 
that Contracting States have a wide margin of appreciation, and defers to the national 
authorities’ judgments.” See Bakircioglu, supra note 80, at 717. A lack of a “uniform 
conception of morals provides a legitimate justification for the Court to evade its 
supervisory role.” Id. at 727. 
88 Alekseyev ¶ 61. 
89 Id. ¶ 62. It again referred to the numerous statements from religious groups, civic 
leaders, and Russian celebrities condemning the gay pride parade. 
90 Id. ¶ 64. Article 12(1)(2) states that the governing body, upon receipt of notice of a 
public event, is obligated “to deliver to the promoter of the public event, within three days 
from receipt of the notice . . . a well-motivated proposal to alter the place and/or time of 
holding the public event.” Assemblies Act, art. 12(1)(2). Even if the proposed public event 
has goals that are counter to the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, 
or defy administrative or criminal bans enacted by the government, the Assemblies Act 
only gives the governing body authority to “immediately give to the promoter of the public 
event a motivated caution in writing to the effect that the promoter and also other 
participants in the public event . . . may be held responsible as appropriate.” Assemblies 
Act, art. 12(2). Nothing in the Act provides for an outright ban on public events, regardless 
of their content or the manner in which they are held. 
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Assemblies Act provided for public safety bans, Alekseyev argued, 
the government failed to prove its case on the other two requirements 
in Article 8 § 2 of the European Convention: that the bans pursue 
legitimate aims and are necessary in a democratic society. 
Alekseyev rejected all three legitimate aims put forward by the 
government to justify the bans. The first, public morals, was rejected 
because “the Government’s definition of ‘morals’ included only 
attitudes that were dominant in public opinion and did not encompass 
the notions of diversity and pluralism.”91 Additional arguments 
pointed out that the proposed activities were actually demonstrations 
in favor of civil liberties—a goal hardly considered morally 
objectionable by most—and that no “immoral” behavior, such as 
nudity or public sexual activity, had been planned for any of the 
events. The Court noted that the Russian government had not shown 
that any concrete harm to persons or society would result from the 
gay pride rallies. Alekseyev argued that, contrary to this notion of 
societal harm, “the events would have been of benefit to Russian 
society by advocating the ideas of tolerance and respect for the rights 
of the lesbian and gay population.”92 
In response to the government’s purported aim of protecting public 
safety and preventing disorder, Alekseyev pointed out that every 
planned march was intended to be peaceful. The government’s 
resistance rested on the assumptions of violence from counter-
demonstrators. However, the Court noted that the government never 
assessed the scale of potential violence between demonstrators and 
counter-demonstrators, which undermined the government’s claim 
that it was unable to provide adequate security for the events.93 While 
the Court does not mention any arguments made by Alekseyev to 
counter the government position that the protection of religious 
freedoms of a majority of its population was a legitimate aim for the 
ban, it does address this claim in its assessment of the case.94 
Finally, Alekseyev disputed the claim that the bans are necessary in 
a democratic society by referencing the Court’s established case law. 
Referring to the 2007 decision in Bączkowski v. Poland, the landmark 
case which found that administrative roadblocks that effectively ban 
gay pride parades can constitute Article 11 violations, the applicant 
 
91 Alekseyev ¶ 65. 
92 Id. (emphasis added). 
93 Id. ¶ 66. The government never submitted reasons why security was not possible at 
any of the rejected venues in the three years that the Court examined (2006–2008). 
94 For discussion on this point, see infra p. 124 and notes 99–100. 
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argued that “the mere possibility of confusing and even shocking part 
of society could not be regarded as a sufficient ground for such a 
sweeping measure as a total ban” on gay pride events.95 Alekseyev 
argued that the values of a democratic society include pluralism, 
tolerance, and broadmindedness, and that bans on gay pride events 
like the ones in question are incompatible with these democratic 
characteristics. In his mind, the government not only discouraged 
participation in a process necessary to a democratic society (freedom 
of assembly), but had also encouraged the negative attitudes 
expressed by counter-demonstrators that the event organizers and 
their goals were immoral. This had the effect of “depriving the 
minority of a lawful right to hold a peaceful demonstration, a right 
that was inherent in a society striving to be democratic.”96 This 
disapproval, and the concurrent violation of democratic aims, led to 
the government’s prohibition on what was essentially a lawful 
demonstration, and to its failure to protect the participants. 
IV 
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT 
The Court immediately noted in its rationale that there is “no 
doubt” that the applicant’s Article 11 rights were interfered with by 
the Russian government; this point was actually conceded by both 
parties. The question the Court was considering was whether or not 
the bans were justified. It wasted no time in finding that there was no 
legitimate justification for the bans enacted by Moscow; 
consequently, the Court easily found that the Russian government had 
committed an unjustified Article 11 violation in banning the pride 
events. Referring back to its decision in Bączkowski, it noted that “the 
only necessity capable of justifying an interference with any of the 
rights enshrined in those Articles is one that may claim to spring from 
a ‘democratic society.’”97 The Court has found in the past that the 
hallmarks of a democratic society, as argued by Alekseyev, are 
pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness.98 In the course of 
pursuing these aims, the Court has allowed the interests of individuals 
 
95 Alekseyev ¶ 67; see also Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, No. 1543/06, ¶ 64 (2007). 
96 Alekseyev ¶ 67. 
97 Bączkowski ¶ 61 (citations omitted). 
98 Id. ¶ 63. The Court put particular emphasis on pluralism, noting: “pluralism is . . . 
built on genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity. . . . The harmonious interaction 
of persons and groups with varied identities is essential for achieving social cohesion.” Id. 
¶ 62 (citations omitted). 
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to be subordinated by those of a group: “[D]emocracy does not 
simply mean that the views of the majority must always prevail: a 
balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment 
of minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position.”99 
A. Public Safety 
The Court then turned to the first of the three “legitimate aims” the 
Russian government claimed, public safety. A large part of the 
government’s evidence to defend this argument rested on the petitions 
presented from those religious and civil organizations that objected to 
the planned pride events.100 In response to this argument, the Court 
referred to its previous case law, noting that Article 11 protects any 
public event that “may annoy or cause offence to persons opposed to 
the ideas or claims that it is seeking to promote.”101 This protection 
imposes an affirmative duty upon governments to take “reasonable 
and appropriate measures to enable lawful demonstrations to proceed 
peacefully.”102 The Court found that the government failed in this 
duty, and that the petitions it presented in support of its public safety 
justification were, at least in part, “irrelevant to safety 
considerations.”103 
Despite this level of discretion, the Court emphasized that the mere 
presence of a risk is insufficient grounds for a ban; the government 
must show assessments of the potential scale of the violence, as well 
as steps taken to mitigate potential violence while still maintaining the 
 
99 Alekseyev ¶ 70 (citations omitted). This appears to be part of a broader argument 
rebutting the Russian government’s position that religious freedom of individuals and 
groups who oppose homosexuality justify the bans. One commentator has noted that the 
implication of this position is that “no matter how dominant a religion is in a society, faith 
should not assume any special status in balancing the protection of the Article 11 rights of 
homosexuals with the rights and freedoms of others.” Johnson, supra note 82, at 589. 
100 The Court pointed out that those petitions were not all of the same ilk. Some merely 
expressed disapproval of the pride events and homosexuality. Others expressed plans to 
demonstrate against the pride parade, and still others explicitly threatened violence if the 
parade was allowed. Alekseyev ¶ 72. 
101 Id. ¶ 73 (citations omitted). 
102 Id. (citations omitted). The first set of petitions presented carried no threats of 
violence or counterdemonstrations, and were thus “irrelevant.” Id. ¶ 74. 
103 Those petitions that carried threats of violence or counter-demonstrations were 
relevant insofar as security arrangements were concerned, an area where governments 
have been given relatively wide latitude. Id. ¶ 75 (“As a general rule, where a serious 
threat of a violent counterdemonstration exists, the Court has a allowed the domestic 
authorities a wide discretion in the choice of means to enable assemblies to take place 
without disturbance.”). 
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rights of its LGBT citizens to demonstrate peacefully.104 In this case, 
the Russian government failed to show any attempts to assess the 
potential violence of counter-demonstrations and create security plans 
to protect the pride parade, opting instead to just ban the event 
outright.105 The Court rejected the government’s argument that the 
violent threats necessitated a ban on the events, noting that if violent 
threats were truly a concern of the Moscow government, it would 
have prosecuted those responsible for making the threats.106 
Furthermore, regardless of the government’s failure to adequately 
assess the risks involved in holding pride events, threats of violence 
should not automatically warrant a complete ban on pride parades: 
“[I]f every probability of tension and heated exchange between 
opposing groups during a demonstration were to warrant its 
prohibition, society would be faced with being deprived of the 
opportunity of hearing differing views on any question which offends 
the sensitivity of the majority opinion.”107 These factors were 
paramount in the Court’s finding that the Russian government’s bans 
were not justified by public safety concerns, but were in fact a 
secondary consideration to the government’s concerns about public 
morals. 
B. Public Morals 
To support its conclusion that the government’s primary concern 
was about public morals, the Court first pointed to the discriminatory 
statements made by government officials, specifically the mayor of 
 
104 Id. 
105 Even if the Muscovite government had done some assessment of the counter-
demonstrations, the Court found that there was only a potential total of about one hundred 
protestors, a number that would hardly overwhelm the security forces of a city the size of 
Moscow. Id. 
106 Again, the Russian government did not make any attempt to take these steps. Id. ¶ 
76. The Court noted that those who threatened violence against the pride participants, 
specifically the Muslim cleric from Nizhniy Novgorod who called for the stoning of 
homosexuals, avoided any culpability: “[I]t does not appear that the authorities in the 
present case reacted to the cleric’s call for violence in any other way than banning the 
event he condemned.” Id. The Court also pointed out that the government’s ban not only 
avoided the issue of violence against LGBT participants, but also encouraged the 
confrontations with those who participated in the pride events: “By relying on such 
blatantly unlawful calls as grounds for the ban, the authorities effectively endorsed the 
intentions of persons and organizations that clearly and deliberately intended to disrupt a 
peaceful demonstration in breach of the law and public order.” Id. 
107 Id. ¶ 77. 
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Moscow.108 In addition to the mayor’s own comments that 
celebrations of gay pride are “inappropriate,” the government argued 
that pride events should be banned on principle, “because propaganda 
promoting homosexuality was incompatible with religious doctrines 
and the moral values of the majority, and could be harmful if seen by 
children or vulnerable adults.”109 The government’s objection on 
morality grounds was, in the Court’s opinion, insufficient grounds for 
banning the events under public law, and was clearly disproportionate 
to either of the aims put forward by Russia.110 
The Court reiterated the importance of freedom of peaceful 
assembly to promoting democratic principles in finding that Article 
11 guarantees apply to all assemblies—except those with violent 
intentions on behalf of the organizers or that deny central tenets of a 
democratic society. Citing a previous decision in Sergey Kuznetsov v. 
Russia, the Court stated that “any measures interfering with the 
freedom of assembly and expression other than in cases of incitement 
to violence or rejection of democratic principles—however shocking 
and unacceptable certain views or words used may appear to the 
authorities—do a disservice to democracy and often even endanger 
it.”111 Ultimately, the Court found that the planned pride events would 
not have risen to the level of controversy that the government claimed 
it would.112 Additionally, the comments of Muscovite officials 
demonstrated that the primary concern was not the behavior of the 
participants, but their open identification as sexual minorities. 
 
108 The Mayor’s comments that those who deviate from “normal principles in 
organizing one’s sexual life” should not publicly display their “deviations,” coupled with 
deputy mayor Shvetsova’s remark that propaganda in favor of LGBT rights could be 
considered “propaganda for immorality,” clearly show that concern for public morals was 
paramount to Moscow’s government. PRIDE AND VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 3. 
109 Alekseyev ¶ 78. 
110 Id. ¶ 79. In fact, during the domestic proceedings, the government relied solely on 
public safety grounds as justification for the ban, while ignoring the public morality 
arguments that it would eventually make before the Court. Id. 
111 Id. ¶ 80 (citing Sergey Kuznetsov v. Russia, No. 10877/04, ¶ 45 (2008)). Underlying 
this point is the concept that conditioning minority rights on acceptance by the majority is 
counter to the foundational principles of the Convention. As the Court points out, if 
minority rights are contingent on majority approval, then minority rights of religion, 
expression, and assembly would be merely theoretical and not practical, as required by the 
European Convention. Alekseyev ¶ 81 (citations omitted). 
112 Both Alekseyev and the government acknowledge that there was no nudity or other 
graphic, obscene activities planned; the government also acknowledged that its 
condemnation of homosexuality was limited to expressions in the public sphere. Id. ¶ 82. 
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C. Margin of Appreciation 
The Court also rejected the government’s margin of appreciation 
argument, which rested on the theory that a lack of consensus in 
Europe on LGBT issues justified its approach to public expressions of 
homosexuality and support of gay rights. This rejection is not entirely 
surprising, given the Court’s recent jurisprudence on the margin of 
appreciation doctrine in the context of LGBT rights.113 The Court 
referred to established case law that reflected a “long-standing 
European consensus” on a variety of matters concerning gay rights: 
decriminalization of consensual homosexual relations between adults, 
military service, and parental rights are just some examples.114 
Regardless of the presence of consensus, it still requires authorities to 
not overstep this margin by acting “arbitrarily.”115 
The presence of general consensus in support of LGBT rights of 
assembly amongst member states led the Court to reject the 
government’s margin of appreciation doctrine. The Court also 
reiterated its position that “any decision restricting the exercise of 
freedom of assembly must be based on an acceptable assessment of 
the relevant facts.”116 Since the only factor that Moscow’s 
government took into account before banning the pride events was 
public opposition and personal views on morals, it failed to meet this 
burden.117 This conclusion, combined with the Court’s rejection of the 
 
113 As one commentator has noted, despite some inconsistencies in application there 
has been a “progressive narrowing” of the margin of appreciation the Court grants states in 
respect to sexual orientation issues since the 1980s. Johnson, supra note 82, at 589. 
Johnson points out that the Court has relied on the presence of European consensus only in 
certain circumstances concerning gay rights. For example, the Court considered Europe’s 
lack of consensus on same-sex marriage in allowing for a wide margin of appreciation in 
E.B. v. France, but did not consider the margin of appreciation doctrine at all in another 
case concerning same-sex adoption. Id. at 589–90. 
114 Alekseyev ¶ 83. Despite this general consensus, there are still some areas where 
Europe is divided on the extent of LGBT liberty (specifically marriage), and the Court has 
generally allowed a wide margin of appreciation to countries on these issues. 
115 Id. The Court emphasized that states’ margin of appreciation “goes hand in hand 
with European supervision.” This supervision defeated the Russian government’s 
argument that the Court was acting as a court of fourth instance. See HARRIS ET AL., supra 
note 81. It also noted that any absence of European consensus was irrelevant in this case 
because there is a fundamental difference between conferring substantive rights on 
homosexuals (such as marriage) and recognizing their right to campaign for those 
substantive rights. No other member states are ambiguous on the right of homosexuals to 
openly identify as such, or prevent homosexuals from exercising rights of free assembly. 
116 Id. ¶ 85. 
117 As the Court took care to note, the mayor of Moscow and his government strived to 
keep homosexuality out of the public sphere based on the notion that homosexuality is a  
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government’s alleged legitimate aims and margin of appreciation 
arguments, led the Court to conclude that the government’s ban on 
LGBT-identified public events “did not correspond to a pressing 
social need and was thus not necessary in a democratic society,” 
thereby violating Alekseyev’s Article 11 rights.118 
D. Other Violations 
While the Article 11 violation was the thrust of this case, the Court 
also found that the government violated Alekseyev’s right to an 
effective remedy under Article 13 of the European Convention, and 
did so with discriminatory purposes, a violation of Article 14.119 
Article 13 was violated because the domestic courts and laws were 
structured to make a successful appeal on a ban effectively 
impossible.120 For a remedy to be effective, there must be the 
 
conscious, anti-social choice. Not only did the government fail to offer any evidence to 
justify this conclusion, but the Court pointed out that “[t]here is no scientific evidence or 
sociological data at the Court’s disposal suggesting that the mere mention of 
homosexuality, or open public debate about sexual minorities’ social status, would 
adversely affect children or ‘vulnerable adults.’” Id. ¶ 86. 
118 Id. ¶¶ 87–88. 
119 Article 13 of the Convention reads: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set 
forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national 
authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an 
official capacity.” European Convention, supra note 49, at art. 13. Article 14, governing 
the prohibition of discrimination, states that “[t]he enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as 
sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” Id. at art. 14. 
120 For the Article 13 claim, Alekseyev argued that he was denied an effective remedy 
for the Article 11 violation because there was no procedure in place to guarantee him a 
final decision before the planned date of the march. The government countered this 
argument by pointing to available judicial remedies, some of which Alekseyev did not 
attempt to pursue. Alekseyev ¶¶ 90, 92. The government also argued that the event 
organizers waited too long before filing court and administrative challenges, casting doubt 
on Alekseyev’s argument that a judicial remedy would not have been provided before the 
planned date of the events. Alekseyev responded by saying that he had filed the appeals as 
soon as he received the full text of the judgment; furthermore, he claimed that due to the 
notice provisions in the Assemblies Act and the sections of the Code of Civil Procedure 
concerning the entry of judgments into force, any first-instance judgments or appeals 
would necessarily become final only after the planned date of the events. Article 7(1) of 
the Assemblies Act holds that notices of public events must be submitted to the governing 
body “within the period not earlier than fifteen and not later than ten days prior to the 
holding of the public event.” Notices for pickets must be submitted no later than three days 
of the event. Assemblies Act at art. 7(1). For example, the events planned for May 27, 
2006, were banned by the first-instance court on May 26. There was no possible way to 
seek redress in a manner that would allow the events to proceed the following day. Any 
judicial decision overturning the ban would have been retrospective and, consequentially, 
futile towards remedying the damage of the ban. The Court sided with Alekseyev, relying  
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possibility of obtaining a ruling before the planned time of the event 
in question: “It is . . . important for the effective enjoyment of 
freedom of assembly that the applicable laws provide for reasonable 
time-limits within which the State authorities . . . should act.”121 The 
Court easily found an Article 14 violation, referring to government 
officials’ own statements as evidence that bias was the driving force 
behind the bans.122 Because the Court had previously found that the 
main reason for the ban was government disapproval of public events 
aimed at promoting homosexuality, and because it found an 
undeniable link between officials’ discriminatory statements and the 
ban, it concluded that there had been unjustified discrimination 
against Alekseyev in the violation of his Article 11 right.123 
Ultimately, the Court found that Russia had violated all three of the 
Articles in question by illegally denying the right of Alekseyev to 
exercise his freedom of assembly, based on discriminatory purposes, 
and by not providing him with a timely, effective remedy.124 
 
on the idea that “the timing of public events is crucial for the organisers and participants.” 
Alekseyev ¶ 98. As mentioned in Part II, supra p. 102, Alekseyev and Gay Russia 
specifically scheduled pride for May 27 in order to mark the anniversary of the 
decriminalization of homosexuality in the Russian Federation. 
121 Alekseyev ¶ 98. 
122 Relying on Article 14 in conjunction with Article 11, Alekseyev alleged that the 
government violated his Article 11 rights because of his sexual orientation, saying that it 
was clear that the real reason for the ban was official disapproval of his moral standing. Id. 
¶¶ 101, 105. Sexual orientation is covered under Article 14, as the Court found in Kozak v. 
Poland in 2010. “Furthermore,” the Court wrote in that opinion, “when the distinction in 
question operates in this intimate and vulnerable sphere of an individual’s private life, 
particularly weighty reasons need to be advanced before the Court to justify the measure 
complained of.” Kozak v. Poland, No. 13102/02, ¶ 92 (2010). The margin of appreciation 
afforded to states in the context of sexual orientation is narrow, and the principle of 
proportionality “does not merely require the measure chosen to be suitable in general for 
realising the aim sought; it must also be shown that it was necessary in the circumstances.” 
Alekseyev ¶ 108. As found by the Court and reiterated by the Council of Europe’s 
Parliamentary Assembly, “a difference in treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective 
and reasonable justification.” Resolution 1728, supra note 65, § 2. The government denied 
Alekseyev’s allegations, arguing that there was no discriminatory intent behind the ban. 
The government acknowledged the “existence” of sexual minorities and the necessity of 
addressing discrimination against LGBT Russians; however, it argued that “in view of 
their antagonistic relations with religious groups, it could prove necessary to place 
restrictions on the exercise of their rights.” Alekseyev ¶ 104. 
123 The Court also determined that the government had not provided any justification 
showing that the impugned distinction was compatible with Convention standards. Id. ¶ 
109. 
124 The decision was issued October 21, 2010, and referred to the Grand Chamber of 
the European Court of Human Rights. The Grand Chamber rejected the referral request on 
April 11, 2011, thereby making the Court’s decision final. Press Release, European Court  
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Alekseyev requested €40,000 in non-pecuniary damages and 
approximately €17,500 in legal fees before both domestic courts and 
the European Court. The Court awarded Alekseyev the full amount of 
legal fees and €12,000 in damages, resulting in a €29,500 fine for the 
Russian government. While the government is expected to pay the 
fine, whether or not this case will have an impact on Russia’s 
approach to LGBT rights, especially Article 11 rights, is yet to be 
seen, though recent developments have not been promising.125 
V 
IMPLICATIONS 
There are three main issues to consider when assessing the 
implications of Alekseyev for Russia and for sexual minorities who 
are denied their rights under the European Convention. First, the 
ruling reinforces the strength of LGBT freedom of assembly in 
Europe. Second, the Court’s decision represents a broadening 
understanding of gay rights in Europe. And third, the decision 
highlights the Russian government’s contracting stance towards 
recognition of homosexuality and protection of LGBT rights. These 
three variables lead to the conclusion that while the Russian state may 
continue to restrict LGBT rights, especially those involving public 
assembly, the European Court is ready to defend the rights of sexual 
minorities in Russia, with the strong support of the Council of Europe 
and other European institutions. 
A. LGBT Freedom of Assembly in Europe 
The primary effect of Alekseyev is its explicit recognition of a 
human right to public assembly and association for sexual minorities. 
This stance is a continuation of the court’s decision in Bączkowski, 
called the “most explicit statement on the obligation of states toward 
LGBT assemblies.”126 Explicit acknowledgement of sexual minority 
rights is especially important since the Convention does not mention 
 
of Human Rights, Court’s Judgment Concerning Repeated Unjustified Ban on Gay-Rights 
Marches in Moscow is Now Final (Apr. 15, 2011), available at http://www.echr.coe.int 
/echr/en/header/press/links/archived+news/archivesnews_2011.htm. 
125 Member states are required under the European Convention to comply with the 
decisions of the Court. See European Convention, supra note 49, at art. 46(1) (“Binding 
Force and Execution of Judgments.”). 
126 Holzhacker, supra note 60, at 18. Bączkowski is a case that “demonstrate[s] the 
Court’s heightened awareness of the unacceptability of discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation and its greater readiness to scrutinize cases coming before it in this 
regard.” HARRIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 598. 
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sexual orientation or gender identity as grounds of discrimination 
prohibited under Article 14 or Protocol No. 12.127 The decision in 
Alekseyev reinforces the notion that the Court is ready, willing, and 
able to scrutinize cases of sexual orientation discrimination.  
Additionally, Alekseyev gives judicial effect to the Committee of 
Ministers’ Recommendation on Discrimination.128 Incorporating this 
recommendation into the Court’s jurisprudence will only strengthen 
the position of LGBT persons claiming Article 11 violations under the 
European Convention. 
B. Pride in Europe 
The second notable aspect of the Alekseyev decision is its reflection 
of a growing understanding of LGBT rights in Europe, specifically 
the right of assembly. A 2011 report released by the Council of 
Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights noted that pride parades 
and other LGBT “cultural events” take place without problems in 
most member states.129 Despite this widening recognition, pride 
participants in Eastern Europe face a higher risk of government 
prohibition and assault than in most countries in Western Europe. At 
least twelve member states have banned or created administrative 
impediments for pride or other cultural LGBT events, including 
Poland, Turkey, Ukraine, Lithuania, and, of course, the Russian 
Federation.130 Aside from Russia, violence has been threatened or has 
 
127 See European Convention, supra note 49, at art. 14; Protocol No. 12 to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1.1 
(2000). Despite the absence of sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination, 
the European Court of Human Rights has recognized that Article 14 covers sexual 
orientation, and it is mentioned in the explanatory report to Protocol No. 12. Holzhacker, 
supra note 60, at 19. 
128 Paul Johnson, Russian Ban on Homosexual Propaganda Violates Human Rights, 
JURIST (Dec. 1, 2011, 8:12 AM), http://jurist.org/hotline/2011/12/paul-johnson-russia-lgbt 
.php. As discussed in Part III, the Recommendation on Discrimination is a comprehensive 
approach to conferring affirmative obligations on states to protect sexual minorities from 
discrimination, with a number of provisions aimed specifically at protecting freedom of 
expression and peaceful assembly. 
129 Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Europe, supra note 54, at 73. In July 2010, 
EuroPride in Warsaw became the first European-wide gay pride event held in Eastern 
Europe, drawing an estimated 8000 participants—a fitting transformation for the city 
where the Bączkowski case was born. Kamil Tchorek, Warsaw’s Gay Pride Reveals the 
Face of Modern Poland, GUARDIAN (July 19, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk 
/commentisfree/2010/jul/19/poland-gay-pride-warsaw. 
130 Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Europe, supra note 54, at 73–74. Another case 
concerning gay pride bans in Moldova is currently pending before the European Court of  
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erupted at gay pride events in Latvia, Hungary, Serbia, and Georgia; 
the Council of Europe has also documented violent attacks on pride 
parades in no less than fifteen member states, from Sweden to 
Ukraine, since 2004.131 
C. Restrictions on LGBT Freedom in Russia 
Even though the Court found multiple violations of Alekseyev’s 
rights and fined the Russian government, LGBT Russians still 
struggle to have their voice heard without government interference or 
prohibition. Despite active gay communities in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, the U.S. State Department has noted that “[s]ocietal 
animosity toward gays remain[s] strong.”132 In June 2011, the 
European Parliament adopted a resolution at the EU-Russia Summit 
in Nizhny Novgorod that explicitly voiced disapproval for the 
 
Human Rights. See Genderdoc-M v. Moldova, No. 9106/06 (2008), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-111394. 
131 The Long March: Gay Rights in Eastern Europe, ECONOMIST (Oct. 26, 2010), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2010/10/gay_rights_eastern_europe. 
The Economist notes that attacks on gay pride events in Eastern Europe “are part of a 
broader trend that has seen politics lurch to the right across the continent in recent years.” 
Id. See also Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Europe, supra note 54, at 75. Violence 
at pride parades is still very much a concern in a number of Eastern European countries; at 
the 2010 Pride parade in Belgrade, Serbia, riots erupted when anti-gay demonstrators 
clashed with police, resulting in over 140 injuries. Serbia Riots Leave Scores Injured, AL 
JAZEERA (Oct. 11, 2010), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe /2010/10/20101010154 
66495888.html. In 2011, approximately 10,000 anti-gay demonstrators attacked about 200 
LGBT activists and allies in Split, Croatia. Croatia: Don’t Force Change in Pride March 
Route, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 31, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/31 
/croatia-don-t-force-change-pride-march-route. Ukrainian gay rights activists cancelled the 
planned 2012 pride parade after threats of violence from anti-gay demonstrators, as well as 
assaults on activists themselves. Ukraine: Investigate Brutal Attack on Gay Activist, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 26, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/26/ukraine    
-investigate-brutal-attack-gay-activist. 
132 U.S. STATE DEP’T, 2010 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: 
RUSSIA (Apr. 8, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160474 
.pdf [hereinafter STATE DEP’T REPORT]. The report cites a number of hate crimes against 
gays in Russia over the past few years, focused largely around public pride events, 
including the kidnapping of Alekseyev by Muscovite security personnel. One gay 
Muscovite who recently obtained asylum in the United States because of sexuality-based 
persecution faced in Russia spoke with The Moscow Times about how difficult it was to be 
a known homosexual in Russia: “I participated in a nonsanctioned gay-pride parade at 
Vorobyovy Gory . . . It was ruthlessly suppressed. Participants were arrested. Those who 
were not arrested, myself included, were left bleeding, bruised and swollen.” Nikola 
Krastev, Why a Gay Muscovite Sought, and Won, U.S. Asylum, MOSCOW TIMES (Aug. 15, 
2012), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/why-a-gay-muscovite-sought-and    
-won-us-asylum/466605.html. 
2012] We’re Here, We’re Queer, Get Used to It: 505 
Freedom of Assembly and Gay Pride in Alekseyev v. Russia 
continuing ban on gay pride parades in spite of the Court’s ruling, 
saying that the Parliament: 
Regrets that, contrary to Russia’s obligations as a member of the 
Council of Europe to uphold freedom of assembly, peaceful 
citizens’ gatherings continue to be banned and violently dispersed, 
including a gay pride march in Moscow for the sixth consecutive 
year, disregarding a final ruling made in April 2011 by the 
European Court of Human Rights.133 
Regardless of the Parliament’s position, Russia (and particularly 
Moscow) has continued to restrict LGBT assemblies, as well as other 
rights. The Moscow government has refused to recognize the 
substance of the Court’s ruling in Alekseyev and continues to ban gay 
pride parades; in fact, the most recent attempt to hold a gay pride 
demonstration—in May 2012—ended in the arrest of about forty 
demonstrators from both sides, including Alekseyev.134 After Mayor 
Luzhkov was removed from his post by then-President Dmitri 
Medvedev in late 2010, gay rights activists had hoped that the new 
mayor, Sergei Sobyanin, would take a softer line on pride parades 
than his predecessor.135 However, Mayor Sobyanin explicitly stated in 
November 2011 that he would not allow gay pride parades to be held 
in Moscow, because Muscovites would oppose the event and their 
opinion “had to be ‘respected.’”136 Other government officials have 
been more vehement in their opposition to gay pride events. In 
response to attempts to organize a pride march, the governor of the 
 
133 European Parliament Resolution of 9 June 2011 on the EU-Russia Summit (June 9, 
2011), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA 
-2011-0268+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN [hereinafter EU-Russia Resolution]. 
See also Intergroup on LGBT Rights, European Parliament Calls on Russia to Authorise 
Gay Prides (June 9, 2011), http://www.lgbt-ep.eu/parliamentary-work/european                 
-parliament-calls-on-russia-to-authorise-gay-prides/. 
134 Alexander Tikhomirov, Moscow Gay Pride Protests Blocked by Russia Police, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 27, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/27/moscow  
-gay-pride-protests_n_1548992.html#s=1026401. 
135 See Simon Shuster, Moscow’s Mayor Fired: A Win—and a Risky Move—for 
Medvedev, TIME (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2022 
106,00.html. 
136 Moscow Mayor Pledges No Gay Pride Parades on His Watch, RIA NOVOSTI (Nov. 
24, 2011), http://en.ria.ru/society/20111124/169012089.html. While Sobyanin initially 
approved the event in late 2010, he reversed course in early 2011 and Moscow Pride was 
once again banned. See Ben Aris, New Moscow Mayor Says Yes to Protest, TELEGRAPH 
(Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/society/8177000/New     
-Moscow-mayor-says-yes-to-protest.html. 
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Tambov Region responded: “Tolerance?! Like Hell! Faggots should 
be torn apart. And their pieces should be thrown in the wind.”137 
The freedom of assembly is not the only right that has been 
restricted in the context of LGBT Russians in recent years. There has 
been significant attention to a new law in St. Petersburg purporting to 
prevent “homosexual propaganda,” which has largely been seen as an 
attempt to stifle gay expression. The law penalizes “public actions 
directed at the propaganda of sodomy, lesbianism, bisexuality and 
transgenderism among minors” with fines of up to USD 17,000, and 
defines homosexual propaganda as “the targeted and uncontrolled 
dissemination of generally accessible information capable of harming 
the health and moral and spiritual development of minors.”138 Aside 
from the well-known instances of LGBT discrimination in Russia, the 
U.S. State Department noted more common occurrences of 
discrimination in its annual human rights report: 
[T]he majority of gays hide their orientation due to fear of losing 
their jobs or their homes, as well as the threat of violence. . . . 
Medical practitioners . . . limit or deny gay and lesbian persons 
health services due to intolerance and prejudice. According to 
recent studies, gay men faced discrimination in workplace hiring 
practices. Openly gay men were targets for skinhead aggression; 
police often failed to respond out of indifference.139 
Additionally, LGBT Russians who attempt to use the European Court 
of Human Rights face potential harassment: “Amnesty International 
and other human rights groups reported past reprisals against 
applicants to the court, including killings, disappearances, and 
intimidation. According to press reports and human rights NGOs, as 
of September 2009 at least six applicants to the ECHR had been killed 
or abducted.”140 
 
137 Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Europe, supra note 54, at 57. 
138 Michael Schwirtz, Anti-Gay Law Stirs Fear in Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2012, at 
A14. 
139 STATE DEP’T REPORT, supra note 132, at 83. For additional information on hate 
crimes against sexual minorities in Russia, see Russian LGBT Network, Discrimination 
and Violence Against Lesbian and Bisexual Women and Transgender People in Russia, 8–
9 (Shadow Report submitted for the 46th CEDAW Session) (July 12–30, 2010), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/ngos/LGBTNetwork_RussianFedera 
tion46.pdf. 
140 STATE DEP’T REPORT, supra note 132, at 21. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the Court’s decision will likely have little impact on 
local and regional governments, as evidenced by the actions in 
Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Krasnodar. However, Alekseyev is an 
important case within the broader context of LGBT human rights. It 
marks the first decision on gay rights in Russia from the European 
Court of Human Rights, continues the tradition of European 
recognition of LGBT rights to assembly and association that was 
started in Bączkowski, and explicitly finds a human right to assembly 
for sexual minorities attempting to express this right through gay 
pride events. Although the Russian Federation’s actions since the 
Court’s decision was finalized have demonstrated its unwillingness to 
recognize the rights of LGBT Russians to publicly express 
themselves, this decision strengthens the Court’s jurisprudence on gay 
rights, giving Russian activists a stronger platform from which to 
fight the government’s continued violations. In the meantime, Nikolai 
Alekseyev continues to fight for LGBT rights, defying Russian 
authorities with bold, public expressions of support for equality: “I 
don’t want to wait any more for my freedoms or civil rights as a gay 
man.”141 
 
  
 
141 Aris, supra note 136. 

